http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20090407/120956498.html
*U.S. analyst says Russia, U.S. leaders seek pragmatic approach* *Stephen Sestanovich*, former special adviser to the U.S. secretary of state, comments on the recent meeting in London between the Russian and American leaders, and on bilateral relations in general, in an interview with Dmitry Gornostaev, the RIA Novosti New York Bureau Chief. Q: President Obama has announced significant initiatives in nuclear affairs promising to put the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) on vote for ratification in Senate. Does it mark the beginning of a completely new U.S. nuclear policy? Why did he decide to make this announcement in such a complicated situation after the North Korea's missile launch? Will his proposal enjoy a wide support on the Capitol Hill? A: For years people who said that Barack Obama did not have much knowledge, interest, or experience in international affairs recognized one big exception to this statement -- nuclear security and non-proliferation. In 2005, in his first year as a senator he joined his colleague senator Richard Lugar on a trip to former Soviet states to study the progress of the so-called Nunn-Lugar program, a long-standing American assistance effort concerned with the control and safe handling of dangerous nuclear materials. I will admit that at the time my interpretation was that a very young senator was simply trying to prove that he had some international expertise. But over time it has become clear that the spread of nuclear weapons is a genuine personal concern for Obama. It is one of a small group of issues that he keeps returning to because he considers them especially important. As he tries to build congressional support for his ideas, the President's strong personal conviction will be a big asset for him, and will increase the chances of early senate ratification of the comprehensive test ban treaty. As you may know, even a respected and moderate republican like senator Lugar opposed the treaty when it last came up for a vote ten years ago. Obama will need to be able to persuade the senator that times -- and technology -- have changed, and that ratifying the treaty today will not undermine our national security. North Korea's missile launch -- and a growing fear that a new increase in the number of states with nuclear weapons is about to take place -- will give extra force and urgency to the president's argument. But don't forget the personal dimension: he will also be helped by the fact that four years ago, when he was a young senator, he and Lugar became allies on this issue. Q: The two Presidents have agreed to start talks on the new strategic arms reduction treaty. What levels of nuclear war-heads can be discussed? What numbers can be comfortable for U.S. and for Russia in terms of keeping their ability to meet current and future military challenges? Is there a theoretical possibility of complete nuclear disarmament? A: The possibility of complete nuclear disarmament is so distant that in the short term no one will work on it directly. Reduction of nuclear forces even to much lower levels can only be preceded, as its advocates recognize, by many preliminary steps. That's why Obama and Medvedev have agreed that the first step should simply be to reduce strategic nuclear forces to levels a little bit below those that Presidents Bush and Putin agreed to in 2002. That will probably not be the last step, but it's the right step for now. I should add that our negotiators may discover that Russia and America don't actually see the future of nuclear weapons in the same way. Many Russian observers and officials have suggested that your country will have to rely more, not less, on nuclear weapons in assuring its security. When he spoke at the ministry of defense recently, President Medvedev himself said that it was an urgent task to increase the readiness of Russia's strategic nuclear forces. I think it's almost inconceivable that President Obama would say such a thing about our forces. Our negotiators will try to discover whether there's a significant difference here. Q: What is your overall estimation of the meeting? Do you think that the results reached in London were quite predictable or they went far beyond the expectations? A: The meeting -- and the statements issued -- were very predictable, but that doesn't mean they were unsuccessful. Both sides wanted to convey a pragmatic message, and they succeeded. Of course, more detailed talks are needed for breakthroughs. I thought Obama and Medvedev were right to avoid overly favorable phrases to describe relations between Russia and America. You may recall that a year ago, at their declaration at Sochi, Bush and Putin used terms like "partnership" and "friendship." Even then, those terms sounded hollow. In staying away from empty labels, the two new Presidents signaled that they want to focus on achievements, not on rhetoric; that they don't mind acknowledging their disagreements; and that they need to find out what's possible before they start proclaiming that we're partners. That's a step forward. Q: Do you believe in the relations between our two countries based on a set of exchanges like, for example, US slowing