http://www.workers.org/indonesia/chap6.html
The Question of State Power
Even those parties which are in favor of armed revolution and have repudiated
the idea of peaceful conquest of power in their programs do not necessarily
succeed in taking power, even under the best of circumstances.
The Communist Party of Germany was programmatically in favor of armed
revolution in 1933 and it could muster nearly six million votes in the early
part of that year. But it went down to defeat at the hands of the fascists in
the same year, suffering physical extermination of tens of thousands of cadres.
Outside of heroic but sporadic pockets of resistance, the German CP did not and
could not (because of previous errors and a previously determined course) mount
a general uprising to check or overthrow the fascists.
Under the much better circumstances of the revolutionary situation in Russia of
1917 and the paralysis of the Russian bourgeoisie, there was a crisis in the
Central Committee of Lenin's own Bolshevik Party over the question of whether
to launch the November 7 insurrection. Lenin's line only prevailed in the
committee because of theprevioustraining and preparation of the party, both in
theoretical understanding and practical struggle. Even then, some of Lenin's
closest collaborators opposed the "tactic" of insurrection.
The objective conditions in Indonesia resembled both the Russia of 1917 and the
Germany of 1933 in some respects. And they were also different, because
Indonesia is a colonial country where revolutionary nationalism against Dutch
and U.S. imperialism has played a tremendous role in both the country's and the
PKI's history.
The PKI was the biggest Communist Party in the world outside of the socialist
countries -- just as the German CP was the biggest before Hitler's victory over
it.
Unlike the case in either Germany or old Russia, the Indonesian Party had the
ear of the head of state, and occupied key positions in the government
apparatus. Furthermore, the head of state, although not a Communist, showed
every sign of collaborating with the Communists to the end -- and in his
fashion, apparently did so. He employed some opportunist slogans, but defied
imperialism on some occasions even more than most leaders of the socialist
world have done. He condemned and split from the imperialist-dominated UN; he
called upon the masses to expropriate the holdings of imperialism in Indonesia;
he was willing to go along with the PKI toward a more and more anti-imperialist
Indonesia. The logic of his course suggested that he would have to adopt
communism at some point whether he wanted to do so or not. The fascist generals
must have believed this, too, since they made sure to take away all his power
and only spared his life for fear of arousing the masses against themselves.
What went wrong? And why was this tremendously powerful movement composed of
both the PKI and the left nationalists unable to prevent the terrible massacre
of its forces and its friends?
The Indonesian Communists themselves, both inside and outside the country, have
been discussing practically nothing else but the question of the PKI's strategy
and tactics -- unless it be the question (for those still inside the country)
of how to physically escape the executioner, and even this question is often
subordinated to the need of developing a better instrument of revolution.
THE EXTRAORDINARY TESTIMONY OF A DOOMED PKI LEADER
One of the grimmest and yet most poignant of the self-criticisms was made by
Sudisman, one of the five top leaders of the PKI. He told his own hangman's
court in 1967 (hoping his speech would be heard by his comrades -- as it
finally was) that the PKI had made serious errors.
(Sudisman took over the top leadership personally after Aidit and Njoto were
murdered, and he attempted to follow a more leftist course.)
Truly, the PKI is the product of its era, born with the era itself. The
revival of the PKI will not depend on the five of us [i.e., himself, D.N.
Aidit, M.H. Lukman, Njoto and Sakirman]; we have failed in our labors. In one
form or another, still with many hardships, the PKI will find a way to come
forth again, with even greater vigor than in our time.
And certainly, failure will act as our teacher. The laws of war have taught
us that we must fight, fight, and fight again. And if we fail once, the
struggle should be taken up again, until conclusive victory is won.
Victory will be to those who are not afraid to face difficulties and who have
the courage to continue fighting. And, to obtain victory we must have the
patience to wait a long time, a very long time.
The judge has spoken of the PKI as if it were an "invisible man," which I
take to mean that the PKI is nowhere and at the same time, everywhere. And in
reality, the Mahmillub in essence has re- cognized the fact that faith cannot
be completely shackled.
And according to the law of the people, the people's faith will lead them to
final victory. This confirms the popular refrain which says: the world keeps on
spinning.
I am convinced that although the PKI is proscribed, history in the long run
will free the PKI, and Marxism-Leninism will reign in the heart of every
Communist. In his oral briefing, the judge called the PKI "poisonous." Yes, he
was right. The PKI is poisonous when it comes to killing the bacteria of the
bloodsuckers of the people, the oppressors and exploiters, but at the same
time, it is also a powerful restorative, animating the people.
For me, everything has two or more sides. For example, the human body cannot
grow without phosphorous. Phosphorous, after all is a poison that kills
bacteria and promotes bone growth. I understand that failure in battle is
brought about by the errors one commits. The errors of the PKI, accumulated
over a long period of time, were the reasons for the failure of the 30th of
September Movement.
