Over the next three weeks, we will hold a series of talks at the Serious Metaphysics Group that are likely to be of interest to a wide audience.
Next Thursday (the 29th) Gábor Betegh from the Faculty of Classics will be speaking on `Colocation' (abstract below). Then, on the following two weeks, we have two visiting speakers: on the 5th of February, John Heil (Washington University) will speak on 'Causal Relations', and on the 12th, Jossi Berkovitz (University of Toronto) will give a talk titled 'A New Interpretation of De Finetti's Theory of Subjective Probability'. All the talks will be held from 1:00 - 2:30 on Thursdays, in the Graduate Common Room in the Philosophy Faculty. Hope to see you there, Georgie Colocation In this paper, I present a historical overview and analysis of the different arguments offered to justify the commonly shared intuition that two bodies cannot be in the same place at the same time. After highlighting the most important relevant texts from Descartes, Locke, and Leibniz, I turn back to Antiquity and analyse in more detail the origins of these arguments. Ultimately, I will argue that the question of what can and what cannot be at the same place at the same time constituted a crucial motivation for distinguishing between different ontological realms. -- Georgie Statham PhD Candidate Faculty of Philosophy University of Cambridge _____________________________________________________ To unsubscribe from the CamPhilEvents mailing list, or change your membership options, please visit the list information page: http://bit.ly/CamPhilEvents List archive: http://bit.ly/CamPhilEventsArchive Please note that CamPhilEvents doesn't accept email attachments. See the list information page for further details and suggested alternatives.
