http://www.gulfnews.com/opinion/columns/region/10333097.html
AP
Voters crowd around the ballot box in Najaf province
southwest of Baghdad on October 15, 2002, during the referendum in which
then-President Saddam Hussain was re-elected for another term.
Saddam said he acceded to party's call
Agencies
Published: July 20, 2009, 23:03
Shortly after his arrest in December 2003, former Iraqi president
Saddam Hussain was interrogated by the FBI.
The secret interrogation documents, which were made public only
recently by the National Security Archive, an independent non-governmental
research institute in the US, shed light on the state of mind of Saddam,
executed in December 2006.
In this series, Gulf News is running the transcripts of the 20
formal interrogations and 5 'casual conversations' he had with a senior FBI
agent. In this eighth session, Saddam recalls how he was forced take leadership
of the Baath and eventually president of Iraq.
Session 8
February 20, 2004
Baghdad Operations Centre
Interview conducted by George L. Piro
Saddam Hussain (High Value Detainee No 1) was interviewed on
February 20, 2004 at a military detention facility at Baghdad International
Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Saddam provided the following information:
Prior to the start of the interview Saddam was informed this
session would be a continuation of the three previous discussions, focusing on
his ascendancy to the presidency.
Beginning in 1973, Iraqi President Ahmad Hassan Al Bakr began
having health problems including issues with his heart. Despite these problems,
Al Bakr performed his duties as best as he could.
Periodically, Al Bakr told Saddam that he should retire and that he
could no longer fulfil his duties as president.
Saddam was unaware whether Al Bakr made such comments to others
within the Baath party leadership. Saddam stated Al Bakr felt close to Saddam.
Around this time, Saddam seriously considered leaving the
government but remaining in the party. His main reason for wanting to leave
government was linked to the overthrow of the Baath government in 1963.
Saddam believed this overthrow occurred because the party
leadership concentrated on the government and forgot about the party.
Saddam did not like the power and his position in the government.
When he joined the revolution of 1968, his intention was not to stay in
government. Saddam had planned to stay involved only within the cells of the
party at the lower levels.
At that time, he believed it would be a "shame to serve in the
government". Until this day, Saddam still does not like government. He likes
the people and the party, but believes it is difficult for the government to
judge fairly.
Saddam observed individuals he described as "kind and gentle"
before serving in the government who subsequently "became the opposite after
their appointments to government positions".
After the 1968 revolution, a governing Revolutionary Command
Council (RCC) was formed. However, the announcement of the RCC was not made,
until one year later in 1969.
The members of the RCC, with the exception of the military members,
were not and "did not want to be known". For this reason, the announcement of
the RCC was delayed.
Saddam was "forced" to take a leadership position in the RCC. Party
members asked Saddam whether he wanted the revolution to fail, implying it
would without his participation, and that it was his responsibility to be a
party leader.
Saddam wanted Al Bakr to remain as president for as long as
possible, describing him as a "nice person". In 1979, however, Al Bakr
contacted Saddam and asked him to meet in the Presidential Palace.
At this meeting, Al Bakr told Saddam he no longer wanted nor felt
able to serve as president. Al Bakr implored Saddam to assume his duties,
telling him if he did not accept the "normal method of appointment as
president, he would use the radio to make an announcement that Saddam was now
president".
Saddam told Al Bakr that this means of announcing a "successor
would not be good for the country, the people, or the party.
Outsiders, or foreigners, especially would have thought something
was wrong within Iraq". Thereafter, Tareq Aziz was asked to prepare an
announcement regarding the change of leadership. A meeting of the RCC was
convened in July, 1979. Saddam is unsure whether he or Al Bakr called the
meeting.
At the meeting, Al Bakr explained to the RCC members that he had
wanted to step down since 1973. He further explained to the members that Saddam
was ready to assume the presidency.
Saddam described the meeting as being "like a family gathering".
There were many emotions present, including sadness.
The transfer of the presidency to Saddam was conducted according to
the Constitution. Saddam stated a vote was taken, but he does not remember
whether it was by secret ballot or by raising hands.
He was designated Secretary-General of the party and President of
Iraq. When asked whether Saddam observed any changes in himself upon assuming
the presidency, he responded: "No", and stated he became "stronger and closer
to the people".
