Author: hawk Date: Sat Apr 19 15:04:16 2008 GMT
Module: SOURCES Tag: Titanium
---- Log message:
- merged from linux-2.6-grsec-minimal.patch at LINUX_2_6 branch
- regenerated for kernel 2.6.24
---- Files affected:
SOURCES:
linux-2.6-grsec-vs-minimal.patch (1.1.2.8 -> 1.1.2.8.2.1)
---- Diffs:
================================================================
Index: SOURCES/linux-2.6-grsec-vs-minimal.patch
diff -u SOURCES/linux-2.6-grsec-vs-minimal.patch:1.1.2.8
SOURCES/linux-2.6-grsec-vs-minimal.patch:1.1.2.8.2.1
--- SOURCES/linux-2.6-grsec-vs-minimal.patch:1.1.2.8 Mon Nov 5 13:52:12 2007
+++ SOURCES/linux-2.6-grsec-vs-minimal.patch Sat Apr 19 17:04:10 2008
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-diff -urNp linux-2.6.20.3/arch/sparc/Makefile
linux-2.6.20.3/arch/sparc/Makefile
---- linux-2.6.20.3/arch/sparc/Makefile 2007-03-13 14:27:08.000000000 -0400
-+++ linux-2.6.20.3/arch/sparc/Makefile 2007-03-23 08:11:18.000000000 -0400
+diff -urNp linux-2.6.24.orig/arch/sparc/Makefile
linux-2.6.24/arch/sparc/Makefile
+--- linux-2.6.24.orig/arch/sparc/Makefile 2008-04-19 16:19:57.000000000
+0200
++++ linux-2.6.24/arch/sparc/Makefile 2008-04-19 16:59:08.000000000 +0200
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ drivers-$(CONFIG_OPROFILE) += arch/sparc
# Renaming is done to avoid confusing pattern matching rules in 2.5.45
(multy-)
INIT_Y := $(patsubst %/, %/built-in.o, $(init-y))
@@ -10,22 +10,10 @@
CORE_Y := $(patsubst %/, %/built-in.o, $(CORE_Y))
DRIVERS_Y := $(patsubst %/, %/built-in.o, $(drivers-y))
NET_Y := $(patsubst %/, %/built-in.o, $(net-y))
-diff -urNp linux-2.6.20.3/Makefile linux-2.6.20.3/Makefile
---- linux-2.6.20.3/Makefile 2007-03-13 14:27:08.000000000 -0400
-+++ linux-2.6.20.3/Makefile 2007-03-23 08:11:31.000000000 -0400
-@@ -553,7 +553,7 @@ export mod_strip_cmd
-
-
- ifeq ($(KBUILD_EXTMOD),)
--core-y += kernel/ mm/ fs/ ipc/ security/ crypto/ block/
-+core-y += kernel/ mm/ fs/ ipc/ security/ crypto/ block/
grsecurity/
-
- vmlinux-dirs := $(patsubst %/,%,$(filter %/, $(init-y) $(init-m) \
- $(core-y) $(core-m) $(drivers-y) $(drivers-m) \
-diff -urNp linux-2.6.20.3/drivers/char/keyboard.c
linux-2.6.20.3/drivers/char/keyboard.c
---- linux-2.6.20.3/drivers/char/keyboard.c 2007-03-13 14:27:08.000000000
-0400
-+++ linux-2.6.20.3/drivers/char/keyboard.c 2007-03-23 08:11:31.000000000
-0400
-@@ -628,6 +628,16 @@ static void k_spec(struct vc_data *vc, u
+diff -urNp linux-2.6.24.orig/drivers/char/keyboard.c
linux-2.6.24/drivers/char/keyboard.c
+--- linux-2.6.24.orig/drivers/char/keyboard.c 2008-04-19 16:19:58.000000000
+0200
++++ linux-2.6.24/drivers/char/keyboard.c 2008-04-19 16:59:08.000000000
+0200
+@@ -631,6 +631,16 @@ static void k_spec(struct vc_data *vc, u
kbd->kbdmode == VC_MEDIUMRAW) &&
value != KVAL(K_SAK))
return; /* SAK is allowed even in raw mode */
