31 August - 6 September 2006
Issue No. 810
Opinion
Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2006/810/op2.htm
The shaping of cultures
It was the singular character of Hizbullah that allowed it to resist the might
of the Israeli military machine. It is a character that the group must not
allow to be diluted, writes Azmi Bishara
When you take a look around the Arab world today, what do you see?
You see sons being groomed for monarchical succession in republics that are
still caricatures of Bonapartism and Mameluke despotism. Ironically, these
heirs apparent always begin their careers by condemning corruption, yet they
are one of the foremost manifestations of corruption.
You see CNN's Rolf Blister questioning the Iraqi president as though he were on
trial: "Do you recognise Israel or not?" Nur Al-Maliki squirms under the
interrogation, unable to pluck up the courage to say that that's the last thing
on his mind at a time when his country is falling apart. But recognition of
Israel is what the American media thinks is important about Iraq, and will
continue to think even after no walls are left standing.
There is the division into regional axes, with political leaders changing
positions as though they were playing musical chairs. One day they'll deride
Arab nationalism and Arab identity if it is used to promote modernism, to
resist Israel or combat the American drive to partition Iraq. The next day
they'll turn around and use these concepts against Iran. Just to hear a Saudi
official defending Arab identity makes your head spin.
There is the Palestinian government under siege, Palestinian society being
destroyed. International delegations meet the Palestinian president and snub
the democratically elected Palestinian government, while in Lebanon they meet
the government and snub the president. Washington could not order non-Arab
countries such as Turkey or Russia not to receive elected Hamas officials but
it has no problem laying down the law with Arab governments. The same
governments which attacked Hizbullah because of its Shia affiliation are the
same ones that attack Sunni-affiliated Hamas. Such are the inconsistencies of
the pro-American axis.
You see the promotion of Resolution 1701 as an achievement even though it is
much worse than 1559, and the Lebanese resistance condemned for its Syrian and
Iranian connections and for having brought trouble to Lebanon. Yet when Syria
and Iran celebrate the victory of this "Syrian-Iranian" resistance movement
they are accused of intervening in Lebanese affairs. As for the resistance's
Arab enemies, they either question whether there was a victory at all or they
attribute it to the Lebanese government.
Even more worrying is the unprecedented drive to inflame sectarian discord and
drive a wedge between Sunni and Shia Muslims, as though they were mutually
hostile tribal groups rather than adherents to differing Islamic doctrines. In
the past, non-democratic governments based their legitimacy upon a doctrine of
national unity that they were uniquely poised to embody. Now we see non-
democratic regimes fuelling sectarian strife and national disunity in order to
perpetuate themselves.
In contrast to the foregoing, we can take heart in the Arab people's rejection
of the sectarian bait. Popular support for the Lebanese resistance was
widespread, proving that Arab identity is alive in spite of everything. Arab
popular support for the predominantly Shia Lebanese resistance was at least as
strong as it was for the Sunni Taliban at the time of the American invasion of
Afghanistan. When it comes to hostility towards American and Israeli policies,
Arab ties prevail over sectarian ones.
People were greatly impressed by the model the Lebanese resistance set and by
its ability to deliver a stunning blow to the Israeli assault and to anti-Arab
stereotypes. This impression has set in motion a fermentation that will have
far-reaching effects in the long run, and this, too, is positive. It should now
be clear to all that the Arab public is not interested in agreements with
Israel that are prejudicial to the Arabs in general, and to the Palestinians in
particular.
I demonstrated my respect and sympathy for the resistance during its ordeal and
the jubilant aftermath. I stood by it when others remained silent because under
such circumstances moral support must take precedence. Even now it is important
to realise that the war against the resistance is not over, which is why one
must bear in mind the source of any criticism. Enemies of the resistance have
aired objections that could reasonably be accepted by the movement's supporters
were they not obviously aimed to undermine the resistance. The following
criticisms are offered by way of support of the resistance.
I believe that the Iranian-supported Lebanese party should not act towards Iran
as communist parties acted towards Moscow in the days of the Soviet Union. Iran
is not infallible, and it is certainly less than innocent in Iraq, where it is
helping to promote sectarian strife in order to further its own regional
ambitions. One can understand Hizbullah's predicament because of its material
dependence on Iran. However, the party still has considerable room for
manoeuvre because of the popular support it has received in the Arab world,
which it can turn to its advantage without having to lose Iran's support.
Nor should we expect Hizbullah to get all worked up over Kofi Annan's visit, as
if its greatest hope was for recognition from the UN secretary-general. After
all, the UN official was there to put into effect a resolution that is unjust
to Lebanon and its resistance movement.
Modesty, action instead of words, persistence, organisation and judgement are
the qualities that have distinguished Hizbullah over the past two decades,
giving the Lebanese resistance its unique character. The party's greatest
success is in having developed a workable model for resistance, ending
inferiority complexes and defeatist theories based on the notion that Arabs are
culturally or genetically flawed.
In the wake of the recent victory, even immediately preceding it, there were
some ominous signs. Not only were there displays of pictures of Iranian
leaders, reminiscent of the Arab communists' displays of socialist leaders in
the past, as if they were new religious icons, but kitschy portraits of the
Hizbullah leader began to appear on private and public buildings, cars, in
restaurants and stores. Of course there is no comparing this with the
ubiquitous pictures of regime leaders that Arab governments force on their
publics. The proliferation of Nasrallah images was spontaneous and reflected
genuine popular admiration and widespread support for the resistance.
