** Milis Nasional Indonesia ppi-india **
Semoga tidak ada terlalu jauh (over) mementingkan diri sendiri
tanpa memperhatikan penderitaan umat umat lain, karena terletak
sebenarnya adalah ketidakadilan dan perlawanan.
Perlu ada pencegahan dan dialog antara US, AL qoeda/Taliban bersama
pihak netral (bisa dari arab, afrika atau lainnya).
Sebenarnya dialog dan kerja sama pemaafan yang mungkin sangat
mampu untuk meredakan konflik pertikaian. Mengapa terus melakukan
pemburuan daripada solusi solusi. Sesungguhnya tidak perlu ada
ditutup tutupi, selama ditutup tutupi akan dapat membangun
perpanjangan kesulitan negara sendiri.
Mengapa tidak mencontohi cara penyelesaian dialog oleh Indonesia dan
GAM maupun penyelesaian konflik Sulawesi/maluku? Sebab itu tidak ada
ditutup tutupi demi membangun keterbukaan dan kebersamaan.
Sebab dalam penyelesaian konflik yang insyallah dapat mengurangi
minim korban jiwa dan mengembalikan tujuan hidup yang baik pada
masyarakat terkena konflik adalah memanfaatkan amal amal yang baik.
Bentuk ini lebih baik daripada hanya mempertahankan permusuhan dan
kedendaman.
Bila Israel maupun Palestina masih berlangsung kekerasan dan
menunggu hari pembalasan, bagaimana bila tidak akan meredamkan
keganasan ke dua pihak sehingga sangat sulit dihentikan?
Sesungguhnya saya sangat berharap ada yang memperhatikan anak anak
dan keluarga yang ikut berperang. Padahal solusi solusi dan dialog
masih banyak di depan. Bukankah yang terpenting adalah bagaimana
perhatian masyarakat dunia terhadap konflik Israel-Palestina sudah
berkisar hampir puluhan tahun yang lama?
Demi mempercepatkan penyelesaian konflik, dapat mengajak mahasiswa
Israel/Palestina untuk berdemo sambil berbaring pura pura tewas
bersembur darahan dan diselip bunga perdamaian. Ada bisa gunakan
atraksi demo antara mahasiswa memakai tentara Israel, mahasiswa
memakai pakaian Hamas dan mahasiswa memakai pakaian sipil dalam
permainan perang perangan selama HAM dan solusi tidak diperhatikan.
Perlu ada menggambarkan tidak perlu kemarahan dan pembantaian
padahal masih ketidakadilan dan kepentingan tertentu. Sungguh
berharap konflik insiden pembunuhan tidak akan membangun kemarahan
dan teror yang tidak perlu.
Sungguh baik selama memperjuangkan penyelesaian daripada mengangkat
pembalasan ke dua pihak. Kalau Israel kalah, selalu ada pembalasan
dari Israel nanti. Bila Palestina kalah, tentu membutuhkan waktu lama
untuk melawan.
Padahal itu tidak perlu dan tidak ada manfaat, semoga ada perhatian
terhadap ke dua masyarakat tersebut. Begitu pula dengan Al qoeda dan
Taliban.
-----
Panel: U.S. Had Plan to Overthrow Taliban
WASHINGTON - One day before the Sept. 11 attacks, senior Bush
administration officials agreed that the United States would try to
overthrow Afghanistan (news - web sites)'s Taliban rulers if a final
diplomatic push to expel Osama bin Laden (news - web sites) from the
country failed, a federal panel reported Tuesday.
The independent commission reviewing the attacks said in a
preliminary report that in the years before the attacks the Clinton
and Bush administrations chose to use diplomatic rather than military
options, which allowed bin Laden and other al-Qaida leaders to elude
capture.
The commission said that three years before the attacks, Saudi Arabia
won a commitment from the Taliban to expel bin Laden, but Afghan
leaders later reneged.
"From the spring of 1997 to September 2001, the U.S. government tried
to persuade the Taliban to expel bin Laden to a country where he
could face justice," the report said. "The efforts employed
inducements, warnings and sanctions. All these efforts failed."
The panel, known formally as the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States, presented its findings as it began
hearings with top-level Bush and Clinton administration officials.
The aim was to question officials on their efforts to stop bin Laden
in the years leading up to the attacks.