When asked what he believed would have happened to himself if he
had been allowed to leave government, Saddam replied he would have been a
regular person, possibly a farmer. He would, however, have continued as a party
member and continued attending meetings of the party.
The interviewer noted his own personal opinion that it would be
difficult to imagine Saddam as a farmer. Saddam stated he was afraid to become
a public figure. He stated that his situation changed as did his obligations,
becoming almost personal.
Saddam observed that while he served as president, thousands of
people viewed themselves as being close to him.
Until 1995, people did not elect him, rather Saddam stated, "The
revolution brought me". After 1995 and 2002, the people did, in fact, vote for
and elect Saddam.
After the elections, his relationship with the people became
stronger, and Saddam now felt an obligation to those who had voted for him. He
was not only obligated to the people by law, but also to the people "in front
of God".
Saddam was questioned whether, at the meeting where Al Bakr
announced his resignation, the entire RCC supported his becoming president.
Saddam responded there was nothing or no one against him to become
the leader. Morally and out of respect for Al Bakr, some members asked the
president to stay.
Al Bakr, however, did not allow their wishes to influence his final
decision. Saddam viewed Al Bakr's decision as final because he, himself, could
not convince Al Bakr to remain as president.
The interviewer noted reports which stated there was at least one
outspoken person - Muhie Abdul Saddam Mashhadi - at the meeting who questioned
Al Bakr's retirement and stated that Saddam's selection should be unanimous.
Saddam stated this information is not correct. There was discussion
about Al Bakr's resignation but no talk about the process for selecting Saddam.
Others offered to assume some of Al Bakr's duties so that he might
be able to remain as president. He did not accept these offers, however.
At that time, Saddam was deputy secretary-general of the party and
vice-president of Iraq. As such, he was next in line to become president, a
fact which could not have been questioned.
Additionally, the Constitution specifically stated any selection of
the president had to be made by a majority, not unanimous, vote. Some members
talked about the possibility of postponing Al Bakr's resignation.
Saddam stated there are former RCC members still alive who can be
questioned regarding this matter. The interviewer stated several former RCC
members generally agree on the details provided by Saddam about: this event.
However, some former RCC members also provided information
indicating Mashhadi voiced his opposition to Al Bakr's resignation and Saddam's
selection as president at the referenced RCC meeting. Saddam replied that he
had told the interviewer all the details known to him.
The interviewer stated a plot against Saddam was discovered shortly
after he assumed the presidency. An infamous meeting took place on July 22,
1979 whereupon the details of the plot were revealed to senior members of the
party.
The interviewer added that the meeting was recorded on video tape,
viewed by the interviewer. Saddam stated this matter was not a secret and the
video was given to all party members. Saddam does not remember whether the
meeting was opened with comments by Taha Yasin Ramadan.
He acknowledged that Mashhadi was brought before the assembly,
admitted his participation in a plot against Saddam involving the Syrian
government, and named some of the others who participated in the plot.
Saddam's reaction and feelings were the same as anyone who had been
betrayed by friends in the party and the government, sadness and a feeling of
being "back-stabbed".
This was especially true because the plot involved Arabs outside
the government and country. Saddam described these actions as treason and the
participants as traitors.
Regarding when Saddam became aware of the plot, he responded: "At
that time." The interviewer pointed out that Mashhadi was arrested a few days
before the meeting, approximately July 15, after Saddam became president.
Saddam stated he became president on July 17. The interviewer
responded that July 17 was the official date, although Saddam had actually
assumed the presidency almost one week prior.
The interviewer questioned Saddam as to how the plot was
discovered. Saddam asked, "Did you hear the video?" He added that the
information on the video should be enough.
The interviewer noted the video did not provide details about how
the plot was discovered. Saddam responded: "These are secrets of the country."
He emphasised that he still considered these details secret despite the fact
that the event occurred almost 25 years ago.
The interviewer then steered the discussion to the video which was
not a state secret. The interviewer noted the video depicted several present
and future members of the senior leadership.
Among those shown were Tareq Aziz and Ali Hassan Al Majid, who was
seen standing and shouting. The video names approximately 66 individuals as
participants in the plot, including Adnan Saddam, deputy prime minister, and
Ganem Abdul Jalil, director of the office of the president.
