Viktor, we're lucky to have Carsten Strotmann on our team (here at sys4). You may know him for his expertise on DNS. Carsten offered to assist in writing the DANE_README.
I'd like you/others to go over the following TOC to make sure we cover all necessary aspects: - What is DANE - Benefits of using DANE - Prerequisites - DNSSEC - What is DNSSEC? - Why does DANE require DNSSEC? - "a bit of a DNSSEC tutorial..." - Local Resolver - DANE will offer only an illusion of security unless the *one and only* nameserver in /etc/resolv.conf is 127.0.0.1 - trust-anchor key rotation - Certificate Considerations - Pros/Cons of "2 0 1", ... - TLSA Key rotation - DANE setup with Postfix - Building a TLS certificate - Basic TLS/SSL configuration - Basics + refer to TLS_README for tuning, other policies etc. - Testing basic TLS functionality - Configuring DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) - Creating a TLSA DNS resource record -> tlsagen -> Refer to "Pros/Cons of "2 0 1"..." - Deploying the TLSA DNS RR - Testing the TLSA DNS resource record -> posttls-finger - Enabling DANE support in Postfix SMTP client - Params, Options, Policies smtp_dns_support_level = dnssec smtp_tls_security_level = dane, dane-only - Verifying DANE - LOG - Monitoring - Troubleshooting - References Thank you p@rick * Viktor Dukhovni <postfix-devel@postfix.org>: > On Mon, Jan 06, 2014 at 11:33:26AM +0100, Patrick Ben Koetter wrote: > > > > Thus the need for a DANE_README.html, any volunteers? All the > > > required material is scattered about in: > > > > > > http://vdukhovni.github.io/ietf/draft-ietf-dane-smtp-with-dane-05.html > > > http://www.postfix.org/postconf.5.html > > > http://www.postfix.org/TLS_README.html > > > http://www.postfix.org/FORWARD_SECRECY_README.html > > > > I can work on it this and next week, but my English writing will need some > > review from a native speaker. > > Fantastic. One important point to get accross is that TLS security > for MTA SMTP to MX is very much unlike TLS security for HTTP or > even mail client SMTP to static MSA. Even though the TLS protocol > is the same, the MTA SMTP protocol context is so different, that > one MUST first shed most of the mental baggage that one may have > learned from HTTP. For many users the first problem will be letting > go of pre-conceptions. > > The second point, which is critical, is that Postfix DANE will > offer only an illusion of security unless the ONE AND ONLY nameserver > in /etc/resolv.conf is 127.0.0.1 (yes, ::1 is also OK). That > nameserver must implement DNSSEC and be configured with a suitable > set of trust anchors. At least the correct trust anchor for the > root zone, plus any additional trust anchors that are stable enough > to configure locally and important enough to not yield control over > those domains to the root. > > There need to be appropriate mechanisms handle trust-anchor key > rotation. Some linux packages for unbound come with scripts to > refresh the root trust anchor, I don't know whether these can > also handle other trust-anchors in a similar manner. > > So there would need to be a bit of a DNSSEC tutorial as well I'm > afraid. Especially for people who want to operate domains with > DANE veriable MX hosts. They'll need to understand why (with > certificate usage 2) wildcard certs are not a very good idea (MITM > server substitution) and the pros/cons of "2 0 1", "2 1 1", and "3 > 1 1" TLSA records (it makes little sense to use any of the other > 12 valid combinations, and none to use the 12 with certificate > usage 0/1). > > They'll also need to understand the key rotation and digest algorithm > agility operational requirements for publishing TLSA records. > > The rest, is largely combining the various Postfix docs about DANE > is a single logical document. > > Those are my immediate thoughts that I thought would be helpful to > get you started, but you'll discover your own ideas as you go along. > > ------------- > > On Mon, Jan 06, 2014 at 05:46:29AM -0800, Corey Quinn wrote: > > > I'll handle editing and review if you'd like. > > Thanks, that would be great. > > -- > Viktor. -- Patrick Ben Koetter p...@state-of-mind.de