@@ -42,9 +30,9 @@
fn_handler[value](vc);
}
-diff -urNp linux-2.6.20.3/drivers/pci/proc.c linux-2.6.20.3/drivers/pci/proc.c
---- linux-2.6.20.3/drivers/pci/proc.c 2007-03-13 14:27:08.000000000 -0400
-+++ linux-2.6.20.3/drivers/pci/proc.c 2007-03-23 08:11:31.000000000 -0400
+diff -urNp linux-2.6.24.orig/drivers/pci/proc.c linux-2.6.24/drivers/pci/proc.c
+--- linux-2.6.24.orig/drivers/pci/proc.c 2008-04-19 16:20:03.000000000
+0200
++++ linux-2.6.24/drivers/pci/proc.c 2008-04-19 16:59:08.000000000 +0200
@@ -467,7 +467,15 @@ static int __init pci_proc_init(void)
{
struct proc_dir_entry *entry;
@@ -52,7 +40,7 @@
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
+ proc_bus_pci_dir = proc_mkdir_mode("pci", S_IRUSR | S_IXUSR, proc_bus);
-+#elif CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
++#elif defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP)
+ proc_bus_pci_dir = proc_mkdir_mode("pci", S_IRUSR | S_IXUSR | S_IRGRP |
S_IXGRP, proc_bus);
+#endif
+#else
@@ -61,10 +49,10 @@
entry = create_proc_entry("devices", 0, proc_bus_pci_dir);
if (entry)
entry->proc_fops = &proc_bus_pci_dev_operations;
-diff -urNp linux-2.6.20.3/fs/Kconfig linux-2.6.20.3/fs/Kconfig
---- linux-2.6.20.3/fs/Kconfig 2007-03-13 14:27:08.000000000 -0400
-+++ linux-2.6.20.3/fs/Kconfig 2007-03-23 08:11:31.000000000 -0400
-@@ -923,7 +923,7 @@ config PROC_FS
+diff -urNp linux-2.6.24.orig/fs/Kconfig linux-2.6.24/fs/Kconfig
+--- linux-2.6.24.orig/fs/Kconfig 2008-04-19 16:20:07.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.24/fs/Kconfig 2008-04-19 16:59:08.000000000 +0200
+@@ -937,7 +937,7 @@ config PROC_FS
config PROC_KCORE
bool "/proc/kcore support" if !ARM
@@ -73,10 +61,10 @@
config PROC_VMCORE
bool "/proc/vmcore support (EXPERIMENTAL)"
-diff -urNp linux-2.6.20.3/fs/namei.c linux-2.6.20.3/fs/namei.c
---- linux-2.6.20.3/fs/namei.c 2007-03-13 14:27:08.000000000 -0400
-+++ linux-2.6.20.3/fs/namei.c 2007-03-23 08:11:31.000000000 -0400
-@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
+diff -urNp linux-2.6.24.orig/fs/namei.c linux-2.6.24/fs/namei.c
+--- linux-2.6.24.orig/fs/namei.c 2008-04-19 16:20:07.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.24/fs/namei.c 2008-04-19 16:59:08.000000000 +0200
+@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
#include <linux/vs_cowbl.h>
#include <linux/vs_device.h>
#include <linux/vs_context.h>
@@ -84,7 +72,7 @@
#include <asm/namei.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
-@@ -637,6 +638,13 @@ static inline int do_follow_link(struct
+@@ -689,6 +690,13 @@ static inline int do_follow_link(struct
err = security_inode_follow_link(path->dentry, nd);
if (err)
goto loop;
@@ -98,7 +86,7 @@
current->link_count++;
current->total_link_count++;
nd->depth++;
-@@ -1700,6 +1734,13 @@ do_last:
+@@ -1856,6 +1864,13 @@ do_last:
/*
* It already exists.
