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**http://www.arabnews.com/?page=7§ion=0&article=77194&d=2&m=2&y=2006
Thursday, 2, February, 2006 (03, Muharram, 1427)
Options Before Hamas
Alon Ben-Meir, Arab News
The degree to which Hamas succeeded in the Palestinian parliamentary
elections may have come as a surprise even to close observers of the
Palestinian political scene, but Hamas' credible challenge to the dominant
Fatah should not really be a mystery. Hamas was able to fully capitalize on the
dismal social, economic and security conditions in the territories. Hamas' rise
to political prominence, however, needs not signal a doomsday scenario or,
necessarily, an end to the peace process. Hamas, if nothing else, is a
pragmatic organization and will not squander its historic political gains by
making shortsighted tactical or strategic moves that will shorten its tenure in
power.
Hamas' success was directly aided mainly by the Palestinian Authority
(PA) itself: Ordinary Palestinians had simply enough of a decade-long
corruption and cronyism, as well as its dismal failure to provide them with
basic social services. Hamas' victory was also indirectly aided by Israel when
it failed to empower President Mahmoud Abbas by refusing to make important
concessions to him, such as releasing prisoners, ending collective punishments,
removing roadblocks to allow for greater mobility, and curbing the expansion of
settlements. The United States too contributed, directly and indirectly, to
Hamas' rise to power by leaving the Israelis and Palestinians to their own
devices, to slug it out at each other. In addition, Washington pushed
prematurely for democracy without allowing time for a strong, untainted, and
liberal movement led by younger Fatah leaders to rise and counterbalance the
far better organized Hamas. And by providing financial and political support wh
ile funneling weapons to sustain an effective resistance, sympathetic states
like Syria and Iran also strengthened Hamas' position.
It is important to consider the reasons behind Hamas' rise to political
prominence because they also point out the directions and measures that Hamas
must take to fully capitalize on its stunning win. First, Hamas' victory must
be seen as a vote against the corrupt, ineffective, and chaotic governance of
the Palestinian Authority. This is important to understand because whereas
Hamas has the solid ideological support of some 25 to 30 percent of the
Palestinians, the rest of its support was simply a non-ideological vote of
protest against the PA. Should Hamas fail to deliver on its promises of social
and economic reforms that will produce immediate benefits, most of this
non-ideological support is likely to quickly evaporate. Second, it is critical
to understand that Hamas was elected during a sustained cease-fire with Israel
and not when violence was raging. A substantial majority of Palestinian (more
than 70 percent) does not want a resumption of violence, because it w
ill slow or stop the social and economic progress they so desperately need.
Quite simply, the Palestinian public is yearning for a nonviolent atmosphere in
which to prosper; Hamas was there to answer the call and must now maintain the
calm. Third, Hamas has the reputation of a clean, honest, and caring
organization that puts to the forefront the welfare and well being of ordinary
Palestinians. Fourth, Hamas is a cohesive political organization with a unified
agenda, which has provided it with a clear direction and tremendous impetus
throughout the election campaign. Finally, Hamas already enjoyed a momentum
generated from its successful municipal elections. This created an aura of
success that begot another.
The reasons behind Hamas' rise to power, however, do not eliminate the
numerous problems, some extremely daunting, that Hamas will confront unless its
leaders heed the reality in which they must operate.
Considering that the Palestinian treasury is basically empty, Hamas must
first find a way to pay the salaries for nearly 136,000 government employees.
It must also deal effectively with a restive, if not violent Fatah opposition,
especially the Aqsa Brigade and the young political leaders, who feel betrayed
by their elders. The leadership of Hamas also has to overcome the tensions
between hard-liners like Khaled Meshel in Syria who rule out any accommodation
with Israel and more moderate and pragmatic leaders like Sheikh Hussein Youssef
in the West Bank and Ismail Haniya in Gaza who understand the need for some
dialogue between the Israeli government and their own. In addition, Hamas is
under time- pressure to deliver immediate benefits that the people want and
expect. The public could become seriously exasperated by Israeli restrictions
of movement of people and goods and any impediments of travel between Gaza and
the West Bank. Finally, there is always the possibility
of initial confusions and mishaps stemming from a lack of experience in
governing.
These conditions and Hamas' pragmatism are likely to shape its behavior
for the foreseeable future and inadvertently foster moderation in both the
organization's conduct and public utterances. Hamas leaders understand that
they cannot deal with the West, especially the United States, let alone receive
financial aid, unless they renounce violence and, at a minimum, mute their
public pronouncement regarding the destruction of Israel. Any resumption of
violence against Israel will invite a massive, even disproportionate Israeli
retaliation, which will bring to a quick end any social and economic
development programs that Hamas and the Palestinian people have envisaged.
This threat will compel Hamas to continue to adhere to the cease-fire
with Israel, even if it means reining in other militant groups such as Islamic
Jihad and the Aqsa Brigade. Finally, Hamas' leaders fully realize that working
harmoniously with other Palestinian factions, especially Fatah, could be a key
to their success. Thus, they will spare no effort to do just this in the weeks
ahead. To that end, they need to secure indirect Israeli cooperation, and so
will lean heavily on Abbas to continue a dialogue with Israel; they may even
appoint a moderate and untainted prime minister to secure some concessions.
And, although it is not likely to disarm any time soon, Hamas may incorporate
its militia into the Palestinian security apparatus, while undertaking some
major reforms to streamline the security forces. At the end of the day, Hamas'
instinct for survival will govern decisions in these areas and its other future
activities.
Hamas will sooner than later realize that the rules of the game change
dramatically when it comes to governing rather than existing as a free
revolutionary movement without the responsibilities and the burdens of running
a state. If Hamas finds the path of moderation, renounces violence, and
abandons the pipe dream of destroying Israel, as has Fatah, it may finally
bring true salvation and redemption to its people. If not, its leaders will sow
with their own hands the seeds of self-destruction and inflict on the people
who put them in power more tragic losses and devastation.
- Alon Ben-Meir is professor at the Center for Global Affairs at NYU and
is the Middle East Project director at the World Policy Institute, New York.
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