<http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/HJ19Ae02.html>


Southeast Asia

Oct 19, 2006  
  
--------------------------------------- 
Behold Indonesia's democratic beacon 
---------------------------------------


By Shawn W Crispin 

With Thailand under military-appointed rule, the 
Philippines fresh off a stint of martial law and 
an unresolved vote-rigging scandal and the rest 
of Southeast Asia under hard and soft authoritarian 
yokes, Indonesia has clearly emerged as the region's 
healthiest, most vibrant functioning democracy. 

Eight years after launching a highly ambitious 
political reform program, Indonesia has surprised 
many analysts and academics by how quickly and 
smoothly the world's fourth-largest country has 
consolidated meaningful democratic gains. Indonesia 
has since 1998 overhauled every fundamental aspect 
of its former authoritarian state, including an 
amended constitution, a more powerful parliament 
and a reformed election system. 

The country's first-ever direct presidential elections 
in 2004, in which former general Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
was elected on a strong reform ticket, represented a 
democratic high-water mark. What's gone less noticed 
over that same period have been 250 or so different 
local-level elections, which are now contested down 
to the grassroots regent level. 

Breaking with former strongman Suharto's top-down New 
Order regime, Indonesia's peripheral populations are 
now less captive to the interests and abuses of local 
political heavies, who under Suharto often inserted 
themselves as gatekeepers to financial and natural 
resources through central government authority. While 
many attempted to co-opt new democratic institutions 
to perpetuate their power, nearly 40% of local level 
incumbents have in recent years been booted from office 
at the ballot box. 

In certain conflict-plagued regions, local democracy 
is even having a healing effect. According to a recent 
report in the Jakarta-based Van Zorge Report, head and 
vice head candidates, often representing respectively 
localities' Muslim majority and Christian minority 
populations, have frequently teamed up to beat competing 
candidates who ran on a one-religion ticket. That is, 
local-level democracy is rewarding politicians who form 
religiously inclusive, not exclusive, coalitions. 

Since 2001, Indonesia has implemented one of Asia's - 
if not the world's - most ambitious decentralization 
programs, rapidly devolving decision-making authority 
and control of resources from the center to the periphery. 
Many pundits predicted that rushed decentralization would 
lead to violent Balkanization across the sprawling archipelago, 
where historically aggrieved, suddenly empowered populations 
straddling resource-rich areas would opt to secede rather than 
cooperate with Jakarta. 

Yet only East Timor has so far moved to break away - and 
some would argue in the wake of recent civil unrest there 
to disastrous effect. The long-running rebellion in Papua 
province has recently lost steam as local-level democratic 
institutions take deeper root. And Jakarta's promise of 
more local autonomy for Aceh province has brought that 
grinding 30-year conflict to a democratic conclusion. 

Michael Malley, an Indonesia expert at the Naval 
Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, notes in a 
recent Van Zorge Report interview that no new breakaway 
armed insurgent groups have emerged since the promulgation 
of the 1998 decentralization reforms. Previously among 
the skeptics, he said: "Many have been surprised that 
such enormous change could take place without national 
disintegration." 

More significantly, Indonesia's extraordinary democratic 
progress has put the lie to academic debates about whether 
Islam and democracy can peacefully co-exist. Predictions 
that dismantling Suharto's highly secular state institutions 
would lead to a coincident rise in Islamic fundamentalism 
have notably not panned out. Political parties that have 
campaigned on strict Islamic platforms fared poorly against 
more secular candidates at the 2004 parliamentary polls. 

Fundamentalists elected on anti-corruption tickets that have 
since attempted to push Islamic-tinged legislation in parliament, 
including a controversial anti-pornography bill, have seen their 
popularity fall dramatically in public opinion polls. (See The 
decline of political Islam in Indonesia, March 28, 2006) 

Rapid transition 
----------------
To be sure, the rapid transition from a highly centralized 
to a highly decentralized political system has been attended 
by growing pains, including widespread confusion about where 
real decision-making authority lies over certain jurisdictions. 

Investors reportedly carp that they now must pay bribes 
not only to central government authorities, but also provincial 
and local-level officials to seal business deals. Provincial 
and local-level officials have quibbled over jurisdiction 
of tax revenues, which in turn has raised hard questions 
about responsibility for the provision of public utilities. 
Central government corruption has in many areas merely been 
replaced by local-level graft. 

At the same time, democratization and decentralization are
unmistakably leading to unprecedented rural empowerment - 
more so than Thailand's highly touted, fiscally unsustainable, 
top-down populist rural handouts, and streets ahead of the 
Philippines' unreformed feudal countryside, where a clutch 
of elite families still owns the majority of land. Indonesian 
democracy is paying broad dividends through greater political 
stability, a more equitable distribution of natural and financial 
resources to the local level and slowly but surely more reactive, 
inclusive local governance. 

Those burnished democratic credentials are fast improving 
Western perceptions about Indonesia, which was widely viewed 
as a basket case in the chaotic aftermath of the 1997-98 
economic crisis, and as a haven for international terrorism 
in the wake of the 2002 Bali bombing. 

US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice strongly praised 
Indonesia's democratic progress during her recent visit to 
Jakarta - though realpolitik motivations of counterbalancing 
China may have colored her upbeat assessment. Yet it was no 
surprise that Indonesia this month won in a landslide the 
right to Asia's revolving allocated seat on the United Nations 
Security Council. 

Some viewed that as a reward for Indonesia's new strong 
democratic leadership role inside the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN), particularly in addressing member state 
Myanmar's worsening political and humanitarian crisis. And 
although criticized domestically for the US$43 million price 
tag, Jakarta's recent decision to send professional peacekeeping 
forces under the auspices of the UN to Lebanon speaks to 
Indonesia's desire to serve as an honest democratic broker 
between Islam and the West in the Middle East. 

President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono deserves much credit 
for presiding over and not obstructing the latest phases 
of Indonesia's remarkable democratic transition. Yet he has 
been widely criticized in the local media for his slow, 
deliberate, consensus-building leadership style - particularly 
in relation to his management of the economy, which some 
Jakarta-based analysts contend needs a quick fiscal kick 
through accelerated infrastructure spending. (See Need for 
speed in Indonesia, September 19) 

But good governance in a checked and balanced democratic 
system is often by necessity slow-moving. Much of the 
grumbling about Yudhoyono's deliberate decision-making 
arises from an increasingly marginalized political elite, 
who received more generous, less scrutinized government 
contracts and concessions under strongman Suharto. Meanwhile, 
Yudhoyono's anti-corruption campaign - though by no means 
as deep-reaching as it could be - has ruffled certain 
politically powerful feathers, down to the grassroots level. 

Yudhoyono's party's small numbers in parliament has meant 
some of his more ambitious reform initiatives have been 
quashed by opposition forces, fairly or unfairly fueling 
perceptions about his ineffectual democratic leadership. 
But that check on presidential power also speaks to the 
significant decentralization of national power, recently 
devolved by law from the executive to the legislative branch. 

It's no longer a question of whether Indonesia's elected 
politicians are truly democratic, but rather whether they 
are effective leaders and custodians of their respective 
national, provincial or local interests. As seen at the 
local and provincial levels, if national perceptions grow 
that Yudhoyono isn't performing up to expectation, Indonesia's 
newly demanding voters will replace him with a candidate 
perceived to be more able at the 2009 direct presidential 
polls. 

Pity the rest of Southeast Asia, which by comparison doesn't 
have that same democratic choice. 

** Shawn W Crispin is Asia Times Online's Southeast Asia editor. 



Kirim email ke