Dear all,

The fifth meeting of this term's Cambridge Mind Seminar will be on Tuesday 12 
June at 11am. Umrao Sethi (CUNY) will present a paper. 

The Cambridge Mind Seminar is an advanced philosophy of mind seminar with short 
talks by local and not-so-local people, followed by discussion.

Meetings take place on Tuesdays from 11:00-13:00. Location: Angevin Room, 
Queens’ College. Refreshments will be provided. 

Sensible Individuation
Umrao Sethi (CUNY)
12 June, 11:00 (Angevin Room, Queens’ College)

Abstract: In this talk, I consider the question of how to individuate property 
instances, with an eye to solving some central problems in the philosophy of 
perception. The argument from hallucination has led most philosophers to 
conclude that if we offer a sense-datum analysis of delusive perceptions, we 
are forced to say that in all cases, perception only makes us aware of 
mind-dependent entities. To the contrary, I argue that once we have the right 
view of property-instance individuation, the argument from hallucination poses 
no threat to a naive view of ordinary perception, according to which perception 
makes us aware of mind-independent objects and their properties. 

Cambridge Mind Seminar
Easter 2018 Schedule

• 1 May: Henry Shevlin (CFI, Downing College)
• 8 May: Solveig Aasen (Oslo)
• 15 May: Neil Barton (Vienna)
• 22 May: No meeting
• 29 May: No meeting
• 5 June: Anastasia Berg (Corpus Christi) [Angevin Room, Queens’ College]
• 12 June: Umrao Sethi (CUNY) [Angevin Room, Queens’ College]
• 19 June: Sophie Archer (Keble College, Oxford) [Angevin Room, Queens’ College]

_______________________

Dr Maarten Steenhagen
Lecturer and Director of Studies
Faculty of Philosophy / Queens’ College
University of Cambridge 
_____________________________________________________
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