These errors included subjectivism in ideology -- that is, our considering a
thing from only one point of view and not in its totality, so that reality was
viewed not as a whole, but as something glimpsed in fragments.
As a result the PKI was unprepared when the Party became larger; it was
careless of the danger of imperialism, which, together with the country's
reactionary forces, was just waiting for the opportunity to attack.
In such a situation it was necessary to have a certain knowledge of
Marxism-Leninism in order to calculate, concretely and scientifically, the
correlation of forces and the relative strengths of the PKI and its enemies.
Moreover, in order to organize a campaign, revolutionary skills are needed,
plus courage to determine, a priori, the correct line to follow and the right
moment for its adoption.
The 30th of September Movement did not fulfill these requirements, and thus
brought about its own failure.
Moreover, the campaign was totally isolated from the masses, although, in
keeping with the announcements of the Revolutionary Junta, the objectives of
the 30th of September Movement were correct.
In addition to subjectivism in the leadership, the PKI was also infested with
modern revisionism. This resulted in the adoption of a bourgeois attitude after
positions in state organizations were obtained.
These weaknesses led to a compromise with the bourgeoisie in the theoretical
field.
In organization, the PKI did not apply adequate methods for solving the
contradictions within the Party through criticism and self-criticism. Without
criticism and self-criticism we became tolerant and criticism from the bottom
was not developed. These errors committed by the PKI in the fields of ideology,
in politics and organization have been mentioned in the self-critical report of
the Central Committee of the PKI, now in the hands of the military regime.
The failure of the 30th of September Movement has led the PKI to criticize
its own errors, to make a self-criticism.
I am certain that sooner or later, the new generation of PKI members will
learn the good lesson of self-criticism. This new generation will make the PKI
a true Communist Party on Marxist-Leninist lines and will choose a correct and
revolutionary agrarian program, free from all types of economism and modern
revisionism. Such a Party will be able to solve the basic problems of the
Indonesian people....
If I die, it does not mean that the Indonesian Communist Party must also die.
Far from it. Although the PKI has been dismembered and ripped to shreds, I am
convinced that this is only temporary and that in the course of history, the
PKI will return.
Quoted in Tri-Continental,
No. 7, 1968
Sudisman, facing a certain death sentence, showed by these admirable remarks
(which were only a small part of his final speech to the court) that he was all
too well aware that the PKI had erred. But he proudly refused to say that the
September 30th Movement was itself in error. On the contrary, the error, he
explained, was in itsfailure. He himself took full responsibility for it before
his enemies as well as before his friends and the judgment of history.
SUDISMAN OPENED QUESTION OF A THOROUGH REVIEW OF TACTICS
But Sudisman does not give any specific recipe for taking power or any precise
explanation of what the Party did wrong after September 30. He was speaking
under the most difficult of circumstances, and it was not at all necessary for
him to spell out his criticisms in detail in order to open the way for a
thorough review of tactics by those who are serious about revolution.
Furthermore, even if he were not speaking in the shadow of the hangman's noose,
his comments as an Indonesian Communist leader have far more value for the
Indonesian and world revolution than the theoretical lucubrations of many
non-Indonesian radicals both revisionist and "revolutionary," whose real motive
in criticism is purely factional and full of hatred.
In other parts of his speech Sudisman mentions that nearly all the members of
the September 30th Movement were "individuals who happened to be members of the
PKI," although he takes personal responsibility in the fascist court for the
leadership of the event and challenges the court to punish him alone.
The importance of this almost quixotic gesture is that it does underline the
fact that "all actions were executed by individuals who happened to be members
of the PKI" -- something that was apparently common knowledge in Indonesia, or
Sudisman would never have revealed it.
This fact must be kept firmly an mind throughout the following pages, because
some of the documents can easily give the impression that Untung and the whole
September 30th Movement were just militant nationalists and that the PKI
completely ignored the fascist danger and repudiated the September 30th
Movement in every way. Some of the documents of the PKI itself give the
impression that the Party was completely blind to the danger of the fascist
generals' coup.
This was not the case, really. But due to the whole policy of the PKI,
including the period in which it worked closely with the Chinese CP leadership,
it was unprepared to cope with the fascist coup. In this sense, it resembled
the CP of Germany at the time of Hitler's 1933 victory. There were many
Communists like Sudisman, including many in the leadership, who were deeply
revolutionary and deeply determined to fight for the Communist victory. But the
point at which to fight and the methods of preparing the fight are not easy to
arrive at, even for the most experienced and devoted leadership.
DID PKI FAIL TO RECOGNIZE THE DANGER OF THE RIGHT-WING?
