http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article/1016/42/379522.htm
Craving to Be a Great Power
15 July 2009By Richard Pipes
In relations between sovereign nations, nothing is more important than
understanding the culture of the countries with which one is dealing. Without
this understanding, there can be tragic consequences. If the Japanese in 1941
had understood the American psyche, they would never have attacked Pearl Harbor
in the vain hope that once a major part of its Pacific Fleet had been
destroyed, the United States would sue for peace. Similarly, the Germans would
not have attacked the Soviet Union if they had known how the Russians
traditionally reacted to invasions by foreign "infidels."
I have a feeling that Western politicians have made little effort to understand
the mentality of the Russian people and leaders. And yet we have a great deal
of evidence from public opinion polls and Russian politicians to convey what it
is they want and what it is they fear.
For one, Russians crave the status of being a velikaya derzhava (great power).
They feel that they are entitled to this status since Russia has the largest
landmass in the world, one that covers most of Eurasia and stretches from the
Baltic to the Pacific. The other component of Russia's great power status is
the country's grand accomplishments, such as breaking the back of the German
army in World War II and sending the first man into space.
The astonishing popularity of a monster like Josef Stalin is primarily due to
the fact that he had made Russia a power that was universally respected because
it was feared. This craving assumes obsessive forms, particularly because
Russians suspect deep in their hearts that their claim to this status is
dubious - that they are not really a great power in economic, political or
military terms. This obsession compensates for the inferiority complex that a
majority of Russians feel when they compare themselves with genuine great
powers, notably the United States.
Precisely because of this inferiority complex, it is important to treat
Russians with deference and to consider their opinions. It is also important to
understand what is behind their attempt to be a spoiler in global affairs. When
the Kremlin says "no" to Western initiatives, Russians feel that they are
indeed a world power. Their uncontrollable fury at the West's behavior in
Kosovo, for example, derived from the sense of frustration that their wishes
had been ignored.
The other cultural factor to take into consideration when dealing with Russians
is their imperial tradition. One prominent peculiarity of Russian historical
development was that the growth of its nation state, Muscovy, occurred
concurrently with the growth of its empire. When Ivan IV conquered Kazan and
Astrakhan in the 16th century, acquiring Muslim subjects and opening the gates
to Siberia, the Russian state was just beginning to coalesce. This differed
from the situation in Western Europe, where the acquisition of colonies
followed rather than accompanied the creation of the state. As a result,
Western powers could let go of their empires without suffering a loss of ethnic
identify, but the loss of Russia's colonial possessions in 1991 was a far more
traumatic experience. To this day, the end of the Russian/Soviet empire is a
tragic historical episode for Russians and it has little to do with communism.
Many Russians continue to regard Ukraine, the Caucasus and Central Asia as
integral parts of the Russian realm.
What this means is that foreign powers have to be extremely careful in
encroaching on these regions. U.S. President Barack Obama was correct in
stressing during the summit last week that the former Soviet republics are now
sovereign states and hence free to conduct their foreign policy as they see
fit. Nonetheless, it is equally true that the United States, which is home to
the Monroe Doctrine for the American continent, should respect Russia's
sensitivities in this respect. Opinion polls indicate that a majority of
Russians regard NATO as a hostile force. For this reason proposing that former
Soviet republics join NATO is dangerous, and this is particularly true for
Ukraine. If Kiev were ever to join NATO, it is likely that the Kremlin would
seriously consider military intervention as a response.
On the other hand, I do not advise Washington to yield to Moscow on all issues
relating to what its leaders call their "privileged zone of influence." The
proposal to install elements of a missile defense system in Poland and the
Czech Republic, for example, is in the interest of U.S. security and should be
implemented. A few military officials who do not submissively toe the Kremlin
line - for example, General Vladimir Dvorkin - openly admit that 10
interceptors and a radar system in Central Europe do not and cannot threaten
Russia's security.
The United States should not hesitate to condemn Russia's invasion of Georgia
or the spurious "independence" of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It should feel
free to criticize Russian behavior when it violates the rules of civilized
behavior at home or abroad. At the same time, we should be aware of their
sensitivities and avoid unnecessarily irritating them in word and deed.
Richard Pipes is professor of history, emeritus at Harvard University and
author, most recently, of "Russian Conservatism and Its Critics."
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