On Fri, 11 Nov 2016 09:54:48 -0500 "Bill Cole" <postfixlists-070...@billmail.scconsult.com> wrote:
> On 11 Nov 2016, at 6:21, li...@lazygranch.com wrote: > > > So is this level of encryption something openssl sets up? > > Yes and no. The partners in an encrypted session negotiate the > details of a ciphersuite when the session is established, based on > both of their configurations. For Postfix, the configuration(s) > determine how Postfix calls functions in the OpenSSL libraries, while > other tools (i.e. client software, other mail servers, etc.) may use > other TLS/SSL implementations that have analogous runtime > configurability or none at all. Different versions of any one > implementation like OpenSSL have differing capabilities as well. > Different programs have different needs and priorities, so typically > the encryption negotiation parameters are set by an application (e.g. > Postfix, Apache, a mail client, a web browser, etc.) rather than at > the shared library (e.g. OpenSSL, GNUTLS, NSS, etc.) level globally > for a system. > > So, Yes: OpenSSL code does the negotiation of ciphersuites between > various ostfix programs and the partners they talk to. Also, No: the > configuration of what ciphersuites are preferred and/or allowed is > done within Postfix, not externally by some part of OpenSSL itself. > > > That is where do I set the parameter? > > You probably shouldn't, because it is unlikely to be of any value to > you. The strength difference between AES128 and AES256 transport > encryption is probably only relevant to you if your threat model > includes a major nation-state being able to intercept your email in > transit today and decrypt it sometime before 2025 as a meaningful > risk. If that is a significant concern to you, email transport > encryption would surely be very low on your list of risks and you > really shouldn't be using email for such things AT ALL. > > With that said... Postfix has multiple settings that define the > ciphers it supports in the SMTP client (smtp) and server (smtpd) as > well as the priorities of which ciphers to prefer in a negotiation. > See Postfix's TLS_README file for the most cohesive documentation of > those parameters. > > Which you probably shouldn't change, but I repeat myself... > > Two mistakes that people often make (and often bring here) with > Postfix TLS configuration are: > > 1. Not allowing for the negotiation of theoretically weaker > ciphersuites, resulting in fallback to unencrypted transport or > simple failure when a partner won't do that fallback. > > 2. Crafting carefully thought out cipher lists specifying individual > ciphersuites in a specific order, neglecting the fact that the "best" > such over-specified cipher list is a moving target even if one > assumes that all participants are using the latest version of OpenSSL > as their TLS implementation. > > Exacerbating both of these is the fact that a lot of the searchable > how-tos for TLS configuration are narrowly focused on web and > web-like interactions where the threat model and the practical > utility of transport encryption are both quite different from SMTP > transport or initial mail submission. This has meant in some cases > that an algorithm's weakness which merits discouraging or even > prohibiting its use on a webserver is ultimately meaningless for a > MTA because the attack mode is implausible against a MTA or the > vulnerability is one that is already intrinsic to SMTP. > > The bottom line (if you've made it this far...) is that the settings > that involve deep encryption parameters in modern Postfix are best > left at their default values unless you have very specific uncommon > security needs, can accept outright insoluble breakage in place of > imperfect security, and understand every sentence of the TLS_README, > the relevant bits of postconf(5), and everything Viktor Dukhovni has > ever written about encryption on this list. My postfix setup lacks the tls_high_cipherlist parameter, as shown here: https://blog.tinned-software.net/harden-the-ssl-configuration-of-your-mailserver/ Is the advice on that link reasonable? I see the setup echoed over the interwebs, but of course bad advice bounces around the internet as well.