The following account by Eric Norden gives one slant on this problem. Norden is
a radical journalist who is very conversant with Indonesian affairs and
believed that "Sukarno's course, in spite of his erratic personality, was
essentially the best one for Indonesia." He gave the following blow-by-blow
account of the events around September 30. He explained about the reactionary
generals' meeting, which Sukarno and Subandrio secretly tape-recorded, and how
the generals had planned at the meeting to overthrow Sukarno and replace him
and then tell the masses that it was done on the grounds of Sukarno's ill
health. Then Norden said (at the June 1966 public inquest):
Sukarno was deeply alarmed by the revelations in this tape recording, and he
called in one of his most trusted aides, a man named Lt. Col. Untung. Untung
was the commandant of the palace guard, whose duty it was to protect Sukarno.
He was a non-political man, with no affiliations left or right, but intensely
devoted to Sukarno, whom he viewed as the founder of the nation. Untung decided
that action would have to be taken quickly, because the September 21st meeting
of the reactionary generals revealed that the armed forces commanders intended
to stage their coup d'etat against Sukarno on October 8, which was Armed Forces
Day. At that time all the top military units would be in Djakarta for a massive
military parade, and it was generally assumed that this would be their best
time to move.
Untung went to a number of pro-Sukarno political leaders for aid, including
Aidit [leader of ] the Communist Party. Aidit flatly refused to believe him. He
couldn't conceive of the generals taking such a risky ploy as an open move
against Sukarno, and refused to give any assistance. However, one military man
who was loyal to Sukarno was Air Marshal Omar Dhani, who was the Commandant of
the Indonesian Air Force. Untung and Dhani together, using small contingents of
hand-picked men they knew were loyal to Sukarno, staged a preventive coup
against the generals the night of September 10, 1965. Units loyal to Untung and
Dhani took over the radio station and several other strategic points in
Djakarta.
It was announced over the radio that a new revolutionary council had been
formed, including cabinet ministers such as Subandrio, the purpose of which was
to defend the President against what they called "a council of generals
formulated by the CIA." It should be noted that the CIA's involvement with this
Council of Generals was stressed repeatedly in the broadcast. Six of the top
army generals involved in the conspiracy were murdered by units loyal to Dhani
and Untung. However, one of the top generals, Abdul Haris Nasution, one of the
leading movers in the anti-Sukarno movement, escaped with a flesh wound and
managed to flee to the outskirts of Djakarta. There he was joined by General
Suharto, one of his allies, who was in command of the crack Siliwangi Division.
With this elite division in his hands, he was able to move into Djakarta. After
a fierce fire fight, the pro-Sukarno troops were driven from the radio station
and Suharto took over the city, reasserting effective control.
Sukarno, during all this, had gone to the Halim Air Force Base on the outside
of the city to await word of the coup. When he found out that it had been a
failure, he fled to the summer palace at Bogor.
Could it be true that the top leader of one of the world's biggest Communist
parties was so naive as to disbelieve the possibility of a fascist coup by
generals who were so well known to be "aided" by the United States and who
fairly openly (in politically sophisticated circles) opposed Sukarno? Aidit
couldn't have been suspicious of Untung to any great degree, although he may
have feared a provocation. And recalling Sudisman's words, we must repeat that
"individual members of the PKI" were the main participants in Untung's action.
But according to Norden, Aidit "couldn't conceive of the generals taking such a
risky ploy as an open move against Sukarno." Norden, of course, did not know
what went on in Aidit's mind, but in one sense at least he might have been
right in his estimate. That is, Aidit may have been lulled to overconfidence
not because he failed to understand the intentions of the generals, but because
he had far too much faith in his own previous policy.
OR DID IT RELY TOO HEAVILY ON SUKARNO?
In August 1917 in Russia, the extreme right-wing generals -- led by General
Kornilov -- took the "risky ploy of an open move" against the still
tremendously popular Kerensky. They were anxious to destroy the growing
revolutionary movement and they were willing to destroy Kerensky to get to it.
Kornilov led an armed counter-revolution. The Bolsheviks summoned the masses to
"defend the revolution" against Kornilov. (And they overthrew Kerensky two
months after they had "defended" him.)
Actually, it was a far less "risky ploy" for Suharto and the reactionary
generals than Kornilov's move was. The Bolsheviks were, on the whole, armed.
They had whole regiments which were openly Bolshevik, where the officers were
paralyzed. The key workers on railroads and in telegraph stations, etc., were
constantly alerted by the Bolsheviks against the reactionary generals. True,
according to some authorities, the total membership of the Bolsheviks was only
40,000 in the month of July, just one month before Kornilov's attack (whereas
the PKI had in the neighborhood of three million). But the Bolsheviks had made
every possible use of the revolutionary situation and paid constant attention
to the problem of how they were going to be able to seize power.
