The Middle East’s Military Delusions
  Jeffrey D. Sachs
  The paradox of the current violence in Israel, Gaza, and Lebanon is that the 
solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not hard to see. A large 
majority of Israelis and Palestinians favor a two-state solution essentially 
along the pre-1967 boundaries. The major Arab states, including Egypt, Saudi 
Arabia, and others, share that view. The problem lies not in seeing the 
solution, but in getting to it, because powerful and often violent minorities 
on both sides oppose the majority-backed solution. 
  Perhaps three-quarters of Israelis and Palestinians are eager for peace and 
compromise, while a quarter on each side – often fueled by extreme religious 
zeal – wants a complete victory over the other. Radical Palestinians want to 
destroy Israel, while radical Israelis demand control over the entire West 
Bank, through either continued occupation or even (according to a tiny 
minority) a forcible removal of the Palestinian population. 
  When peace appears to be close at hand, radicals on one side of the conflict 
or the other provoke an explosion to derail it. Sometimes this involves overt 
conflict between moderates and radicals within one side, such as when an 
Israeli religious zealot assassinated Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin when 
peace negotiations were making progress. Sometimes this involves a terrorist 
attack by radical Palestinians against Israeli civilians, in the hope of 
provoking an exaggerated violent response from Israel that breaks the process 
of trust building among moderates on both sides. 
  The moderates are in a daily battle with their own extremists, who claim that 
compromise is impossible. Israeli extremists insist that all Palestinians are 
intent on destroying the state of Israel itself. They take the Palestinian 
suicide bombings and kidnappings as proof that peace with the other side is 
impossible. “There are no partners for peace,” goes the refrain. 
  Palestinian extremists insist that Israel is simply plotting to maintain its 
occupation over all of Palestine and that withdrawal from Gaza or announced 
plans to withdraw partly from the West Bank are merely tactical, without giving 
up real control over land, transport, water, defense, and other attributes of 
sovereignty. 
  The extremists have been able to block peace because any attack from one side 
has systematically provoked a violent counterattack from the other. Moderates 
are repeatedly made to look weak, naïve, and idealistic. The extremists also 
peddle the appealing fantasy that total victory is somehow possible, often by 
personalizing the battle. Israeli forces regularly try to “decapitate” the 
violent opposition by killing Palestinian leaders, as if the problem were a few 
individuals rather than ongoing political stalemate. Violent Palestinians, for 
their part, propagandize that Israel will lose its nerve in the face of another 
terrorist attack. 
  In an environment as deadly as this, the details and symbolism of a possible 
settlement are bound to loom very large. Israelis and Palestinians came close 
to agreement on “land for peace” in the context of the Oslo peace process. Both 
sides endorsed something like the pre-1967 borders, yet the deal was not quite 
struck, with each side claiming intransigence by the other on one or another 
point. Such a deal can be struck now, but only by avoiding the useless debate 
over who blocked peace in the past. 
  An insight of Nobel Prize-winning game theorist Tom Schelling is especially 
useful in this context. Schelling identified the practical importance of a 
bargaining “focal point” as the way forward for negotiators who are in range of 
an agreement. The pre-1967 boundaries are the inevitable focal point in the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Both sides should agree to the pre-1967 
boundaries in principle, and then swap small land parcels and definitions of 
control (especially regarding Jerusalem) in slight and mutually convenient 
deviations from the 1967 boundaries. 
  In other words, quibbling over details should come after both sides agree on 
the principle of respect for the pre-1967 borders, which are recognized by key 
countries throughout the region and around the world, and are enshrined in 
numerous UN resolutions. 
  Today’s tragedy is that we are receding from this possible agreement. Israel 
is rightly aggrieved by the abduction of its soldiers by Hamas-backed 
insurgents in Gaza and Hezbollah forces in Southern Lebanon, but Israel’s 
massive and disproportionate military response plays into the hands of the 
extremists. 
  Indeed, each side says that the other struck first. Israel refused even to 
negotiate with the Hamas-led Palestinian government, trying to squeeze it 
financially and make it capitulate. Hamas refused to acknowledge a two-state 
solution except obliquely, and then under considerable pressure. Yet broad 
Palestinian public opinion is on the side of compromise. Blame is easy enough 
to assign, but misses the point. Compromise based on the pre-1967 borders is 
the way to peace. 
  Nor is the United States playing a stabilizing role. It, too, is playing into 
the hands of extremists by fighting terrorism with military rather than 
political means. Just as the war in Iraq was a mistaken response to the threat 
of al-Qaeda, the Bush administration’s green light to Israel’s military 
assaults in Gaza and Lebanon offers no real solution. The US and other powerful 
outside parties should be pressing both sides to the focal point solution, not 
sitting on their hands as the violence spirals out of control. 
  The most powerful ideology in the world today is self-determination. Until 
there is a Palestinian state and an Iraq free of US occupation, Islamic 
extremists will win recruits. Military reprisals will swell their ranks still 
further, and, until political grievances are addressed, the spread of democracy 
will not change that equation, because the extremists will win at the ballot 
box. 
  In short, specific terrorist threats should be fought through narrowly 
targeted counter-terrorist operations, while moderates should undercut 
extremism through the politics of compromise rather than the false and 
dangerous delusions of military victory. 
  ** Jeffrey Sachs is Professor of Economics and Director of the Earth 
Institute at Columbia University. 
  Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2006. 
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/sachs113 

                
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