http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/common/story_page/0,5744,15595265%255E2703,00.html
China shifts centre of gravity
Henry Kissinger
June 13, 2005
THE relationship between the US and China is beset by ambiguity. On the one
hand, it represents perhaps the most consistent expression of a bipartisan,
long-range US foreign policy.
Starting with Richard Nixon, seven presidents have affirmed the importance of
co-operative relations with China and the US commitment to a One China policy -
albeit with temporary detours at the beginning of the Reagan, Clinton and
George W.Bush administrations.
Mr Bush and secretaries of state Condoleezza Rice and Colin Powell have
described relations with China as the best since opening to Beijing in 1971.
The two presidents, Bush and Hu Jintao, are planning reciprocal visits to
Washington and Beijing this year and to meet several times at multilateral
forums.
Nevertheless, ambivalence has suddenly re-emerged. Various officials, members
of Congress and media are attacking China's policies, from the exchange rate to
military build-up, much of it in a tone implying China is on some sort of
probation. To many, China's rise has become the most significant challenge to
US security.
Before dealing with a long-range view on how to keep the relationship from
becoming hostage to reciprocal pinpricks, I must point out that the consulting
company I chair advises clients with business interests around the world,
including China. Also, in early May, I spent a week in China, much of it as a
guest of the Government.
The rise of China, and of Asia, will, over the next decades, bring about a
substantial reordering of the international system. The centre of gravity of
world affairs is shifting from the Atlantic, where it was lodged for the past
three centuries, to the Pacific. The most rapidly developing countries are
located in Asia, with a growing means to vindicate their perception of the
national interest.
China's emerging role is often compared to that of imperial Germany at the
beginning of the last century, the implication being that a strategic
confrontation is inevitable and the US had best prepare for it. That assumption
is as dangerous as it is wrong.
The European system of the 19thcentury assumed that its major powers would, in
the end, vindicate their interests by force. Each nation thought a war would be
short and that, at its end, that nation's strategic position would have
improved.
Only the reckless could make such calculations in a globalised world of nuclear
weapons. War between major powers would be a catastrophe for all participants.
There would be no winners; the task of reconstruction could dwarf the causes of
the conflict.
Which leader who entered World WarI so insouciantly in 1914 would not have
recoiled had he been able to imagine the world at its end in 1918? Our age
knows the consequences, at least nearly enough. Wise statesmen will do their
utmost to avoid the re-emergence of the deadly calculus that, after Germany's
rise, turned the international system into a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Another special factor that drove the international system to confrontation a
century ago was the provocative style of German diplomacy. In 1900, a
combination of Russia, France and Britain would have seemed inconceivable given
the conflicts between Russia and Britain in Central Asia and between France and
Britain over the sources of the Nile.
Fourteen years later, a bullying German diplomacy had brought it about,
challenging Britain with a naval build-up and seeking to humiliate Russia over
Bosnia in 1908 and France in two crises over Morocco in 1905 and 1911.
Military imperialism is not the Chinese style. Carl von Clausewitz, the leading
Western strategic theoretician, addresses the preparation and conduct of a
central battle. Sun Tzu, his Chinese counterpart, focuses on the psychological
weakening of the adversary. China seeks its objectives by careful study,
patience and the accumulation of nuances - only rarely does China risk a
winner-take-all showdown.
It is unwise to substitute China for the Soviet Union in our thinking and to
apply to it the policy of military containment of the Cold War. The Soviet
Union was heir of an imperialist tradition, which, between Peter the Great and
the end of World War II, had projected Russia from the region around Moscow to
the centre of Europe.
The Chinese state in its present dimensions has existed substantially for 2000
years. The Russian empire was governed by force; the Chinese empire by cultural
conformity with substantial force in the background.
At the end of World War II, Russia found itself face-to-face with weak
countries along all its borders and unwisely relied on a policy of occupation
and intimidation beyond the long-term capacity of the Russian state.
The strategic equation in Asia is altogether different. US policy in Asia must
not mesmerise itself with the Chinese military build-up. There is no doubt that
China is increasing its military forces, which were neglected during the first
phase of its economic reform.
But even at its highest estimate, the Chinese military budget is less than 20
per cent of the US's; it is barely, if at all, ahead of that of Japan and, of
course, much less than the combined military budgets of Japan, India and
Russia, all bordering China. That is not to speak of Taiwan's military
modernisation supported by American decisions made in 2001.
Russia and India possess nuclear weapons. In a crisis threatening its survival,
Japan could quickly acquire them and might do so formally if the North Korean
nuclear problem is not solved.
When China affirms its co-operative intentions and denies a military challenge,
it expresses less a preference than the strategic realities. The challenge
posed by China for the medium-term future will, in all likelihood, be political
and economic, not military.
The problem of Taiwan is an exception and is often invoked as a potential
trigger. This could happen if either side abandons the restraint that has
characterised US-Chinese relations on the subject for more than a generation.
But it is far from inevitable.
