http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2010/979/sc270.htm
31 December 2009 - 6 January 2010
Issue No. 979
Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875
Iranian forecast
What will Iran look like 10 years from now, asks Mustafa El-Labbad *
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Click to view caption
Reformist challengers to the hardline Iranian theocracy in jubilant mood
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What will Iran be like in 2020? If predicting the future is difficult enough in
view of the plethora of factors that need to be taken into account, the task is
all the more difficult when it comes to Iran.
The Iranians themselves have a custom when they need to make a forecast. They
consult their famous poet Shamseddin Mohamed Hafez-e Shirazi, known by his
penname Hafez. The method of doing so is to pick up a volume of Hafez, close
your eyes, flip open the book and place your finger on the verse at which the
page falls open.
The verse your finger has landed on is the key to the forecast. In Persian they
call this the Faal Hafez -- the Hafez omen. As I am not proficient in this type
of augury, I will fall back on a more conventional approach to discerning the
shape of Iran in 2020.
A major regional power, the Iranian geopolitical space has continuously
intersected with the global political map, both under the former monarchy,
which was "open" to the international order, and under the Islamic republican
system, which has locked horns with that order.
Indeed, such labels as "friendly" or "hostile", as accurate as they may be to
describe Iranian regimes in certain historical periods, fall by the wayside
when we take the longer view. Iranian regimes, regardless of their ideological
outlooks, intersect with the international order for the very simple reason
that regional ambitions form a constant in Iranian foreign policy.
As this constant is applied in an area whose petroleum resources have made it
one of the most strategic parts of the globe, Iran has acquired a unique and
highly important position in the international order. With a historical and
civilisational continuum several thousand years old, Iran is an ancient
centralised state. It possesses enormous human resources, with young people
nowadays accounting for 65 per cent of the population.
In spite of restrictions on communications as a result of the heavy
surveillance of Internet and mobile connections (as has been the case since
protests erupted following the 2009 presidential elections), Iran has the
third- largest country ratio of bloggers on the web and the highest rate of
Internet users in the Middle East.
Iran's human potential extends far beyond the country's borders. Iranians
around the world and in the US in particular form a large scientific base that
transcends ideology, in the sense that it will remain in place regardless of
changes in the regime.
In addition to its human resources, Iran possesses vast energy resources. Iran,
which has the most diversely skilled labour force and the most highly educated
population in the Middle East, represents only one per cent of the world's
population. Yet, it possesses 10 per cent of the world's known oil reserves,
and it is the fourth-largest oil producer in the world.
It also possesses 16 per cent of the world's known natural gas reserves, making
it the second-largest natural gas producer in the world after Russia. As 3.6
million of the 6.2 million barrels of oil it produces daily are consumed
domestically, Iran has a surplus of 2.6 million barrels per day for export. As
its known reserves are around 130 billion barrels, Iran could continue to
maintain the current level of output for at least the next 40 years. In
addition, with estimated natural gas reserves of 27 trillion cubic metres, Iran
could also produce 500 billion cubic metres of natural gas per year for the
next 55 years.
A country's political future is contingent upon diverse factors, the most
prominent being the efficacy of its political system and its ability to
optimise the use of its human and material resources. In the light of the
above, it follows that Iran theoretically stands an excellent chance of
ascending further on the regional power ladder in the coming decade.
Iran's current influence, stretching from its western borders to Lebanon, is
the strongest and most extensive in its modern history. Since the victory of
the Islamic Revolution, Iran has locked horns with the US in particular through
various proxy wars, economic blockades, and innumerable diplomatic standoffs.
However, Washington has not succeeded in changing the Iranian regime. Nor has
that regime succeeded in overcoming the US drive to oust it as a regional
power.
Today, the confrontation between the two sides has entered a critical phase,
which will determine the state of Iran in 2020. The Iranian nuclear question is
now on the negotiating table between Iran and the five UN Security Council
nations plus Germany. Most recently, Iran has turned down an international
offer to have its uranium enriched abroad.
This is not the place to enter into the technical and legal details of the
issue. As consequential as it is in its own right, the Iranian nuclear question
is the fulcrum of a number of other demands that each side is pressing for. As
we have seen, negotiations over Iran's uranium enrichment activities have
served as an avenue for the two sides to explore possibilities of reaching an
understanding over, for example, guarantees that Iran can keep the regional
gains it has acquired over the past seven years since the US-led invasion and
occupation of Iraq.
These include guarantees that the US can exit safely from Iraq and Afghanistan
while keeping its regional interests intact, and arrangements that will help
alleviate the general climate of hostility between the US and a large segment
of the peoples of the Middle East.
Since concrete interests tend to prevail over ideology in international
relations, there appears to be a strong likelihood that Tehran and Washington
will eventually reach an understanding. Given Iran's vast human resource
potential, energy resources and regional influence, the Obama administration
could well deem this the right time to propel Iran further up the scale of
regional power balances.
Therefore, as sound as Persian sayings usually are, I doubt whether the
following one applies to the relationship between Tehran and Washington: Dusti
ve doshmani kessan az pedaran be farzandan ba zamand (friendships and enmities
are passed on from father to son).
At all events, this is not exactly a one-way relationship. Washington may need
Iran, but not to the extent that it will forge a partnership with Tehran
without very strict guidelines and conditions. Simultaneously, as strident as
the Iranian ideological line is, as represented by President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad, who is not even the most powerful official in the land, Tehran
knows that unless it strikes some form of alliance with the world's foremost
superpower it stands no chance of gaining recognition as the foremost power in
the region.
The operation and development of Iran's gas and oil sectors will require
billions of dollars of investment over the next 10 years. Otherwise production
levels will fall off, and Iran will be unable to translate its natural-resource
potential into cash. Granted, Iran can make deals with China and Russia, but
they still do not have the technological prowess that the US has in the
petroleum sector.
In addition, unless it normalises relations with the US, Tehran cannot
translate the regional influence it has acquired on many fronts into a
springboard for leveraging itself to the status of a major regional power in
the international order. Iran's situation today reminds one of a big-time
gambler in a casino. This gambler has made quite a few successful bets and has
raked in several piles of chips, but he cannot change his horde of chips into
money. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the bipolar world order, the
US has run the cashier's cage in the Middle East political casino.
The future of Iran a decade from now is thus contingent on the ability of its
government and diplomatic machine to transform the nuclear question into
successful negotiations and eventually a form of partnership with the US. Only
then will Iran secure its status as a regional power, open doors to the
financial and technological investments it needs for its energy sector, and
receive the recognition and respect that it seeks.
On the other hand, if Iran squanders its cards and turns the negotiations into
an opening for further international pressures and isolation, the country will
look much grimmer a decade from now. Iran has endured 30 years of rupture with
Washington, and of course it could probably continue for another 10 years.
However, the dynamics surrounding the Iranian nuclear question are such as to
have made it the pivotal determinant of Iran's geo- strategic position.
It can therefore be said with some confidence that the decisions the Obama
administration takes with respect to the Iranian nuclear question and the ways
that Tehran responds will have a profound impact on the shape of Iran in 2020.
* Director of Al-Sharq Centre for Regional and Strategic Studies.
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