Now Aidit was familiar with this history. Why didn't he see the imminent danger
from the Indonesian generals' clique? Why was he so sure that the generals
would not move? The more surely that Indonesia was moving in the Communist
direction Aidit thought it was, the more surely the fascist generals would at
some point move against the Communists. But Aidit was not prepared for the
move. Much of Aidit's previous policy was based on utilizing Sukarno's
tremendous popularity and helping to build up that popularity with both
Communist and non-Communist masses. So much of his policy was based on the idea
that Sukarno, although a left bourgeois nationalist, could move right on to
communism leading the non-Communist masses with him.
While this concept is theoretically wrong, there is no eternal absolutely
unbreakable law in social relations. And it did seem that Indonesian practice
could make the theory wrong in this particular instance. Sukarno certainly
showed many signs of wanting to do this and at the end never crossed over to
the side of the fascist generals.
He might very well have played a valuable figurehead role for the Communist
revolution in spite of and because of the fact that he had his origins in the
bourgeois nationalist movement.
THE STATE WAS BOURGEOIS
But Aidit and the PKI forgot or neglected one tremendous factor -- the state
itself.
Whatever Sukarno's role, the state was still bourgeois -- still a capitalist
state. The "armed bodies of men," the essence of the state, were under
pro-capitalist commanders. There were PKI members in the government apparatus.
But there was no rival state power in the form of a congress of soviets, a
workers' army, mass worker defense guards, etc., or anything to seriously rival
the capitalist-controlled army and seriously oppose it in a showdown. The three
million-member PKI could be immobilized if it depended upon purely
parliamentary means when the generals resorted to open force.
Aidit couldn't believe the generals would dare to oppose Sukarno, because he
was thinking of Sukarno's matchless oratory; he was thinking in purely
propagandistic terms, in terms of popularity, winning votes and so on -- rather
than in terms of force and ruthless showdown, as the generals were thinking.
It is true, of course, that such a show of force may come only once in a
generation and all the rest of the time it seems to be a question of maneuver,
publicity, persuasion and so on. But the truth is that revolutionary parties
are trained to be ready for the supreme moment not only by learning about such
moments in history books, but also by constantly engaging in open struggle on
lower levels with the bosses, with the police, with the reactionary detachments
of the army, etc. They must be educated in struggle and in the spirit of
distrust and hatred for the bourgeoisie. When a party becomes as powerful as
the PKI was, it must also understand that capitalism -- andworld capitalism (in
this case, the U.S.) -- is planning day and night to destroy it.
The fact that Aidit and most of the leadership seemed not to understand this
does not necessarily mean that they were secretly revisionists who were
influenced by Moscow rather than Peking. To the contrary, they had been working
with the Chinese CP for several years.
In the summer of 1965, it is true, Chou En-lai, while on a trip to Indonesia,
publicly called for the arming of the masses. Both Aidit and Sukarno by that
time seem to have been in favor of it too. But the idea came too late, as it
did in the case of Mossadegh in Iran, Nkrumah in Ghana, and Arbenz in
Guatemala. (There is evidence that it was proposed as early as January or
February of 1965, but little was really done about it.) The idea came late, and
even then, the conviction was not strong enough to urge the masses daily and
hourly to get their own arms -- by disarming the police, recruiting bands of
soldiers, getting arms from friendly soldiers who steal them from the army
supply depots, etc. This can be done whenever the situation is anywhere near as
revolutionary as it was in Indonesia. But of course it requires not just
courage, resolution, etc., which the Indonesian leadership of course had, but a
certain approach to the state, a strong and unshakable conviction that only the
Communists can really solve the question of social justice and must lead the
masses to smash the old state and create a new one.
Actually, both Aidit, the PKI leadership and the left wing of the Nationalist
Party had been urgingSukarnoto form a people's militia all during the spring of
1965. And on August 17 (Indonesia's Independence Day) Sukarno announced that a
militia of several million was to be formed. He covered up -- and really
softened -- its potentially revolutionary character by saying that it was to be
used in the national fight against Malaysia. But the announcement must have
alarmed the generals' clique, nevertheless. And coming as late as it did and
promoted so awkwardly, it may have forced the generals to make their
counter-revolution that much earlier. In defense of the PKI it should be added
that Communists would certainly have been in the leadership of most of this
militia if it ever had really gotten started. So they now assumed they were
going to be in a position to protect their flanks --in case the generals tried
to move against them. Why should it occur to them to start training bands of 20
or 30 militia men when they would soon command millions? And besides they felt
that the Army would side with them against the generals.
RANK AND FILE OF ARMY WAS PROGRESSIVE
The NLF armed themselves from 1960 to 1964 by first practicing with wooden
sticks, attacking their enemies with their bare hands, often sacrificing five
guerrillas to capture one gun in Viet Nam. Of course, the atmosphere in
Indonesia was such that the army seemed to be a pro-revolutionary army, and the
real polarization did not occur until after September 30, and by then the time
was very, very short. This is only another way of saying that every country has
its own peculiarities of development. But the PKI leadership took the view that
the Indonesian peculiarities made afundamental difference so far as the
Communist strategy was concerned.