Nevertheless, one would think that a party bearing a liberationist message
would strive to minimise this type of personality cult, which has always been a
product of folk faith and official encouragement. Instead the party is
fostering it through its publications and media.
Generally, political movements tend to condemn this phenomenon only in others.
Arab nationalists condemned the hero worship of Stalin yet these same people
turned Gamal Abdel-Nasser into an icon in a similar way. The revolutionary
left, which scoffed at both Stalinists and Nasserists, pinned up its pictures
of Marx and Che Guevara. The problem with this is that it obviates critical
thought because it voids the symbols of the ideas they are meant to embody. To
personify an idea by vesting symbolic meaning in an individual is to elevate
that individual beyond criticism. This immunity must inevitably alter the
quality of the idea itself.
No one in the West would know the daughter of Guevara. Yet she was received in
Lebanon as if she was the member of a royal dynasty in line for succession.
That's how things work in Lebanon. Religious affiliations are an important part
of politics and social life, but ultimately everything boils down to powerful
family dynasties. Hizbullah has stood as a remarkable exception. Its leaders
fought with their own sons on the field of battle and paid the price instead of
sending other people's sons off to war as they groomed their own to take over.
This policy has won Hizbullah respect among Lebanese and Arab forces. It would
be a pity if this model was now sullied by personality cults.
Democracy is not a panacea that will solve all our problems. The history of
democracy is full of attempts to falsify the popular will, to delude the
people, to purchase power, to use sensationalism and mass media chicanery to
turn opinion in a particular direction. Yet whatever its failings, it is
difficult to imagine such leader worship in a democracy, regardless of how
popular a leader is. Democracy, democratic institutions and the rule of law are
inherently averse to the adulation of political leaders. Democratic societies
seem to have channelled the inclination to hero worship into the alternative
"religions" of mass consumer societies, which take as their temples the stage
and screen and sporting arenas. The daily brass tacks of politics keep
politicians far too busy to become media celebrities, apart from at campaign
time. In the Arab world, by contrast, the cult of the ruler is usually pursued
in inverse proportion to his political legitimacy.
Hizbullah is not the ruling party, though you would never guess given the
adoration accorded to its leaders. But even if it were just a resistance
movement such personality cultism is inconsistent with its function. I know
that a large portion of the resistance's leadership would agree with me on this
point, though they would hold that the cult comes with the territory, is a
product of a process of mobilisation that draws on both political and religious
sentiments. They would add that it is a healthy expression of self-respect to
brandish pictures of resistance leaders in the faces of the dynastic heads of
the various religious denominations who do not have to lift a finger to have
their pictures posted around the country while simultaneously ridiculing the
ubiquitous pictures of rulers in neighbouring countries. All this is true, but
the party is still responsible for the type of culture it is disseminating.
What are we to make, for example, of such post- war declarations as "my
children died as martyrs in the cause of Al-Sayid," or "this house was
destroyed by the Israeli bombardment, but to those concerned the house was
offered as tribute to Al-Sayid". Obviously these are expressions of sacrifice
for the sake of the resistance or the national cause. They are meant to affirm
the determination to remain steadfast and to challenge anyone who tries to
drive a wedge between the resistance and the families that lost their homes or
loved ones. That is the political message of such declarations. But it is one
thing for people to say such things in private and quite another for Hizbullah
to broadcast them through its media. The latter represents a conscious attempt
to shape a culture favorable to the party. Such a culture may be useful when
directed against foreign invaders but it cannot combat social and economic
backwardness, political regression, corruption, exploitation, sectarianism and
nepotism.
Some presume that the culture of the resistance offers an alternative to the
general spectacle of an Arab world that has succumbed to all of the above. The
phenomena I have described though, suggests the opposite. This is not because
of its sectarian character, which is unavoidable given conditions in Lebanon.
In fact, Hizbullah deserves credit for its openness to other
political/sectarian forces and the model of religious tolerance it has
presented. However, it has not presented Lebanon with a non- sectarian model.
Even if Hizbullah's origins are a natural product of the Lebanese environment
we could hope it might offer an alternative. The party has every right to boast
of offering a model of dedication and organisation at the level of the
resistance, but it has not offered an alternative vision for society. The
resistance culture Hizbullah is fostering is a culture determined to reject
foreign hegemony and adopt modern and rational means to organise and equip the
party and its social bases towards that end. This is precisely why it is
difficult to imagine a resistance leader squirming before a foreign journalist
asking him whether he is going to recognise Israel. But this culture does not
offer an alternative to the Arab world's prevalent political culture. Perhaps
this is not Hizbullah's historic mission. Perhaps it should not be asked to
perform this mission. But an alternative to the prevailing political and social
culture is urgently needed throughout the Arab world. Imitating Hizbullah is
not the answer, because the nature of the mission is not the same.
[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
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Berdikusi dg Santun & Elegan, dg Semangat Persahabatan. Menuju Indonesia yg
Lebih Baik, in Commonality & Shared Destiny.
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