I have just published a new requirements draft. -----Original Message----- From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: Thursday, August 23, 2012 3:37 PM To: Trevor Freeman Cc: [email protected]; [email protected] Subject: New Version Notification for draft-freeman-plasma-requirements-03.txt
A new version of I-D, draft-freeman-plasma-requirements-03.txt has been successfully submitted by Trevor Freeman and posted to the IETF repository. Filename: draft-freeman-plasma-requirements Revision: 03 Title: Requirements for Message Access Control Creation date: 2012-08-23 WG ID: Individual Submission Number of pages: 59 URL: http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-freeman-plasma-requirements-03.txt Status: http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-freeman-plasma-requirements Htmlized: http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-freeman-plasma-requirements-03 Diff: http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-freeman-plasma-requirements-03 Abstract: There are many situations where organizations want to protect information with robust access control, either for implementation of intellectual property right protections, enforcement of contractual confidentiality agreements or because of legal regulations. The Enhanced Security Services (ESS) for S/MIME defines an access control mechanism which is enforced by the recipient's client after decryption of the message. The ESS mechanism therefore is dependent on the correct access policy configuration of every recipient's client. This mechanism also provides full access to the data to all recipients prior to the access control check, this is considered to be inadequate due to the difficulty in demonstrating policy compliance. This document lays out the deficiencies of the current ESS security label, and presents requirements for a new model for doing/providing access control to messages where the access check is performed prior to message content decryption. This new model also does not require policy configuration on the client to simplify deployment and compliance verification. The proposed model additionally provides a method where non-X.509 certificate credentials can be used for encryption/decryption of S/MIME messages. The IETF Secretariat _______________________________________________ plasma mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/plasma