*/
@@ -110,9 +98,9 @@
+ }
+
mutex_unlock(&dir->d_inode->i_mutex);
- audit_inode_update(path.dentry->d_inode);
+ audit_inode(pathname, path.dentry);
-@@ -1755,6 +1806,13 @@ do_link:
+@@ -1927,6 +1942,13 @@ do_link:
error = security_inode_follow_link(path.dentry, nd);
if (error)
goto exit_dput;
@@ -126,7 +114,7 @@
error = __do_follow_link(&path, nd);
if (error) {
/* Does someone understand code flow here? Or it is only
-@@ -2322,7 +2450,16 @@ asmlinkage long sys_linkat(int olddfd, c
+@@ -2509,7 +2531,16 @@ asmlinkage long sys_linkat(int olddfd, c
error = PTR_ERR(new_dentry);
if (IS_ERR(new_dentry))
goto out_unlock;
@@ -143,11 +131,11 @@
dput(new_dentry);
out_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&nd.dentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
-diff -urNp linux-2.6.20.3/fs/proc/array.c linux-2.6.20.3/fs/proc/array.c
---- linux-2.6.20.3/fs/proc/array.c 2007-03-13 14:27:08.000000000 -0400
-+++ linux-2.6.20.3/fs/proc/array.c 2007-03-23 08:11:31.000000000 -0400
-@@ -486,3 +531,14 @@ int proc_pid_statm(struct task_struct *t
- return sprintf(buffer,"%d %d %d %d %d %d %d\n",
+diff -urNp linux-2.6.24.orig/fs/proc/array.c linux-2.6.24/fs/proc/array.c
+--- linux-2.6.24.orig/fs/proc/array.c 2008-04-19 16:20:10.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.24/fs/proc/array.c 2008-04-19 16:59:08.000000000 +0200
+@@ -629,3 +629,14 @@ int proc_pid_statm(struct task_struct *t
+ return sprintf(buffer, "%d %d %d %d %d %d %d\n",
size, resident, shared, text, lib, data, 0);
}
+
@@ -161,10 +149,135 @@
+}
+#endif
+
-diff -urNp linux-2.6.20.3/fs/proc/inode.c linux-2.6.20.3/fs/proc/inode.c
---- linux-2.6.20.3/fs/proc/inode.c 2007-03-13 14:27:08.000000000 -0400
-+++ linux-2.6.20.3/fs/proc/inode.c 2007-03-23 08:11:31.000000000 -0400
-@@ -166,7 +166,11 @@ struct inode *proc_get_inode(struct supe
+diff -urNp linux-2.6.24.orig/fs/proc/base.c linux-2.6.24/fs/proc/base.c
+--- linux-2.6.24.orig/fs/proc/base.c 2008-04-19 16:20:10.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.24/fs/proc/base.c 2008-04-19 16:59:08.000000000 +0200
+@@ -1205,7 +1205,11 @@ static struct inode *proc_pid_make_inode
+ if (task_dumpable(task)) {
+ inode->i_uid = task->euid;
+ inode->i_gid = task->egid;
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
++ inode->i_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID;
++#endif
+ }
++
+ /* procfs is xid tagged */
+ inode->i_tag = (tag_t)vx_task_xid(task);
+ security_task_to_inode(task, inode);
+@@ -1222,17 +1226,38 @@ static int pid_getattr(struct vfsmount *
+ {
+ struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
+ struct task_struct *task;
++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER) ||
defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP)
++ struct task_struct *tmp = current;
++#endif
++
+ generic_fillattr(inode, stat);
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ stat->uid = 0;
+ stat->gid = 0;
+ task = pid_task(proc_pid(inode), PIDTYPE_PID);
+- if (task) {
++ if (task
++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER) ||
defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP)
++ && (!tmp->uid || (tmp->uid == task->uid)
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
++ || in_group_p(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID)
++#endif
++ )
++#endif
++ ) {
+ if ((inode->i_mode == (S_IFDIR|S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO)) ||
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
++ (inode->i_mode == (S_IFDIR|S_IRUSR|S_IXUSR)) ||
