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A joint fight against terror By Kuldip Nayar Friday, 16 Oct, 2009 New Delhi should realise that the road to Beijing goes through Islamabad. This is what a Pakistan foreign minister told me many years ago. There is some truth in this even today. Likewise, Islamabad would have known by now that its route to Kabul lies through New Delhi. This is not to suggest that India is helping Afghanistan in its armed struggle against the Taliban. What it means is that New Delhi can wield influence over Kabul. The hospital it has built in Kabul and the roads and power transmission lines it has laid there despite the killings of Indian engineers and workers have earned the Manmohan Singh government the trust of an average Afghan. This goodwill can benefit Islamabad if it can have even a workable relationship with New Delhi. Another attack on India's embassy in Kabul recently is nothing new from the point of view of the Taliban who regard India as their enemy and economic development an anti-war measure. But the alleged role of the ISI in such attacks is difficult to comprehend. Mistrust between India and Pakistan clouds judgment. Yet both have known to their cost that the Taliban consider them their enemy. The recent attack on the army headquarters at Rawalpindi reconfirms the fact that when it comes to causing harm, the Taliban make no distinction between Islamic Pakistan and secular India. Why have not New Delhi and Islamabad sat together to plan a common strategy? Kashmir does not have to be sorted out before solving other problems. The situation in Afghanistan is too serious for further delay. Every gain that the Taliban make in Pakistan is at the expense of India's security. But certain irritants need to be removed. Islamabad should give up the idea of having Afghanistan as its area of strategic depth. Kabul lives under the fear that Islamabad is out to belittle or destroy it. Just as the stability of Pakistan is essential for the stability of India, Afghanistan's viability is necessary for Pakistan's viability. Essentially, the fight against the Taliban is the fight for a free world. But the most important step for India and Pakistan is joint, concerted action against the Taliban. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has said at a press conference in Mumbai: 'If we work together to deal with this menace (terrorism), a [larger] good can come out of it.' Pakistan's allegation that India is trying to export terrorism does not help the situation. Manmohan Singh's charactersing it as 'a false accusation' should set doubts in Pakistan at rest. Manmohan Singh has seldom personally rubbished a statement. The real problem is Gen Stanley McChrystal's assessment. The top US commander in Afghanistan has said that India was adding to regional tensions and encouraging counter-measures. At the same time, it was indicated that Indian activities benefit the Afghan people. The economic measures which New Delhi has undertaken in Afghanistan are bound to endear India in the eyes of the Afghans. The American commander's assessment can be a talking point between New Delhi and Islamabad. When both agree that the Taliban are the biggest menace they can surely find a common strategy for joint action. They can adopt different ways, economic or military, but they should have one policy to tackle the Taliban. Pakistan's reluctance to move troops from the Indian border to Afghanistan is understandable. Islamabad is making the same point which New Delhi was making when it was in the midst of a war with China in 1962. Pakistan has argued that while it is concentrating its full attention on fighting the Taliban, India should not in any way be disturbing it on the border. In 1962, both US President Kennedy and British Prime Minister Macmillan had told Gen Ayub not to take such steps as would in any way distract New Delhi's attention from fighting against China. Jawaharlal Nehru's fear was that Ayub would march into Kashmir once India withdrew its forces from the border with Pakistan. Gen P.N. Thapar, chief of the Indian army, asked for the government's permission to move the troops from the Pakistan border to the theatre of war in Assam. Washington and London talked to Islamabad and assured New Delhi on Pakistan's behalf that it would not attack India. Only then did India withdraw one division from the Pakistan border. Krishna Menon, then India's defence minister, was opposed to the move. He considered Pakistan more of an enemy than China. Still Thapar withdrew the troops after getting Nehru's permission. Ayub did not open a second front, although it was an opportune moment for him to do so. Still Ayub used the opportunity to give China the northern areas of Kashmir, then under Pakistan. He wanted to establish closer relations with Beijing. Islamabad has followed that policy strictly. Pakistani rulers, like Nehru, have conveyed more or less the same fears in similar words to the Americans who have been asked to guarantee that New Delhi would do nothing if Pakistan withdrew its troops from the border with India. Islamabad is far from satisfied by mere statements that there is no question of India attacking Pakistan. Still, with all the assurances, Islamabad has hardly withdrawn any forces from the border with India. Whatever the situation and from wherever you start, you find loads of mistrust. The inevitable conclusion is that there is no alternative to rapprochement between India and Pakistan. President Obama once talked about a regional solution to Afghanistan and other problems between the countries. Little has happened on that front so far. The writer is a leading journalist based in Delhi. [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
