Hi Paul, hi Markus,
On Fri, Oct 14, 2016 at 08:42:11AM +1100, paul.sz...@sydney.edu.au wrote:
> Dear Markus,
> >> [ I contacted t...@security.debian.org about this, but no response ... ]
> > ... Please send them to the security team
> > first and not to a public mailing list.
> I did. They did not reply within what seemed a reasonable timeframe.
To be fair one could say, the initial mail was on 'Thu Oct 13 01:38:41
UTC 2016' and the bugreport on 'Thu Oct 13 20:22:50 UTC 2016'. But
thanks for reporting (appreciated!) and it's maybe anyway better to
have it tracked in the BTS in this case:
> >> Recently DSA-3670 was released, and /etc/init.d/tomcat8 modified so...
> > No, we did not modify this part in /etc/init.d/tomcat8. ...
> Whoops, sorry, you are right. Now checking, I do not see how I got
> confused. This is a separate, maybe new issue.
Yes, I think, that should be considered a different issue. Please not
that in your attack vector, though if the attacher created a symlink
between the rm and the mkdir then mkdir will still fail with -p on a
symlink. (Or do I miss something?). So the attacker would need to do
it two-staged, first a directory, which will pass the mkdir -p
successfully, then replace the directory with a symlink which will be
On the practicality for Debian systems though this is mitigated by the
Kernel hardenings which are enabled by default:
which will prevent that the target of the symlink in /tmp will be
changed on the chown call.
So while I think it should be fixed, this would not warrant a DSA,
since mitigated by default in Debian.
This is the maintainer address of Debian's Java team
debian-j...@lists.debian.org for discussions and questions.