++#elif defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP)
++ (inode->i_mode ==
(S_IFDIR|S_IRUSR|S_IRGRP|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP)) ||
++#endif
+ task_dumpable(task)) {
+ stat->uid = task->euid;
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
++ stat->gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID;
++#else
+ stat->gid = task->egid;
++#endif
+ }
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+@@ -1262,9 +1287,18 @@ static int pid_revalidate(struct dentry
+ struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(inode);
+ if (task) {
+ if ((inode->i_mode == (S_IFDIR|S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO)) ||
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
++ (inode->i_mode == (S_IFDIR|S_IRUSR|S_IXUSR)) ||
++#elif defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP)
++ (inode->i_mode ==
(S_IFDIR|S_IRUSR|S_IRGRP|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP)) ||
++#endif
+ task_dumpable(task)) {
+ inode->i_uid = task->euid;
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
++ inode->i_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID;
++#else
+ inode->i_gid = task->egid;
++#endif
+ } else {
+ inode->i_uid = 0;
+ inode->i_gid = 0;
+@@ -2503,6 +2537,9 @@ int proc_pid_readdir(struct file * filp,
+ {
+ unsigned int nr = filp->f_pos - FIRST_PROCESS_ENTRY;
+ struct task_struct *reaper =
get_proc_task_real(filp->f_path.dentry->d_inode);
++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER) ||
defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP)
++ struct task_struct *tmp = current;
++#endif
+ struct tgid_iter iter;
+ struct pid_namespace *ns;
+
+@@ -2524,6 +2561,15 @@ int proc_pid_readdir(struct file * filp,
+ filp->f_pos = iter.tgid + TGID_OFFSET;
+ if (!vx_proc_task_visible(iter.task))
+ continue;
++#if defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER) ||
defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP)
++ if (tmp->uid && (iter.task->uid != tmp->uid)
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
++ && !in_group_p(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID)
++#endif
++ )
++ continue;
++#endif
++
+ if (proc_pid_fill_cache(filp, dirent, filldir, iter) < 0) {
+ put_task_struct(iter.task);
+ goto out;
+@@ -2588,6 +2634,9 @@ static const struct pid_entry tid_base_s
+ #ifdef CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION
+ REG("make-it-fail", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, fault_inject),
+ #endif
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR
++ INF("ipaddr", S_IRUSR, pid_ipaddr),
++#endif
+ };
+
+ static int proc_tid_base_readdir(struct file * filp,
+@@ -2622,7 +2671,14 @@ static struct dentry *proc_task_instanti
+
+ if (!inode)
+ goto out;
++#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
++ inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR|S_IRUSR|S_IXUSR;
++#elif defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP)
++ inode->i_gid = CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID;
++ inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR|S_IRUSR|S_IRGRP|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP;
++#else
+ inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR|S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO;
++#endif
+ inode->i_op = &proc_tid_base_inode_operations;
+ inode->i_fop = &proc_tid_base_operations;
+ inode->i_flags|=S_IMMUTABLE;
+diff -urNp linux-2.6.24.orig/fs/proc/inode.c linux-2.6.24/fs/proc/inode.c