Saddam stated Adnan was the minister of planning and secretary of
the committee for oil and agreements. Saddam acknowledged that Adnan may have
already been appointed as deputy prime minister after Saddam assumed the
presidency and before this meeting.
Saddam acknowledged that a total of five RCC members, and none of
the original seventy revolutionaries, were implicated in the plot.
Saddam denied that any of the conspirators, including Adnan and
Ganem, were his friends. People who worked in the government were not his
friends.
Saddam stated Adnan and Ganem were "not close to me". Like others,
they were appointed to government positions.
Some made it while some did not. When pointed out to Saddam that
the interviewer saw Saddam crying in the video when Ganem's name was announced,
Saddam responded that, as a human being, he still had feelings.
As the head of his office, Saddam saw Ganem every day delivering
various papers. A11 of the members of the plot were in the leadership.
Saddam remarked that treason makes you feel "sorrowful". When noted
by the interviewer that one might say Saddam had been betrayed by his closest
colleagues, Saddam responded the most important thing is that they were in the
government and were with Saddam in the party.
The interviewer reminded Saddam of a speech he gave on August 8,
1979, wherein he stated that the RCC, formerly numbering 22, now included 16
members due to the implication of five RCC members in the plot.
Saddam continued in the speech saying, of the 16 RCC members, three
conducted the investigation and seven formed the tribunal which heard the facts
and decided the punishment.
In the speech, Saddam added that this was the first time in the
history of revolutionary movements and human struggle that over half of the
supreme leadership of a nation took part in such a matter. Saddam responded to
the interviewer, "Good, very good."
According to the Constitution, members of the RCC must be tried by
other RCC members, not by a tribunal outside of the RCC.
When questioned regarding the fairness or neutrality of the RCC
conducting a trial of its own members, Saddam replied that fairness existed
within the individuals of the RCC. The plot was not against them, it was
against Saddam. Additionally, the Constitution, which dictated procedure,
existed well before the plot.
When questioned regarding previous statements he made saying the
plot was against the party, Saddam replied, "1 did not say that. I said it was
against Saddam."
The conspirators plotted with another country (Syria) to prevent
Saddam from coming to power. While it is true Saddam was head of the party, the
plot was against him individually.
Saddam believes there were individuals who did not want him in
power because he would not be "easy to control". With another person as
president, who had conspired with the five members of the RCC and the other
country, others would have been able to control Iraq.
Saddam acknowledged that a tentative agreement regarding
unification of Syria and Iraq was being worked on at the time, specifically
through Aziz.
However, the plot ended that discussion/agreement as "anything
based on plotting has no value". When questioned what the other country hoped
to gain, Saddam responded, "Ask them. We did not ask them."
Saddam stated copies of the video of the July 22, 1979 meeting were
sent to Iraqi ambassadors in other countries.
The videos were to be used by embassy officials to present
information to Iraqis living outside of the country concerning events occurring
within Iraq.
Saddam denied knowledge of whether the video was shown to leaders
of other countries. Saddam remarked, if it was shown to such people, that would
have been "a good thing, not a bad thing".
Perhaps the video would have been shown to other leaders because
another Arab country was involved in the plot. Regarding whether the video was
made and distributed to demonstrate that Saddam was in charge of Iraq, he
responded that the interviewer had seen the video and "this is your opinion,
you have the right".
The interviewer provided comments reportedly made by Saddam around
the time of the plot wherein he said: "With our party methods, there is no
chance for anyone who disagrees with us to jump on a couple of tanks and
overthrow us."
Saddam stated he does not remember making such a comment, but
believed he could explain as these words were a part of his thinking.
This message was directed at not only the other country with whom
the conspirators were plotting but also to all Party members.
Saddam was questioned about the sincerity of his reported previous
statements to Al Bakr in the 1960s and 1970s wherein he expressed a desire to
leave the government. Saddam responded by saying that after 1974, he believed
he had a moral obligation to the Iraqi people.
After many discussions with Al Bakr, Saddam acknowledged it was
"his fate". From this time forward, he decided he would accept such an
appointment and planned for the presidency.
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