>>>>> "Daniel" == Daniel Ryšlink <rysl...@dialtelecom.cz> writes:
Daniel> | You disable cleartext SMTP as well? Daniel> The rationale here is that by accepting provenly insecure Daniel> protocols, one provides an illusion of security, which is Daniel> potentially more dangerous than transparently refuse, and fall Daniel> back to plaintext delivery to preserve the functionality Daniel> (which can create an incentive to upgrade from probably Daniel> obsolete and unsupported software). What incentive? People don't know/care how the email gets from their mail client to the receiver, just that it gets there. On my personal domain, I'm seeing about 10% TLSv1, the rest TLSv1.2. Suprisingly, no non-TLS connections. Looking back over the past 4500+ emails (I'm a small personal domain) It's about 20% TLSv1, <.1% TLSv1.1, and the rest TLSv1.2, without any non-TLS connections accepted. John