+--- linux-2.6.24.orig/fs/proc/inode.c 2008-04-19 16:20:10.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.24/fs/proc/inode.c 2008-04-19 16:59:08.000000000 +0200
+@@ -411,7 +411,11 @@ struct inode *proc_get_inode(struct supe
if (de->mode) {
inode->i_mode = de->mode;
inode->i_uid = de->uid;
@@ -176,23 +289,23 @@
}
if (de->vx_flags)
PROC_I(inode)->vx_flags = de->vx_flags;
-diff -urNp linux-2.6.20.3/fs/proc/internal.h linux-2.6.20.3/fs/proc/internal.h
---- linux-2.6.20.3/fs/proc/internal.h 2007-03-13 14:27:08.000000000 -0400
-+++ linux-2.6.20.3/fs/proc/internal.h 2007-03-23 08:11:31.000000000 -0400
-@@ -37,6 +37,9 @@ extern int proc_tid_stat(struct task_str
- extern int proc_tgid_stat(struct task_struct *, char *);
+diff -urNp linux-2.6.24.orig/fs/proc/internal.h linux-2.6.24/fs/proc/internal.h
+--- linux-2.6.24.orig/fs/proc/internal.h 2008-04-19 16:20:10.000000000
+0200
++++ linux-2.6.24/fs/proc/internal.h 2008-04-19 16:59:08.000000000 +0200
+@@ -54,6 +54,9 @@ extern int proc_tgid_stat(struct task_st
extern int proc_pid_status(struct task_struct *, char *);
extern int proc_pid_statm(struct task_struct *, char *);
+ extern int proc_pid_nsproxy(struct task_struct *, char *);
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR
+extern int proc_pid_ipaddr(struct task_struct*,char*);
+#endif
- extern struct file_operations proc_maps_operations;
- extern struct file_operations proc_numa_maps_operations;
-diff -urNp linux-2.6.20.3/fs/proc/proc_misc.c
linux-2.6.20.3/fs/proc/proc_misc.c
---- linux-2.6.20.3/fs/proc/proc_misc.c 2007-03-13 14:27:08.000000000 -0400
-+++ linux-2.6.20.3/fs/proc/proc_misc.c 2007-03-23 08:11:31.000000000 -0400
-@@ -667,6 +667,8 @@ void create_seq_entry(char *name, mode_t
+ extern const struct file_operations proc_maps_operations;
+ extern const struct file_operations proc_numa_maps_operations;
+diff -urNp linux-2.6.24.orig/fs/proc/proc_misc.c
linux-2.6.24/fs/proc/proc_misc.c
+--- linux-2.6.24.orig/fs/proc/proc_misc.c 2008-04-19 16:20:10.000000000
+0200
++++ linux-2.6.24/fs/proc/proc_misc.c 2008-04-19 16:59:08.000000000 +0200
+@@ -707,6 +707,8 @@ void create_seq_entry(char *name, mode_t
void __init proc_misc_init(void)
{
@@ -201,17 +314,16 @@
static struct {
char *name;
int (*read_proc)(char*,char**,off_t,int,int*,void*);
-@@ -688,7 +690,9 @@ void __init proc_misc_init(void)
+@@ -722,13 +724,24 @@ void __init proc_misc_init(void)
{"stram", stram_read_proc},
#endif
{"filesystems", filesystems_read_proc},
+#ifndef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
{"cmdline", cmdline_read_proc},
+#endif
- {"locks", locks_read_proc},
{"execdomains", execdomains_read_proc},
{NULL,}
-@@ -696,6 +700,15 @@ void __init proc_misc_init(void)
+ };
for (p = simple_ones; p->name; p++)
create_proc_read_entry(p->name, 0, NULL, p->read_proc, NULL);
@@ -227,10 +339,10 @@
proc_symlink("mounts", NULL, "self/mounts");
/* And now for trickier ones */
-@@ -704,7 +717,11 @@ void __init proc_misc_init(void)
- if (entry)
- entry->proc_fops = &proc_kmsg_operations;
+@@ -741,7 +754,11 @@ void __init proc_misc_init(void)
+ }
#endif
+ create_seq_entry("locks", 0, &proc_locks_operations);
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
+ create_seq_entry("devices", gr_mode, &proc_devinfo_operations);
+#else
@@ -239,10 +351,10 @@
create_seq_entry("cpuinfo", 0, &proc_cpuinfo_operations);
#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
create_seq_entry("partitions", 0, &proc_partitions_operations);
-@@ -712,7 +729,11 @@ void __init proc_misc_init(void)