There was a strong tendency not to rock the boat, to continue on the previous
course, which was to depend on Sukarno's ability to swing the whole army (with
the help of the PKI of course) over to the defense of the new expropriations
and the continued course to socialism. There was good ground for the PKI to
have illusions on this score, because the Party was well aware that the rank
and file of the army was made up so largely of either Communists, Communist
sympathizers or revolutionary nationalists who would be at least neutral to
Communism -- if the Communists took a clear hold on the helm of the state, and
especially if they did this in company with the ever-popular Sukarno, who did
not represent the national bourgeoisie in the eyes of the masses, but the
revolution against imperialism.
The PKI's illusions about the nature of the army are most clearly -- and
tragically -- expressed in a statement made immediatelyafterthe September 30th
Movement. In an editorial appearing in the Oct. 2, 1965, edition of Harian
Rakjat, the national newspaper of the PKI, there appeared the following
statement, most probably written on Oct. 1, when it still appeared that the
September 30th Movement was successful, although it was known that the
reactionary politician-general Nasution and the extremely powerful General
Suharto were still alive and actively working against the PKI, moving their
troops furiously to counter the actions of the September 30th Movement.
The Harian Rakjat editorial follows:
It has happened that on the 30th of September measures were taken to
safeguard President Sukarno and the Republic of Indonesia from a coup by a
so-called Council of Generals. According to what has been announced by the
September 30th Movement, which is headed by Lt. Col. Untung of a Tjakrabirawa
(palace guard) battalion, action taken to preserve President Sukarno and the
Republic of Indonesia from the coup by the Council of Generals is patriotic and
revolutionary.
Whatever the justification that may have been used by the Council of Generals
in its attempt, the staging of a coup is a condemnable and counterrevolutionary
act.
We the People fully comprehend what Lt. Col. Untung has asserted in carrying
out his patriotic movement.
But however the case may be,this is an internal Army affair. On the other
hand, we the People, who are conscious of the policy and duties of the
revolution, are convinced of the correctness of the action taken by the
September 30th Movement to preserve the revolution and the People.
The sympathy and support of the People is surely on the side of the September
30th Movement. We call on the People to intensify their vigilance and be
prepared to confront all eventualities. [Our emphasis.]
>From the last sentence it is clear that the Party leaders were very uneasy
>about the situation. Eric Norden may be quite correct in saying that Aidit
>couldn't believe that Suharto and the generals really intended to try a coup.
>By October 1, the PKI leadership seems convinced. But it is moving far too
>slowly.
The Party correctly identified itself with the September 30th Movement, but
having done so, it was time to summon the masses to arms. But the Party's call
was only to "intensify their vigilance." At such a time, such a call might
easily spread alarm or indecision rather than vigilance.
Even worse, by saying in the same statement in which it identified itself with
the September 30th Movement, that the action was "an internal Army affair," the
Party tended to half repudiate the action and close its eyes to the
consequences.
But again, this mistake flowed from a previous false policy and a previous
misunderstanding. The false policy was one of expecting Sukarno to be able to
outweigh all the possible actions of the generals, and assuming that Sukarno
himself would be loyal to his own program and be able to carry it out against
the will of his generals. The misunderstanding was about the class character of
the Indonesian state and the class character of the Army.
WHAT DETERMINES THE CLASS CHARACTER OF AN ARMY?
The class character of any army is determined in the long run by the class it
serves, and in the short run by the class character of its high command and not
at all by the class composition of its rank and file, which is always made up
of the poor -- of workers, farmers, farm laborers, etc. And the generals of the
Indonesian Army were for the most part reactionary servants of Indonesian and
international (i.e., imperialist) capital. Untung, their main opponent within
the Army, it must be noted, was only a lieutenant colonel, with direct command
over less than a thousand men.
(In Untung's first statement to the country, announced over the national radio
on the morning of October 1, is the following revolutionary statement: "The
Army is not for generals, but it is the possession of all soldiers of the Army
who are loyal to the ideals of the revolution of August, 1945." On the
afternoon of the same day a decree was read which abolished the rank of general
altogether.)
Many "left" critics have misused Mao's correct observation, claiming that the
PKI did not understand that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."
It would be more correct to say the PKI did understand this, but failed to
understand the class character of the guns they thought were theirs (in the
national army).
Sukarno was the Supreme Commander of the Army and "Great Leader of the
Revolution" -- in name, of course. But merely because the Supreme Commander,
alone among top officers, moves left, the army does not become a revolutionary
proletarian army.
