commit d02222cd44b006c6a643de03a2cc6d86cae95d87
Author: misi3k <[email protected]>
Date: Thu Mar 20 09:07:39 2003 +0000
- Attacking RSA-based Sessions in SSL/TLS (CAN-2003-0131)
Changed files:
openssl-security2.patch -> 1.1
openssl-security2.patch | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 53 insertions(+)
---
diff --git a/openssl-security2.patch b/openssl-security2.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5277735
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssl-security2.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+--- ssl/s3_srvr.c 29 Nov 2002 11:31:51 -0000 1.85.2.14
++++ ssl/s3_srvr.c 19 Mar 2003 18:00:00 -0000
+@@ -1447,7 +1447,7 @@
+ if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+-
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
++ /*
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
+ }
+
+ if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1]
== (s->client_version & 0xff))))
+@@ -1463,30 +1463,29 @@
+ (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] ==
(s->version & 0xff))))
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+-
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER);
+- goto f_err;
++ /*
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
++
++ /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of
Bleichenbacher's attack
++ * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits
the version
++ * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an
alert would
++ * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to
some ciphertext
++ * made up by the adversary is properly
formatted except
++ * that the version number is wrong. To avoid
such attacks,
++ * we should treat this just like any other
decryption error. */
++ p[0] = (char)(int) "CAN-2003-0131 patch
2003-03-19";
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (al != -1)
+ {
+-#if 0
+- goto f_err;
+-#else
+ /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead
as countermeasure
+ * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA
padding
+- * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1).
+- * But note that due to length and protocol version
checking, the
+- * attack is impractical anyway (see section 5 in D.
Bleichenbacher:
+- * "Chosen Ciphertext Attacks Against Protocols Based
on the RSA
+- * Encryption Standard PKCS #1", CRYPTO '98, LNCS 1462,
pp. 1-12).
+- */
++ * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
+ p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
+ p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
+ RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2); /* should be RAND_bytes,
but we cannot work around a failure */
+-#endif
+ }
+
+ s->session->master_key_length=
================================================================
---- gitweb:
http://git.pld-linux.org/gitweb.cgi/packages/openssl102.git/commitdiff/9fc1b1b87b259e8a327c99835865e91a391efc9e
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