+@@ -749,7 +766,11 @@ void __init proc_misc_init(void)
create_seq_entry("stat", 0, &proc_stat_operations);
create_seq_entry("interrupts", 0, &proc_interrupts_operations);
- #ifdef CONFIG_SLAB
+ #ifdef CONFIG_SLABINFO
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
+ create_seq_entry("slabinfo",S_IWUSR|gr_mode,&proc_slabinfo_operations);
+#else
@@ -251,7 +363,7 @@
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_SLAB_LEAK
create_seq_entry("slab_allocators", 0 ,&proc_slabstats_operations);
#endif
-@@ -729,7 +750,7 @@ void __init proc_misc_init(void)
+@@ -767,7 +788,7 @@ void __init proc_misc_init(void)
#ifdef CONFIG_SCHEDSTATS
create_seq_entry("schedstat", 0, &proc_schedstat_operations);
#endif
@@ -260,24 +372,27 @@
proc_root_kcore = create_proc_entry("kcore", S_IRUSR, NULL);
if (proc_root_kcore) {
proc_root_kcore->proc_fops = &proc_kcore_operations;
-diff -urNp linux-2.6.20.3/fs/proc/root.c linux-2.6.20.3/fs/proc/root.c
---- linux-2.6.20.3/fs/proc/root.c 2007-03-13 14:27:08.000000000 -0400
-+++ linux-2.6.20.3/fs/proc/root.c 2007-03-23 08:11:31.000000000 -0400
-@@ -65,7 +65,13 @@ void __init proc_root_init(void)
- return;
- }
- proc_misc_init();
+diff -urNp linux-2.6.24.orig/fs/proc/proc_net.c linux-2.6.24/fs/proc/proc_net.c
+--- linux-2.6.24.orig/fs/proc/proc_net.c 2008-04-19 16:20:10.000000000
+0200
++++ linux-2.6.24/fs/proc/proc_net.c 2008-04-19 16:59:08.000000000 +0200
+@@ -110,7 +110,13 @@ static struct pernet_operations __net_in
+
+ int __init proc_net_init(void)
+ {
+#ifdef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
-+ proc_net = proc_mkdir_mode("net", S_IRUSR | S_IXUSR, NULL);
++ shadow_pde = proc_mkdir_mode("net", S_IRUSR | S_IXUSR, NULL);
+#elif defined(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP)
-+ proc_net = proc_mkdir_mode("net", S_IRUSR | S_IXUSR | S_IRGRP |
S_IXGRP, NULL);
-+#else
- proc_net = proc_mkdir("net", NULL);
-+#endif
- proc_net_stat = proc_mkdir("net/stat", NULL);
-
- #ifdef CONFIG_SYSVIPC
-@@ -78,7 +84,15 @@ void __init proc_root_init(void)
++ shadow_pde = proc_mkdir_mode("net", S_IRUSR | S_IXUSR | S_IRGRP |
S_IXGRP, NULL);
++#else
+ shadow_pde = proc_mkdir("net", NULL);
++#endif
+ shadow_pde->shadow_proc = proc_net_shadow;
+
+ return register_pernet_subsys(&proc_net_ns_ops);
+diff -urNp linux-2.6.24.orig/fs/proc/root.c linux-2.6.24/fs/proc/root.c
+--- linux-2.6.24.orig/fs/proc/root.c 2008-04-19 16:20:10.000000000 +0200
++++ linux-2.6.24/fs/proc/root.c 2008-04-19 16:59:08.000000000 +0200
+@@ -140,7 +140,15 @@ void __init proc_root_init(void)
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_DEVICETREE
proc_device_tree_init();
#endif
@@ -291,171 +406,20 @@
proc_bus = proc_mkdir("bus", NULL);
+#endif
proc_vx_init();
+ proc_sys_init();
}
-
-diff -urNp linux-2.6.20.3/grsecurity/Kconfig linux-2.6.20.3/grsecurity/Kconfig
---- linux-2.6.20.3/grsecurity/Kconfig 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
-+++ linux-2.6.20.3/grsecurity/Kconfig 2007-03-23 08:11:31.000000000 -0400
-@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
-+#
-+# grecurity configuration
-+#
-+
-+menu "Grsecurity"
-+
-+config GRKERNSEC
-+ bool "Grsecurity"
-+ select CRYPTO
-+ select CRYPTO_SHA256
-+ help
-+ If you say Y here, you will be able to configure many features
-+ that will enhance the security of your system. It is highly
-+ recommended that you say Y here and read through the help
-+ for each option so that you fully understand the features and
-+ can evaluate their usefulness for your machine.
