Dear all, David Pitt (California State University) will be speaking at the next meeting of the Moral Sciences Club with a talk entitled "Objects and Their Phases". The abstract for this talk is below:
*There are four central questions that can be asked concerning the relation of a material object to the matter it’s made of: (1) Which matter is it made of? (2) Is it identical to the matter it’s made of? (3) Can it be made of different matter at different times? (4) Could it have been made of different matter than it is in fact made of at a given time?* *I begin with question (2), as it is raised by the puzzle of the statue and the lump. I argue that the relation of the statue to the lump (at a time) is the same as the relation between an ice cube and the water it’s made of (at a time), or a paper airplane and the paper it’s made of (at a time), or a fist and the hand it’s “made of” (at a time). The ice cube is the water it’s made of in a particular state (i.e., frozen); the paper airplane is the paper it’s made of folded in a particular way, the first is a hand clenched in a certain way. States of matter (solid, liquid, gas, plasma) are called “phases” by physicists. I suggest that the statue (the ice, the airplane, the hand) is a phase of the lump (the water, the paper, the hand) – that is, the lump in a particular state (with a particular property). ‘Statue’ is a phase sortal. There are also phase nominals, such as ‘Goliath’ and Lumpl’. The statue is not identical to the lump, but they are not distinct physical objects in any worrisome sense: they’re not (what physics seems to disallow) distinct quantities of matter located in the same place at the same time.* *The fact that the statue can be destroyed without destroying the lump is just the fact that the clay can be made to lose the property (the shape) that’s part of what we refer to when we use the phase sortal ‘statue’ without ceasing to be a lump (just as the water can be made to lose the property that’s part of what we refer to when we use the phase sortal ‘ice’). This no more implies that there are distinct physical objects in the same place at the same time than does the fact that a red, round thing can lose its color without losing its shape: a red thing is not, per se, a round thing, and vice versa; and red things and round things may be physical objects; but it doesn’t follow that wherever there’s coinstantiation of redness and roundness there are distinct physical objects.* *I also show that puzzles of constitution can arise for mereological simples (as well as for gunk), and, hence, that the problem of constitution is not the same as the problem of composition (and for relational properties as well as intrinsic ones). However, I argue that this account can be used to resolve controversies (e.g., Nihilism vs Universalism) concerning material composition.* *Finally, I may have a few (sketchy) things to say about how this account might be applied to Tibbles/Tib-type cases, as well to the puzzles that raise questions (3) and (4).* This meeting will be held on Tuesday the 10th May from 2.30 until 4.15 in Sidgwick Hall in Newnham College. The meeting will be followed by tea and coffee in the philosophy faculty. For those who have not yet paid, there is a yearly membership fee of £7.50 for students and £15 for others (alternatively, students can pay a one-off fee for the meeting of £2 and others can pay a one-off fee of £3). These fees can be paid online (at the following link: *http://onlinesales.admin.cam.ac.uk/browse/extra_info.asp?compid=1&modid=1&catid=75&prodvarid=87 <http://onlinesales.admin.cam.ac.uk/browse/extra_info.asp?compid=1&modid=1&catid=75&prodvarid=87>*) or in cash on the day. We look forward to seeing many of you there. Best wishes, Adam Bales and Daisy Dixon -- Daisy Dixon and Adam Bales Secretaries of the Moral Sciences Club Faculty of Philosophy University of Cambridge [email protected] http://www.phil.cam.ac.uk/seminars-phil/seminars-msc _____________________________________________________ To unsubscribe from the CamPhilEvents mailing list, or change your membership options, please visit the list information page: http://bit.ly/CamPhilEvents List archive: http://bit.ly/CamPhilEventsArchive Please note that CamPhilEvents doesn't accept email attachments. See the list information page for further details and suggested alternatives.