or abandoning the ABM deployment in Europe for Russia's strengthening pressure on Iran and North Korea? Many Russian analysts cast doubts that the Kremlin can officially and practically engage itself in a quid pro quo dialogue with Washington. What's your opinion? A: I have been skeptical of this quid pro quo approach. Yes, diplomatic progress is always based on some degree of compromise and even what we call horse-trading. But even horse-trading depends on a measure of mutual confidence, and right now that confidence is lacking. Each side has become suspicious of the other's motives. Before talking about mutual concessions, each government needs a little practical evidence that the other is serious about solving problems. If neither side really believes that our strategic interests overlap, then even minor compromises can seem more costly than they should. Q: Will the Obama administration keep the same degree of pressuring Russia on the issues of human rights and energy supplies to Europe or promoting the political dialogue may become more important? A: All these issues are likely to remain part of the dialogue. To my mind, one of the most interesting elements of the meeting between Obama and Medvedev was that the American president chose to ask about the beating of Lev Ponomarev, the well-known human rights advocate, which occurred in Moscow the day before. Since president Medvedev has spoken so often and so publicly about the importance of strengthening the rule of law, this was perhaps a natural topic of conversation. But it would be good to find new and more productive ways of discussing these issues. After all, it's not necessary to treat them simply as a tool of pressure on Russia. Russia has its own reasons to want to strengthen the rule of law. President Medvedev, I thought, recognized this when he said last year that Russia cannot enjoy the full respect of other countries unless it makes progress in this area. As for energy, this issue has been given a very high priority by President Obama. I would expect him to come back to it again and again. Q: The Presidents avoided - at least on public - discussing the issues of engaging Georgia and Ukraine into NATO. Will these issues remain among the irritating points in the dialogue between Moscow and Washington? A: I think these issues will probably receive less attention in the period immediately ahead, but it is very unlikely that there will a complete change of American policy. If the U.S. rules out the idea of NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia, how can it keep open the idea of membership for Russia? The open door policy is not for some states only. What's most likely, in my view, is that in the next few years Russia, Georgia and Ukraine -- and why not Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan too? -- will all deepen their cooperation with NATO, but without immediate reference to the question of membership in the Alliance. Of course, as their cooperation deepens the issue will naturally arise. Let's hope that it will be treated less emotionally in the future. The political emotionalism surrounding this issue in the past several years reflects a lack of maturity in our relations. Consider the very different way it has been handled in relations between the U.S. and China. No serious Chinese official would think of saying that the alliance between America and Japan, or between America and South Korea, is a threat to china's security. Q: On Russia's accession to World Trade Organization, Obama and Medvedev - as their predecessors have done many times - said that they would ask their governments to act for completing the process of engaging Russia into WTO. Will this declared intention be implemented or will it be dissolved eventually again? Do you think that Obama really wants Russia to join WTO? A: The global economic crisis may well make it a bit harder for Russia to enter the WTO, but I am confident that President Obama favors early accession. Bringing Russia's trade relations into the framework of the WTO will be good for everybody, particularly at a time when protectionist pressures are growing in all countries. If, however, Russia's accession is delayed, I hope that the congress will act separately on a related issue -- that is, removing Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union from the coverage of the so-called Jackson-Vanik amendment. This piece of legislation played a very positive role during the cold war, as a symbol of support for human rights. But it does not play a positive role today. Some people in Russia mistakenly believe that the Jackson-Vanik amendment blocks economic cooperation between our two countries; it actually has no role of any kind, except as a symbolic irritant. President Obama should seek to put aside this inheritance of Soviet times. And he can do so while making clear his support for strengthening the rule of law in all former Soviet states. Stephen Sestanovich is a former special adviser to the secretary of state on policy toward newly independent states, and is now the Columbia University Professor and Senior Fellow for Russian and Eurasian Studies in the Council on Foreign Relations. New York [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
