Dear all,

This coming Wednesday Dorothy Edgington (Birkbeck) will be giving a 
paper entitled “Indeterminacy and Conditionals” (abstract below) at the 
Serious Metaphysics Group.

As usual, the seminar will run from 4.30 to 6.00pm in the Philosophy 
Faculty Board Room.

Hope to see you there,


Many conditionals with false antecedents seem to have no determinate 
truth value, and yet they can be assigned probabilities or judged to be 
probable or improbable, e.g. 'If you had picked a red ball it would have 
had a black spot' (when 90% of the red balls have black spots); 'If I 
had approached, the dog would have attacked'; 'If you had had the 
operation, you would have been cured'. I defend a way of treating this 
indeterminacy, which can also be applied to vague statements, and show 
that it is compatible with the conditionals having truth conditions, 
although it is often indeterminate what their truth value is. The truth 
conditions are due to a construction by Richard Bradley, who, with an 
adaption of Stalnaker's semantics, shows how assessing conditionals by 
conditional probability is not after all incompatible with their having 
truth conditions.

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