Dear all,

A reminder that today Matt Farr (Cambridge HPS) will be giving a paper 
entitled “Explaining Temporal Qualia” for the last Serious Metaphysics 
Group meeting of the term (abstract and link to the paper below).

The seminar will take place at the Philosophy Faculty Board Room from 
4.30 to 6.00pm. The talk should last about 45 minutes followed by 
questions and discussion.

Hope to see you there,
Carlo


Abstract.
Does time pass? A-theorists of time say it does; B-theorists disagree. 
However both sides of the time debate generally agree that it at least 
appears to us as though time passes, with B-theorists standardly taking 
the passage of time to be some kind of cognitive illusion. This paper 
rejects the idea that temporal passage forms part of our conscious 
representation of the world. I consider a range of explanatory 
strategies for the aspects of our temporal experience generally taken to 
be passage-like—which I term 'temporal qualia'—, and defend a 
reductionist account, according to which our temporal qualia are nothing 
more than our generally veridical experience of change, motion, 
succession, and other such features of the world well-studied by 
empirical psychology. As such, I argue that our experience of time is 
neither illusory nor corresponds to temporal passage, and show that 
reductionism about temporal qualia is both continuous with and well 
supported by empirical work on time perception.

Link to paper.
http://www.mattfarr.co.uk/files/theme/etq.pdf

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