Secretary of State Colin Powell (news - web sites) stressed
administration efforts to fight terrorism, an implicit rebuttal to
criticism in a recent book by President Bush (news - web sites)'s
former counterterrorism coordinator, Richard Clarke, who is expected
to testify Wednesday.
"President Bush and his entire national security team understood that
terrorism had to be among our highest priorities and it was," Powell
said.
Shortly before the Sept. 11 attacks, the Bush administration was
debating how to force bin Laden out of Afghanistan. At a Sept. 10,
2001, meeting of second-tier Cabinet officials, officials settled on
a three-phase strategy. The first step called for dispatching an
envoy to talk to the Taliban. If this failed, diplomatic pressure
would be applied and covert funding and support for anti-Taliban
fighters would be increased.
If both failed, "the deputies agreed that the United States would
seek to overthrow the Taliban regime through more direct action," the
report said. Deputy national security adviser Stephen Hadley said the
strategy had a three-year timeframe.
The report described Saudi Arabia as "a problematic ally in combating
Islamic extremism," noting its lax oversight of charitable donations
that may have funded terrorists.
Clinton designated CIA (news - web sites) Director George Tenet as
his representative to work with the Saudis, who agreed to make
an "all-out secret effort" to persuade the Taliban to expel bin
Laden.
Saudi intelligence chief Prince Turki bin Faisal, using "a mixture of
possible bribes and threats," received a commitment from Taliban
leader Mullah Omar that bin Laden would be handed over. But Omar
reneged on the agreement during a September 1998 meeting with Turki
and Pakistan's intelligence chief.
"When Turki angrily confronted him Omar lost his temper and denounced
the Saudi government. The Saudis and Pakistanis walked out," the
report said.
The Clinton administration had early indications of terrorist links
to bin Laden and future Sept. 11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed as
early as 1995, but let years pass as it pursued criminal indictments
and diplomatic solutions to subduing them abroad, the commission's
report said.
Former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright (news - web sites) told
the commission that President Clinton (news - web sites) and his
team "did everything we could, everything we could think of, based on
the knowledge we had, to protect our people and disrupt and defeat al-
Qaida."
The preliminary report said the U.S. government had determined bin
Laden was a key terrorist financier as early as 1995, but that
efforts to expel him from Sudan stalled after Clinton officials
determined he couldn't be brought to the United States without an
indictment. A year later, bin Laden left Sudan and set up his base in
Afghanistan without resistance.
The hearing follows explosive allegations in Clarke's book. Clarke
was Bush's former counterterrorism coordinator and a holdover from
the Clinton administration.
He said that he warned Bush officials in a January 2001 memo about
the growing al-Qaida threat after the Cole attack but was put off by
national security adviser Condoleezza Rice (news - web sites),
who "gave me the impression she had never heard the term (al-Qaida)
before."
The commission's report Tuesday said Clarke pushed for immediate and
secret military aid to the Taliban's foe, the Northern Alliance. But
Rice and Hadley proposed a broader review of the al Qaida response
that would take more time. The proposal wasn't approved for Bush's
review until just weeks before Sept. 11.
The 10-member commission had invited Rice to testify, but she has
declined, with the White House citing separation of power concerns
involving its staff appearing before a legislative body.
Other potential diplomatic failures cited by the commission:
_ The United States in 1995 located Mohammed in Qatar. He was then a
suspect in a 1995 plot to plant bombs on American airliners in Asia.
FBI (news - web sites) and CIA officials worked on his capture, but
first sought a legal indictment and then help from the Qatari
government, who they feared might tip Mohammed off. In 1996, Qatari
officials reported Mohammed had suddenly disappeared.
_ The U.S. government pressed two successive Pakistani governments
from the mid 1990s to pressure the Taliban by threatening to cut off
support. But "before 9-11, the United States could not find a mix of
incentives or pressure that would persuade Pakistan to reconsider its
fundamental relationship."
_ From 1999 through early 2001, the United States pressed the United
Arab Emirates, the Taliban's only travel and financial outlets to the
outside world, to break off ties, with little success.
***************************************************************************
Berdikusi dg Santun & Elegan, dg Semangat Persahabatan. Menuju Indonesia yg Lebih
Baik, in Commonality & Shared Destiny. www.arsip.da.ru
***************************************************************************
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