If the almost invincible Napoleon were to have sold out to the feudal kings of
Europe at the height of the victories of the French revolutionary army, he
could not have thereby turned the army into an instrument of feudalism.
Or more to the point, if General Eisenhower had decided to become a Communist
in Europe in 1945 (as Senator Joseph McCarthy implied he did) this would not
have altered the class character of the U.S. Army or materially changed the
history of the post-World War II years. Eisenhower would simply have been
assassinated by his brother officers or removed by arrest and punished by legal
means, depending upon how stable the situation in the rest of the army was.
Sukarno was removed under cover of protecting him. And his influence was
destroyed under cover of praising him. He did not even have the military clique
ties to the army that a top general would have. He was far more isolated from
the generals than a person like Eisenhower would have been in the example
given.
PKI PERSISTED IN MISCALCULATING ARMY
The misunderstanding of the PKI about the nature of the Indonesian Army went so
deep that the Second Deputy Chairman of the PKI was able to say, two months
after the counter-revolution began, that it was a unique army and that no
counter-force was really necessary against it.
During an interview with the Tokyo Evening News on December 2, 1965, Deputy
Chairman Njoto made the following remarks:
Question: How can your party set up your own army? Lenin and Mao Tse-tung
have maintained that the establishment of the army of the Communist Party is an
indispensable condition of revolution.
Njoto: The PKI always regards the Indonesian Army as being not the same as
armies in the imperialist countries or as in India now, seen both from the
history of its formation as well as from the tasks of being against imperialism
and feudalism, and also seen from the composition of its soldiers, who mostly
come from the peasant and worker class. That there still exist in the national
army anti-people elements is the same thing as in the republic as a whole....
Question: How about the relations between your own army and the present
professional army?
Njoto: The PKI has never had its own army. This is why there is no connection
in any way between this thing that never existed and the national army.
Actually there had been some success in creating the popular national militia
during 1965 although it apparently did not get very far. Njoto repudiates the
whole idea of a Communist-led militia. At best he is being elusive with a
reporter at the wrong moment on the wrong question. At worst he is repudiating
the whole idea of any armed opposition to the bourgeois-controlled army.
It is quite possible that Njoto was not wholly candid in the extremely
difficult situation that had developed. Perhaps he felt he had to conceal
whatever elements of armed opposition the PKI was able to summon up at the last
minute. But his statements generally have the ring of conviction and fit in
with the previous mistaken position of the PKI in this matter.
Tremendous events were now going on. Millions of people were listening in. They
needed an immediate tactical program, no matter how euphemistically or
carefully phrased it might be. They needed a clear explanation of who was
friend and who was foe. Njoto was not obligated to give correct answers to the
Japanese press. But he also failed to give them to the Indonesian masses. He
himself was to pay with his own life for this failure.
SOME ELEMENTS OF PARTY WANTED TO FIGHT
In the middle of the crisis that began with September 30, there were more
forthright elements than the top leadership in the PKI, elements who, although
in theoretical agreement with Aidit and the Central Committee, felt in their
bones that this was the time to fight and fight hard -- rather than merely be
"vigilant" and relegate the whole struggle to "an internal matter of the Army."
This is indicated in the statement of the East Java Communist Youth
Organization which was issued on October 1, 1965. It appears in Pemuda Rakjat,
the youth organization's paper. The following is based on the Indonesian text
given in Berita Yudha October 7, 1965 (the statement was also read on the local
radio several times).
Statement supporting the "September 30th Movement"
-- No. 1 56/v/PBD/65
In connection with the occurrence of a September 30th Movement under the
leadership of Lt. Col. Untung to safeguard the Indonesian Revolution and Bung
Karno, and in relation to the revolutionary situation which has enraged the
counterrevolutionaries into forming a so-called "Council of Generals" to carry
out a coup d'etat (against) the Government of the Republic of Indonesia, in the
name of the 750,000 members of the People's Youth for the whole of East Java,
we declare our fullest support for, and stand behind the September 30th
Movement in forming Indonesian Revolution Councils down to the regions.
We instruct all Organization Leadership Bodies as well as the entire
membership of the East Java People's Youth to sharpen their vigilance, heighten
their support for Youth Unity on the basis of the Nasakom axis and carry out
the Five Charms of the Revolution, in order to continue to crush American
imperialism. "Malaysia," village devils, city devils, modern revisionism and
other internal counter-revolutionary elements.
Surabaja, October 1, 1965
Leadership of the Major Region
(East Java) People's Youth
(signed) Tjap S. Gijo
Regardless of its references to the nationalist, Sukarno-coined slogans, this
was obviously an appeal to create soviets throughout the country. That is, it
was an attempt to establish a "dual power" -- a rival political power to the
government, which when armed, would be also a rival state. This was exactly
what the situation called for and with a group of 750,000 (in East Java alone)
calling for it, there it little doubt that it would be successful -- if the PKI
leadership did not oppose it. (But they did!)
