On Sat, Oct 17, 2026 at 12:15:00AM +0000, David Uhden Collado wrote: [...] > 3. The restrictions persist across execve(2) and apply to subsequently > executed programs. The target cannot expand its pledge promises or unlock > unveil.
I don't believe execpromises in its current form is usable for this. Among the issues are: - You need to know what shared libraries a program might load - A process contained in this way can't securely further reduce its set of unveils (The test for this would be to try any base command that uses unveil, e.g. "stty". Either you need to promise "unveil" which means the sandbox can be expanded at will, or further calls to unveil is blocked.) I do successfully use execpromises in some private code, but I don't think this is something that is currently generally applicable, because the sandboxing will fail in some cases and those cases aren't obvious to the user, meaning they are likely to disable the sandboxing, defeating the point of it.
