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Jul 25, 2009 Indonesian terror changes face By Nelson Rand The day before last week's bombings of two luxury hotels in Jakarta, the Australian Strategic Policy Research Institute (ASPRI) released a report warning of possible new attacks by Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Southeast Asia's largest terrorist network. The report "Jemaah Islamiyah: A renewed struggle?" indicated a possible resurgence of attacks because of competition among extremist factions inside JI seeking to establish dominance. The day before the report's release, two newly recruited suicide bombers checked into the JW Marriott hotel in Jakarta. They later smuggled explosives into the hotel, which was highly secured by armed guards and metal detectors, and used room 1808 as a makeshift command center to assemble the bombs and make final preparations for Indonesia's first terrorist attack in nearly four years. Closed-circuit television footage from the JW Marriott on the morning of Friday, July 17, shows one of the suicide bombers, wearing a baseball cap, carrying a backpack on his chest and wheeling a suitcase, as he walked purposefully toward a hotel cafe where 18 business executives and an Australian trade commissioner were having a breakfast meeting. About two minutes later, his partner in terror detonated himself at the restaurant of the nearby Ritz Carlton. The attacks killed nine people, including the two bombers, and injured over 50 others. They came nine days after presidential elections in which incumbent president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was re-elected in a landslide. The elections have been hailed as the most peaceful in Indonesia's history, and while pre-election violence was always a possibility considering the country's turbulent past, few expected such deadly attacks would occur well after the vote. Earlier speculation that Yudhoyono's political enemies may have played a role in the bombings has been widely discounted due to the nature of the explosives and method of attack. "The attacks come at an unexpected time and are intended to rattle the country after the most trouble-free election Indonesia has ever seen," wrote STRATFOR, a US-based private intelligence firm in an analysis of the bombings. "By attacking five-star hotels in the capital, the perpetrators have reminded the international business community of Indonesia's inherent security concerns." One of Yudhoyono's bigger achievements in his first term was the curbing of Islamic extremism. Dozens of JI members were arrested or killed and several deadly plots were thwarted, including a planned bombing of a cafe frequented by Western tourists in West Sumatra in 2008. According to several assessments, the international linkages that gave JI members access to funds and training have been decimated. Yudhoyono notched those successes by addressing terrorist threats more through police work than military means, establishing village-level intelligence networks, rehabilitating and reintegrating former militants into society, and allowing opportunities for Islamists to participate in above-ground politics and organizations. Those policies have been coupled with substantial outside assistance from the United States and Australia, including the establishment, funding, equipping and training of the country's elite Detachment 88 counter-terrorism taskforce. "[Yudhoyono] has done exceptionally well in terms of arresting JI members and making them talk," said Noor Huda Ismail, executive director of Indonesia's International Institute for Peacebuilding and co-author of the recent ASPRI paper. Those policies, however, have not come without criticism. Human rights groups say the country's anti-terror legislation and decrees curb basic human rights, while Yudhoyono has been repeatedly criticized for over-accommodating Islamic hardliners and allowing them to influence government policy. Extreme splinters At the same time, Yudhoyono's counter-terrorism successes have apparently caused a reactive transformation of the group. "I'm not sure JI or any other label has any relevance any more," said long-time Indonesia observer and veteran journalist John McBeth. "There are obviously networks, but they are pretty fragmented and disparate." According to the ASPRI report, JI has fractured into three categories: those who are cooperative with the authorities, those whose position is unclear, and those who continue to resist the authorities. Violence-prone splinter groups, consisting of members of the latter category, are now seeking to reassert themselves, according to the ASPRI research. "JI is no longer a cohesive organization with a clear, unified leadership structure," the same report argues. "The continued leadership split in the JI organization and the release from prison of unreformed members of the group ... raises the possibility that splinter factions might now seek to re-energize the movement