The PKI had three million members and influenced about 20 million more through
trade unions, mass organizations, etc. This would correspond to 40 million in
the United States (close to the highest vote ever received by a U.S.
Presidential candidate). Had the PKI leadership fully supported its own
"individual PKI members" in the September 30th Movement and its East Java Youth
Movement, it would have opened the road to victory instead of defeat. It would
have set the masses on the road toward political power.
It would not have even been necessary to make an open break with Sukarno to do
this, although Sukarno himself might have repudiated the councils that were
"defending" him, especially if Suharto forced him at pain of his life to do so.
But the PKI leadership turned once again to depending upon its alliance with
Sukarno to magically overcome the fascist drive of the generals. It was the
prisoner of its own previous political course in this.
"AN INTERNAL ARMY PROBLEM"
The Jogjakarta Regional Committee of the PKI was quoted in the Jogjakarta
daily, Ariwarti Waspada, on October 5 as saying: "The September 30th, 1965
Affair is an internal Army problem, and therefore the Party has no part in it."
This was an outright repudiation of September 30th. It was a considerable step
away from the position of October 1, and must have been taken because Suharto
had now crushed the September 30th Movement in the army. (He had not yet moved
against the PKI.) The statement could have been due to fear or panic, rather
than policy. But it was a published statement, nevertheless, and had its
inevitable effect on the masses.
On October 8 and 9 the statement of the Political Bureau of the Central
Committee of the PKI (issued on October 5] was printed in the same paper, and
it said:
The Indonesian Communist Party supports the Message of President Sukarno,
Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia, on settling
the problem of the September 30th Movement. [Sukarno said in the Message that
he had "reassumed" leadership of the state and of the Army and appointed
Suharto as practical commander of the troops.]
Having carefully studied the Message of President Sukarno, Supreme Commander
of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia and Great Leader of the
Revolution, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Indonesian
Communist Party states that it fully supports this Message, and calls on all
Committees of the PKI, all members and sympathizers of the PKI and all
revolutionary mass organizations led by the PKI cadres to help carry out the
Message of President Sukarno, Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the
Republic of Indonesia and Great Leader of the Revolution.
With regard to the September 30th Movement, the Central Committee of the PKI
considers it to be an internal problem of the Army and the PKI does not involve
itself in it.
With regard to the names of members of the PKI included in the list of the
Indonesian Revolution Council, it can be stated, as a consequence of questions
put to the members concerned, that these members were neither informed
beforehand nor asked for their permission.
The Central Committee of the PKI calls on the whole People to continue to
heighten their vigilance, to continue to strengthen the National United Front,
the Nasakom axis, and the Nasakom Spirit in putting into practice the Five
Charms of the Revolution, in carrying out Djwikora to crush the joint
British-U.S. Project "Malaysia," and to continue the anti-Nekolom struggle in
general.
Djakarta, October 5. 1965
Political Bureau,
Central Comittee of the PKI
This all too clear statement repudiated not only the September 30th armed
actions, but also directed that the "revolutionary councils" (which were the
beginnings of real soviets, political, if not military dual power, potential
state power for the masses) be disbanded, by saying that no PKI member had
"permission" to take part in them.
(General Suharto had by now gained full control of the Army.)
HOPED TO CAPTURE STATE PEACEFULLY THROUGH MANEUVER
Now such a position, such a repudiation, might somehow be forced on a party in
order to avoid an immediate repression. But the Indonesian Communist Party was
still tremendously powerful. It was not a question of hiding itself. The Party
had the very core of the masses behind it. The maneuver of going from
semi-repudiation to full repudiation of the September 30th Movement, if a
maneuver it was, could only have been designed to further the strategy of
working with Sukarno to "capture" the state, so to speak, and shift it more or
less peacefully onto the road of socialist construction.
It was the false premise of this strategy -- the premise that the state was
"different" and the Indonesian Army "not the same" -- that played such a tragic
role in the defeat of the PKI.
It was because of this false premise that the basic policy of the Indonesian
Communist Party, when it should have been one of actively preparing revolution
and insurrection, was one of delay, one of expecting the Army to be faithful to
Sukarno and Sukarno to be faithful to the revolution -- and faithful in such a
way that only a true communist possibly could be. In the actual event, the
reactionary generals merely spoke in the name of Sukarno, ruled in the name of
Sukarno and -- with a pistol at Sukarno's head -- took full power in the name
of Sukarno. And then they murdered the revolution in their own name and brought
their imperialist bosses back to exploit that part of the Indonesian people who
remained alive.