-+
-+menu "Filesystem Protections"
-+depends on GRKERNSEC
-+
-+config GRKERNSEC_PROC
-+ bool "Proc restrictions"
-+ help
-+ If you say Y here, the permissions of the /proc filesystem
-+ will be altered to enhance system security and privacy. You MUST
-+ choose either a user only restriction or a user and group restriction.
-+ Depending upon the option you choose, you can either restrict users to
-+ see only the processes they themselves run, or choose a group that can
-+ view all processes and files normally restricted to root if you choose
-+ the "restrict to user only" option. NOTE: If you're running identd as
-+ a non-root user, you will have to run it as the group you specify
here.
-+
-+config GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
-+ bool "Restrict /proc to user only"
-+ depends on GRKERNSEC_PROC
-+ help
-+ If you say Y here, non-root users will only be able to view their own
-+ processes, and restricts them from viewing network-related
information,
-+ and viewing kernel symbol and module information.
-+
-+config GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
-+ bool "Allow special group"
-+ depends on GRKERNSEC_PROC && !GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER
-+ help
-+ If you say Y here, you will be able to select a group that will be
-+ able to view all processes, network-related information, and
-+ kernel and symbol information. This option is useful if you want
-+ to run identd as a non-root user.
-+
-+config GRKERNSEC_PROC_GID
-+ int "GID for special group"
-+ depends on GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
-+ default 1001
-+
-+config GRKERNSEC_PROC_ADD
-+ bool "Additional restrictions"
-+ depends on GRKERNSEC_PROC_USER || GRKERNSEC_PROC_USERGROUP
-+ help
-+ If you say Y here, additional restrictions will be placed on
-+ /proc that keep normal users from viewing device information and
-+ slabinfo information that could be useful for exploits.
-+
-+config GRKERNSEC_LINK
-+ bool "Linking restrictions"
-+ help
-+ If you say Y here, /tmp race exploits will be prevented, since users
-+ will no longer be able to follow symlinks owned by other users in
-+ world-writable +t directories (i.e. /tmp), unless the owner of the
-+ symlink is the owner of the directory. users will also not be
-+ able to hardlink to files they do not own. If the sysctl option is
-+ enabled, a sysctl option with name "linking_restrictions" is created.
-+
-+config GRKERNSEC_FIFO
-+ bool "FIFO restrictions"
-+ help
-+ If you say Y here, users will not be able to write to FIFOs they don't
-+ own in world-writable +t directories (i.e. /tmp), unless the owner of
-+ the FIFO is the same owner of the directory it's held in. If the
sysctl
-+ option is enabled, a sysctl option with name "fifo_restrictions" is
-+ created.
-+
-+endmenu
-+
-+config GRKERNSEC_PROC_IPADDR
-+ bool "/proc/<pid>/ipaddr support"
-+ help
-+ If you say Y here, a new entry will be added to each /proc/<pid>
-+ directory that contains the IP address of the person using the task.
-+ The IP is carried across local TCP and AF_UNIX stream sockets.
-+ This information can be useful for IDS/IPSes to perform remote
response
-+ to a local attack. The entry is readable by only the owner of the
-+ process (and root if he has CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE, which can be removed via
-+ the RBAC system), and thus does not create privacy concerns.
