ID: 37874 Comment by: judas dot iscariote at gmail dot com Reported By: Harry dot Boeck at t-online dot de Status: Open Bug Type: Documentation problem Operating System: all PHP Version: Irrelevant Assigned To: colder New Comment:
in my latest comment I really mean "even **without** allow_url_fopen enabled" Previous Comments: ------------------------------------------------------------------------ [2006-06-23 04:22:28] judas dot iscariote at gmail dot com your latest comment have nothing to do with allow_url_fopen..looks like that is a combination of a MOS bug with the GLOBALS overwrite issue detected by Steffan Esser some time ago.. adittionally buggy code like include $_GET['page'] can be exploited even with allow_url_fopen , to read local files, or arbitrary code execution tricking the php://input wrapper ( that do not obey allow_url_fopen at all) I think this last point,and the NULL byte attack should be mentioned in the security docs too.. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ [2006-06-22 15:13:24] Harry dot Boeck at t-online dot de Well, when i look at the intrusion attempts on my server, for example (cut off from the log): req:"GET /index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=1index2.php?_REQUEST[option]=com_content&_REQUEST[Itemid]=1&GLOBALS=&mosConfig_absolute_path=... req:"GET /index.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=1index2.php?_REQUEST[option]=com_content&_REQUEST[Itemid]=1&GLOBALS=&mosConfig_absolute_path=... req:"GET /mambo/index2.php?_REQUEST[option]=com_content&_REQUEST[Itemid]=1&GLOBALS=&mosConfig_absolute_path=... req:"GET /Mambo/index2.php?_REQUEST[option]=com_content&_REQUEST[Itemid]=1&GLOBALS=&mosConfig_absolute_path=... req:"GET /news/index2.php?_REQUEST[option]=com_content&_REQUEST[Itemid]=1&GLOBALS=&mosConfig_absolute_path=... req:"GET /home/index2.php?_REQUEST[option]=com_content&_REQUEST[Itemid]=1&GLOBALS=&mosConfig_absolute_path=... req:"GET /cvs/index2.php?_REQUEST[option]=com_content&_REQUEST[Itemid]=1&GLOBALS=&mosConfig_absolute_path=... req:"GET /index.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=1index.php?_REQUEST[option]=com_content&_REQUEST[Itemid]=1&GLOBALS=&mosConfig_absolute_path=... req:"GET /mambo/index.php?_REQUEST[option]=com_content&_REQUEST[Itemid]=1&GLOBALS=&mosConfig_absolute_path=... req:"GET /Mambo/index.php?_REQUEST[option]=com_content&_REQUEST[Itemid]=1&GLOBALS=&mosConfig_absolute_path=... req:"GET /news/index.php?_REQUEST[option]=com_content&_REQUEST[Itemid]=1&GLOBALS=&mosConfig_absolute_path=... req:"GET /home/index.php?_REQUEST[option]=com_content&_REQUEST[Itemid]=1&GLOBALS=&mosConfig_absolute_path=... req:"GET /cvs/index.php?_REQUEST[option]=com_content&_REQUEST[Itemid]=1&GLOBALS=&mosConfig_absolute_path=... then it seems that there are at least _a_few_ people out there not being able to read the "pretty well" documentation while being able to program wide spread public programs versus being able to setup servers. They are, of course, only extremely rare exceptions! OK, i have done all i could to help those guys. If it shouldn't be, then i will let it be. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ [2006-06-22 14:56:15] [EMAIL PROTECTED] It seems that this manual page[1] needs some fixes and is not really up to date. I'll also add something about the "include security hole". [1] http://php.net/security.filesystem ------------------------------------------------------------------------ [2006-06-22 14:15:12] [EMAIL PROTECTED] There is already: http://php.net/security.filesystem http://php.net/security.variables So I really can't think about a possible improvement. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ [2006-06-22 14:10:25] [EMAIL PROTECTED] What are you talking about when speaking about "bypassing any restriction" ? Quite every configuration directive is documented in the manual. Any capable host is able to read the doc, expressing pretty well what the role of allow_url_fopen is: http://php.net/manual/en/ini.php . Remember, allow_url_fopen is a completely secure feature unless _you_ screw it. Would you also like having a warning "including tainted client data in the argument is dangerous" in about each filesystem functions, like unlink() ? If I understand you correctly, you want to have a warning somewhere about the danger of using code like include $_GET['page']; ? This security hole is not only related to allow_url_fopen, requesting page.php?page=/path/to/secret_file is posible even with allow_url_fopen disabled. The documentation about allow_url_fopen is fine. But maybe a security paragraph like http://php.net/session#session.security would be useful. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ The remainder of the comments for this report are too long. To view the rest of the comments, please view the bug report online at http://bugs.php.net/37874 -- Edit this bug report at http://bugs.php.net/?id=37874&edit=1