through violent attacks." One of these splinter factions is said to be led by Noordin Mohamed Top, a Malaysian-born former accountant who became an Islamic extremist now known in intelligence circles for his bomb-making capabilities. Noordin is known to have fled to Indonesia after the Malaysian government's crackdown on Islamic extremists, following the September 11, 2001, terror attacks against the United States. Noordin is also believed to be responsible for numerous terrorist attacks in Indonesia, including the 2002 Bali bombings, which killed 202 people and injured more than 200, the bombing of the JW Marriott in Jakarta in 2003, the bombing of the Australian embassy in Jakarta in 2004, and the follow-up Bali bombings of 2005. In April 2006, he narrowly escaped arrest when Indonesian police raided his safehouse. "Noordin Top is a very intelligent person, not because of his being an accountant, but from his experiences as well as his knowledge of the Islamic faith and the expertise that he has derived over the years working closely with JI members," said Andrin Raj, a counter-terrorism expert and director of Malaysia's Stratad Asia Pacific Strategic Center. "From my research and understanding of Noordin Top, he is likely to continue his endeavors for jihad and will die as a jihadist," he added. Terrorism analysts contend that Noordin drifted away from the mainstream JI group due to a disagreement over hitting "soft targets", such as hotels and nightclubs, which directly target civilians. In 2006, Noordin is believed to have founded the group Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad, which translates as the Organization for the Base of Jihad - also referred to as al-Qaeda for the Malay Archipelago. Analysts say it is the most radical and violent of the JI splinter groups and advocates the killing of Westerners. Other factional groups identified in the Australian Strategic Policy Research Institute's report are Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT) and Jamaah Tauhid wal Jihad. The former was allegedly set up last year by JI's reputed spiritual leader, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, while the latter is said to be a study group led by Aman Abdurrahman, a young Muslim teacher, according to the ASPRI report. Most fingers have pointed to Noordin's group as the likely culprit behind the July 17 attacks in Jakarta. Police say the bombs used were similar to the explosive devices discovered at an Islamic boarding school in Central Java that were uncovered during a raid just days before the Jakarta bombings. The police had apparently received information Noordin was seen earlier at the school. The explosives used at the hotel bombings, they said, were also the same type used in the 2002 Bali bombings that Noordin and JI stand accused of orchestrating. Analysts say that the more mainstream JI faction now rejects the extreme tactics of Noordin and other hard-line group elements, believing that the disadvantages of launching indiscriminate attacks that harm innocent civilians - such as generating public outrage and resulting in inevitable crackdowns on their organization - far outweigh the benefits. This supposed faction, known by analysts as the "traditionalists", is allegedly led by Abu Rusdan, an Indonesian religious teacher who was sentenced to three-and-a-half years in prison in 2004 for giving sanctuary to one of the 2002 Bali bombers, who have since been convicted and executed under Yudhoyono's watch. Rejecting such tactics, however, does not make the traditionalists any less radical; rather, analysts say, it is a strategic decision that could shift with changed circumstances. And while these traditionalists may reject the tactics of the hardliners, they remain ideological allies, say analysts. "Although internal friction is apparent among JI members, this does not mean they will call the police and report the whereabouts of Top," said Noor Huda Ismail in e-mail correspondence. "Such individuals would be happy to provide sanctuary for Top and have even arranged for his nuptials with women who believe that marrying Top will increase their social status because he is considered a mujahid, a warrior of Islam." JI's fracture into splinter groups has apparently left the group without a formal chain of command. But as last week's attacks in Jakarta demonstrate, factions and cells have the capability and will to act on their own with devastating effect. "The Jakarta bombing is a means to show that JI is indeed active and capable of carrying out strategic attacks within the region," said Andrin of Stratad Asia Pacific Strategic Center. Nelson Rand is a journalist based in Bangkok, Thailand. He has a Master's Degree in Asia Pacific Policy Studies and is the author of the newly released book Conflict: Journeys through war and terror in Southeast Asia. (Copyright 2009 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. 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