Dear all, This coming Wednesday our own Hugh Mellor (Queens College) will be giving a paper entitled “Chances and Conditionals” at the Serious Metaphysics Group (abstract below).
The seminar will take place at the Philosophy faculty Board Room from 4.30 to 6.00pm. The talk should last about 45 minutes followed by questions and discussion. Hope to see you there, Carlo Abstract: In his projected book, 'Most Counterfactuals Are False', Alan Hájek infers the truth of its title from the ubiquity of chance. I argue in this talk that he's wrong: the ubiquity of chance doesn't verify his title. Chances are perfectly compatible with determinism, I.e. with the existence of ‘hidden variables', and hence with the relevant counterfactuals. They don’t even stop us knowing which counterfactuals are safe (i.e. truth-preserving) when there are hidden variables, and often when there aren’t. _____________________________________________________ To unsubscribe from the CamPhilEvents mailing list, or change your membership options, please visit the list information page: http://bit.ly/CamPhilEvents List archive: http://bit.ly/CamPhilEventsArchive Please note that CamPhilEvents doesn't accept email attachments. See the list information page for further details and suggested alternatives.