Almost all countries - all major ones - have recognised China's claim that
Taiwan is part of China. So have seven American presidents of both parties -
none more emphatically than George W.Bush. Both sides have managed the
occasional incongruities of this state of affairs with some skill.
In 1972, Beijing accepted a visit by Nixon, even while the US recognised Taipei
as the capital of all of China, and by another president - Gerald Ford - under
the same ground rules in 1975. Diplomatic relations were not established until
1979. Despite substantial US arms sales to Taiwan, Sino-US relations have
steadily improved based on three principles: US recognition of the One China
principle and opposition to an independent Taiwan; China's understanding that
the US requires the solution to be peaceful and is prepared to vindicate that
principle; and restraint by all parties in not exacerbating tensions in the
Taiwan Straits.
That delicate balance has held steady for 33 years. The task now is to keep the
Taiwan issue in a negotiating framework. The recent visit to Beijing by the
heads of two of Taiwan's three major parties may be a forerunner. Talks on
reducing the build-up in the Taiwan Straits seem feasible.
With respect to the overall balance, China's large and educated population, its
vast markets, its growing role in the world economy and global financial system
foreshadow an increasing capacity to pose an array of incentives and risks, the
currency of international influence.
Short of seeking to destroy China as a functioning entity, however, this
capacity is inherent in the global economic and financial processes that the US
has been pre-eminent in fostering.
In that context, the historic US aim of opposing hegemony in Asia - first
announced as a joint aim with China in the Shanghai Communique of 1972 -
remains valid. It will have to be pursued, however, primarily by political and
economic measures - albeit backed by US power.
The test of China's intentions will be whether its growing capacity will be
used to seek to exclude the US from Asia or whether it will be part of a
co-operative effort.
Paradoxically, the best strategy for achieving anti-hegemonic objectives is to
maintain close relations with all the major countries of Asia, including China.
In that sense, the rise of Asia will be a test of the US's competitiveness in
the world now emerging, especially in the countries of Asia.
The vast majority of nations view their relations with the US in terms of their
perception of their own interests. In a US confrontation with China, they will
seek to avoid choosing sides; at the same time, they will generally have
greater incentives for participating in a multilateral system with America than
adopting an exclusionary Asian nationalism.
They will not want to be seen as pieces of a US design. India, for example,
perceives ever-closer common interests with the US regarding opposition to
radical Islam, some aspects of nuclear proliferation and the integrity of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations. It sees no need to give these common
purposes an ideological or anti-Chinese character.
It finds no inconsistency between its dramatically improving relations with the
US and proclaiming a strategic partnership with China. US insistence on an
ideological crusade and on a cold war-type containment might accelerate such
gestures. And they would risk inflaming India's Muslim population.
China, in its own interest, is seeking co-operation with the US for many
reasons, including the need to close the gap between its own developed and
developing regions; the imperative of adjusting its political institutions to
the accelerating economic and technological revolutions; the potentially
catastrophic impact of a cold war with the US on the continued raising of the
standard of living, on which the legitimacy of the Government depends.
But from this it does not follow that any damage to China caused by a cold war
would benefit the US, which would have few followers anywhere in Asia. Asian
countries would continue trading with China. Whatever happens, China will not
disappear. The US interest in co-operative relations with China is for the
pursuit of world peace.
Pre-emption is not a feasible policy toward a country of China's magnitude. It
cannot be in our interest to have new generations in China grow up with a
perception of a permanently and inherently hostile US. It cannot be in China's
interest to be perceived in the US as being exclusively focused on its own
narrow domestic or Asian interests.
The issue of nuclear weapons in North Korea is an important test case. It is
often presented as an example of China's failure to fulfil all its
possibilities. But anyone familiar with Chinese conduct over the past decade
knows that China has come a long way in defining a parallel interest with
respect to doing away with the nuclear arsenal in North Korea.
Its patience in dealing with the problems is grating on some US policy makers.
But it partly reflects the reality that the North Korean problem is more
complex for China than for the US.
The US concentrates on nuclear weapons in North Korea; China is worried about
the potential for chaos along its borders. These concerns are not incompatible;
they may require enlarging the framework of discussions from North Korea to
Northeast Asia.
Attitudes are psychologically important. China needs to be careful about
policies seeming to exclude the US from Asia and our sensitivities regarding
human rights, which will influence the flexibility and scope of the US stance
toward China.
The US needs to understand that a hectoring tone evokes in China memories of
imperialist condescension and is not appropriate in dealing with a country that
has managed 4000 years of uninterrupted self-government.
As a new century begins, the relations between China and the US may well
determine whether our children will live in turmoil even worse than the 20th
century or whether they will witness a new world order compatible with
universal aspirations for peace and progress.
Henry Kissinger was US secretary of state between 1973 and 1976. He was jointly
awarded the Nobel peace prize in 1973 with Vietnamese foreign minister Le Duc
Tho; the latter refused to accept the prize.
Tribune Media Services
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