http://www.arabnews.com/?page=7&section=0&article=130549&d=2&m=1&y=2010&pix=opinion.jpg&category=Opinion


Saturday 2 January 2010 (16 Muharram 1431)

      In the face of protests, Iran at an impasse
      Ray Takeyh | The Washington Post
     
        
      The mayhem that has swept over Iran in the past few days is once more 
calling into question the Islamic Republic's longevity. Recent events are 
eerily reminiscent of the revolution that displaced the monarchy in 1979: A 
fragmented, illegitimate state led by cruel yet indecisive men is suddenly 
confronting an opposition movement that it cannot fully apprehend. It is 
premature to proclaim the immediate demise of the theocratic regime. Iran may 
well be entering a prolonged period of chaos and violence. In the aftermath of 
recent disturbances, however, it is obvious that the lifespan of the Islamic 
Republic has been considerably shortened.

      In retrospect, the regime's most momentous, and disastrous, decision was 
its refusal to offer any compromises to an angered nation after the fraudulent 
presidential election in June. The modest demands of establishment figures such 
as Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, including for the release of political 
prisoners and restoring popular trust (via measures such as respecting the rule 
of law and opening up the media), was dismissed by an arrogant regime confident 
of its power.

      Disillusioned elites and protesters who had taken to the streets could 
have been unified, or their resentment assuaged, by a pledge by supreme leader 
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei for the next election to be free and fair, for 
government to become more inclusive or for limits to be imposed on President 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's prerogatives. Today, such concessions would be seen as a 
sign of weakness and would embolden the opposition. The regime no longer has a 
political path out of its predicament. Ironically, this was the Shah's dilemma, 
as he made concessions too late to fortify his power and broaden the social 
base of his government.

      Another irony is that the Islamic Republic today is led by a politician 
as vacillating as the Shah was. Khamenei's forbidding posture conceals an 
uncertain personality. Like the Shah, Khamenei seems reluctant to order a 
massive crackdown that would involve summary executions and random shootings of 
the thousands of protesters. Whether the regime's security forces have the 
strategic depth and willingness to engage in such conduct is unknown. 

      Thus far, the regime has opted for a containment strategy: Unleashing 
Basij militias to beat and intimidate the protesters while arresting many of 
its former loyalists. Yet this not only fails to quell the demonstrations but 
also erodes the cohesion of the security forces who have the demoralizing task 
of routinely confronting their compatriots. Meanwhile, as the movement 
continues to defy authorities, it is likely to become more radicalized. Signs 
of such militancy are already obvious: The slogans of some demonstrations have 
changed from demanding the sanctity of the vote to rejecting the entire 
Islamist enterprise.

      Unlike in 1979, the clerical state today has had the luxury of 
confronting an opposition movement that is incohesive and lacks identifiable 
leaders. The candidates who challenged Ahmadinejad for the presidency, Mir 
Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, seem more like intrigued observers than 
masterminds of recent events. This should be cold comfort to the regime, 
however, because the longer the movement survives, the more likely it is to 
produce its own leaders. The most remarkable aspect about the events in Iran 
since June has been the opposition's ability to sustain itself and to generate 
vast rallies while deprived of a national organizational network, a 
well-articulated ideology and charismatic leaders.

      Put another way, the Islamic Republic has reached an impasse; it can 
neither appease the opposition nor forcibly repress it out of existence.

      As the United States and its allies wrestle with the issue of Iran's 
nuclear program, they would be wise to recognize the changes to the context in 
which their policy was framed. The Obama administration should take a cue from 
Ronald Reagan and persistently challenge the legitimacy of the theocratic state 
and highlight its human rights abuses. 

      The notion that harsh language militates against a nuclear accord is 
false. At this juncture, the only reason Tehran may be receptive to an 
agreement on the nuclear issue is to mitigate international pressures while it 
deals with its internal insurrection. Even if the regime accommodates 
international concerns about its nuclear program, the United States must stand 
firm in its support for human rights and economic pressure against the 
Revolutionary Guards. And Tehran's clerical rulers should know that in no 
uncertain terms. Reagan had no compunction about denouncing the Soviet Union as 
an "evil empire" while concluding arms control treaties with the Kremlin. The 
Islamic Republic, like the Soviet Union, is a transient phenomenon. America's 
embrace of individual sovereignty will place it on the right side of history as 
the fortunes of history inevitably change.

      - Ray Takeyh is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and 
the author of "The Guardians of the Revolution: Iran and the World in the Age 
of the Ayatollahs."
     


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