Dear All, The Early Career Philosophy Group is meeting again on Friday at 4pm in the Philosophy Boardroom. This time, Ori Beck will be presenting on whether illusions are experiences (abstract below).
If you’re interested in presenting later in the term, please let me know! All the best, Bernhard Abstract: When we were little, our teachers told us that there are three types of sensory experiences: perceptions, illusions and hallucinations. Any sensory experience must belong to one of these three types, and no sensory experience can belong to two of them. So on the received view of sensory experiences, perceptions, illusions and hallucinations are the three distinct species of the sensory experience genus. Call this received view the “3-Kinds” view. I argue that the 3-Kinds view is false. More particularly, I argue that though perceptions and hallucinations are distinct species of a single genus, illusions fall into a different genus altogether. In arguing for this, I construct an alternative view on the nature of illusions, and of our sensory states more generally. This alternative has the benefit of allowing us to dissipate much of the disagreement between representationalist and naive-realist accounts of sensory experience. _____________________________________________________ To unsubscribe from the CamPhilEvents mailing list, or change your membership options, please visit the list information page: http://bit.ly/CamPhilEvents List archive: http://bit.ly/CamPhilEventsArchive Please note that CamPhilEvents doesn't accept email attachments. See the list information page for further details and suggested alternatives.