-+
-+config GRKERNSEC_SHM
-+ bool "Destroy unused shared memory"
-+ depends on SYSVIPC
-+ help
-+ If you say Y here, shared memory will be destroyed when no one is
-+ attached to it. Otherwise, resources involved with the shared
-+ memory can be used up and not be associated with any process (as the
-+ shared memory still exists, and the creating process has exited). If
-+ the sysctl option is enabled, a sysctl option with name
-+ "destroy_unused_shm" is created.
-+
-+config GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL
-+ bool "Sysctl support"
-+ help
-+ If you say Y here, you will be able to change the options that
-+ grsecurity runs with at bootup, without having to recompile your
-+ kernel. You can echo values to files in /proc/sys/kernel/grsecurity
-+ to enable (1) or disable (0) various features. All the sysctl entries
-+ are mutable until the "grsec_lock" entry is set to a non-zero value.
-+ All features enabled in the kernel configuration are disabled at boot
-+ if you do not say Y to the "Turn on features by default" option.
-+ All options should be set at startup, and the grsec_lock entry should
-+ be set to a non-zero value after all the options are set.
-+ *THIS IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT*
-+
-+config GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL_ON
-+ bool "Turn on features by default"
-+ depends on GRKERNSEC_SYSCTL
-+ help
-+ If you say Y here, instead of having all features enabled in the
-+ kernel configuration disabled at boot time, the features will be
-+ enabled at boot time. It is recommended you say Y here unless
-+ there is some reason you would want all sysctl-tunable features to
-+ be disabled by default. As mentioned elsewhere, it is important
-+ to enable the grsec_lock entry once you have finished modifying
-+ the sysctl entries.
-+
-+endmenu
-diff -urNp linux-2.6.20.3/grsecurity/Makefile
linux-2.6.20.3/grsecurity/Makefile
---- linux-2.6.20.3/grsecurity/Makefile 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000 -0500
-+++ linux-2.6.20.3/grsecurity/Makefile 2007-03-23 08:11:31.000000000 -0400
-@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
-+# All code in this directory and various hooks inserted throughout the kernel
-+# are copyright Brad Spengler, and released under the GPL v2 or higher
-+
-+obj-y = grsec_fifo.o grsec_sock.o grsec_sysctl.o grsec_link.o
-+
-+obj-$(CONFIG_GRKERNSEC) += grsec_init.o
-+
-+ifndef CONFIG_GRKERNSEC
-+obj-y += grsec_disabled.o
-+endif
-+
-diff -urNp linux-2.6.20.3/grsecurity/grsec_disabled.c
linux-2.6.20.3/grsecurity/grsec_disabled.c
---- linux-2.6.20.3/grsecurity/grsec_disabled.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000
-0500
-+++ linux-2.6.20.3/grsecurity/grsec_disabled.c 2007-03-23 08:11:31.000000000
-0400
+diff -urNp linux-2.6.24.orig/grsecurity/grsec_disabled.c
linux-2.6.24/grsecurity/grsec_disabled.c
+--- linux-2.6.24.orig/grsecurity/grsec_disabled.c 1970-01-01
01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ linux-2.6.24/grsecurity/grsec_disabled.c 2008-04-19 16:59:08.000000000
+0200
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+void
+grsecurity_init(void)
+{
+ return;
+}
-diff -urNp linux-2.6.20.3/grsecurity/grsec_fifo.c
linux-2.6.20.3/grsecurity/grsec_fifo.c
---- linux-2.6.20.3/grsecurity/grsec_fifo.c 1969-12-31 19:00:00.000000000
-0500
<<Diff was trimmed, longer than 597 lines>>
---- CVS-web:
http://cvs.pld-linux.org/cgi-bin/cvsweb.cgi/SOURCES/linux-2.6-grsec-vs-minimal.patch?r1=1.1.2.8&r2=1.1.2.8.2.1&f=u
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