Why was it possible for the reactionary pro-imperialists to use Sukarno's name
as effectively as the Communists had done in a previous period and thus mollify
the masses and confuse the Communists at the same time? It was not because
Sukarno had sold out -- although it is significant that he did not defy the
reaction and insist on continuing the previous anti-imperialist course. It was
because Sukarno had straddled between classes, between the bourgeoisie and the
proletariat. He had defied the imperialists, it is true. He had defied them so
thoroughly that they decided to get rid of him. But he was originally based in
a radical bourgeois movement and he never broke with the Indonesian
bourgeoisie. The Indonesian bourgeoisie correctly felt it could still utilize
Sukarno as a cover for its own comeback -- finally even against his own will --
as long as he did not really become a Communist.
"NASAKOM" COULDN'T WORK IN CONTEXT OF IMPERIALISM
This should have been made clear by one of Sukarno's own slogans, a slogan that
the PKI supported wholeheartedly: Nasakom, which means "nationalism, religion
and communism." This was an opportunistic combination of terms that was
supposed to describe the character of the Indonesian state. The PKI thought it
would work. And if no pro-imperialists were operating under the cover of the
"nationalist" wing of the state, perhaps it could have worked. That is only
another way of saying that if the capitalists would not fight to keep their
privileges, there could really be a peaceful road to socialism. To get rid of
those pro-imperialists who shouted for "Nasakom," an armed showdown would have
been necessary.
After the event many of the PKI's international friends told them that they
(the PKI) had been totally wrong to rely on Sukarno, who was a bourgeois
leader, and that supporting Sukarno was the same as supporting the bourgeoisie.
This ice-in-the-wintertime advice came rather late, as did the advice to take
up arms against Suharto and Co.
But none of these critics seems to have made this point very strongly in
advance of the event. The reason, of course, was that the prospects were so
glittering and until the last moment the strategy seemed so workable and
Sukarno so agreeable.
A strong comradely criticism from powerful friends along the above line before
September 30 might well have prepared the leadership politically to brace
itself and choose open revolutionary tactics immediately after September 30,
when they still might well have succeeded.
But bad as the defeat was the revolution itself was not defeated. The struggle
goes on, large forces have taken up arms. Guerrilla detachments fight in Java,
Sumatra and West Kalimantan. No sooner is one force reported to be crushed,
than another force springs up.
At the heart of all the lessons and all the tactics on both sides in the
tremendous conflict of 1965 was the question of state power and the class
character of the state -- the problem of smashing the capitalist state, with or
without Sukarno, and creating the workers' state.
"I DO NOT REPENT!"
The reborn PKI will answer these questions and solve this problem, as Sudisman
bravely said in his speech to the judge-executioner.
We opened this chapter with Sudisman's self-criticism. Let us close it with his
final words in defense of revolution, words which have no immediate relevance
to the ever-pressing problem of what to do at the given moment -- but which
catch the soul of the Indonesian proletariat and guarantee its future victory:
In keeping with this sense of responsibility, I must explain that it is
somewhat difficult to answer the question put by the President of the Court:
Does the prisoner repent of his actions?
The question in itself is quite simple: it is the reply that is difficult.
Usually, the simpler the question, the more difficult the answer, since it
cannot be answered by a simple Yes or No, without qualification.
After all this, out of respect for my communist beliefs, my communist
responsibility, and solidarity with my dead comrades, Aidit, Lukman, Njoto and
Sakirman, I have come to my decision.
I DO NOT REPENT.
Moreover, aware that other victims have fallen, I as a Communist cannot do
less than they.
We live to fight and we fight to live. We do not live just for the sake of
living. We live to defend life valiantly, to the death.
In the course of human history, from the first cry of the newborn babe to
death, there has always been struggle -- at times hard struggle, in violent
battle. A battle can be very violent, but not all violent battles are crowned
with victory.
The objectives of life are: To have the courage to enter this violent
struggle on the battlefield and at the same time to try to win the battle. This
is the dream of all fighters, including communist fighters. And this has also
been my life's dream.
Life would be sterile without imagination and ideals.
What a wonder of wonders is life itself! We live to fight and we fight to
live. This is my communist goal. This goal cannot be attained without
responsibility, and for me responsibility is like a pearl. To express this, I
have written a small poem in prison which goes:
Facing one attack after another,
Suffering interrogation after interrogation,
Withstanding tortures and more tortures,
With my head and with my heart,
Ready to face death for the PKI,
This is the pearl of responsibility!
And now that I face the verdict, I say with the words of the writer, Andrew
Carr: No tears for Sudisman! . . .
Since I am a Communist born in Java, I feel obliged to say something in
keeping with Javanese tradition:
First, I want to thank all who have helped me in the struggle.
Second, to the mass of progressive revolutionaries, to those who believe that
they have been hurt during the struggle through fault of mine: Forgive me.
Third, to my family, my wife and children, as I face the verdict I ask your
blessing with all my heart.
Long live the Indonesian Communist Party!
[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
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