http://insideindonesia.org/content/view/1268/47/
Inside Indonesia 99: Jan-Mar 2010
Killing for God
When Nahdlatul Ulama members killed communists, they believed they were
doing it for God
Greg Fealy
Ansor drum bands, such as the one pictured here in East
Java, were
commonly used as a show of force by NU against PKI
mobilisation
Anam, Choirul, Pertumbuhan dan Perkembangan Nahdlatul Ulama,
Jatayu Sala, Solo, 1985.
'If we remain quiet, we are dead.'
These are the words that Munasir Ali uttered to a tense meeting of the
leaders of the Muslim organisation Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) in Jakarta three days
after the 30 September 1965 coup attempt had been defeated on 1 October by army
units under the command of Major-General Suharto. NU was a potentially critical
actor in post-coup events. It was the largest Islamic party in Indonesia and
the only major Islamic organisation to be part of Sukarno's Guided Democracy
regime. Moreover, it also had a history of bloody conflict with communists,
most notably in the communist uprising in Madiun in 1948 where hundreds of NU
and PKI members were killed. More recently, NU and PKI supporters had clashed
violently in the so-called 'unilateral actions' of 1964 and early 1965, during
which communist groups had sought to occupy large rural landholdings owned by
well-to-do Muslims. In the period leading up to the coup, some sections of NU
had worked closely with anti-communists in other political parties and the army
to build an informal anti-PKI alliance. If there was to be a mass response to
the coup movement and particularly the PKI, NU was set to play a prominent
role.
Within the NU meeting on 3 October, opinions were divided. Some central
board members wanted the party to proceed cautiously, arguing that the
political situation was too uncertain and that precipitate action might imperil
NU members and the future of the party. They were especially worried that the
PKI and its supporters in the military and the ruling regime remained powerful
and would retaliate fearfully against any hostile activity. Others were
determined to act emphatically against the PKI. They were militantly
anti-communist and believed that the failed coup attempt provided a
long-awaited opportunity to strike back at the PKI. They were convinced that
communists posed a grave threat not only to Islam but also to NU and its elite
ulama (religious scholars).
When Munasir Ali told the meeting that inaction equalled death, most
those in attendance agreed with him. They decided on two courses of action
which helped to seal the fate of the PKI and its supporters. Not only would NU
publicly identify the PKI as the main coup plotter and push for its immediate
banning, it also would also begin mobilising its members for a physical
campaign against communists.
A new organisation called the NU Security Coordination Body (BKKJNU) was
established the same day, under the chairmanship of Munasir, with the objective
of coordinating the anti-PKI mobilisation. Other NU figures joined with
anti-communist leaders from a variety of religious and political backgrounds to
found KAP-Gestapu, an 'action front' which quickly organised large public
demonstrations against the coup movement and in support of Suharto. A small
group of NU leaders also succeeded on 5 October in getting military approval
for the broadcast on national radio of the first statement connecting the coup
movement to the PKI and calling for the communist party's prohibition.
The NU central board sent a string of instructions to branches condemning
the PKI and the coup movement and calling on members to help the authorities to
'root out' and 'eliminate' communism. Parallels were drawn with the events of
1948 in Madiun, where NU said that communists had slaughtered Islamic scholars.
NU leaders where concerned to avoid uncontrolled aggression by party members,
particularly if this resulted in conflict with the authorities. But while not
explicitly enjoining violence, such action was clearly implied in these
communiqués.
By the second week of October, the first systematic NU violence towards
PKI members had taken place in East Java. It soon spread to other parts of the
island. Local ulama usually played a pivotal role, organising their followers
into squads or directing NU's paramilitary brigade, Banser, as well as liaising
with regional military officials and the NU Security Coordination Body in
Jakarta.
The exact details of NU operations varied from area to area, but the most
common pattern was for NU units to work closely with the army and other
anti-communist groups in drawing up lists of PKI members and supporters, and
then either detain or execute them. Much of the killing by NU squads took place
on riverbanks or in fields, with victims usually being killed in a quick and
orderly fashion using bladed weapons. Tens of thousands of PKI members and
'sympathisers' met their deaths at the hands of NU killing squads and anecdotal
information suggests that NU units were probably responsible for more
executions than any other civilian group.
Explaining the killings
When those involved in NU's killing squads are asked why they executed
communists, the most frequent reply is that their motivation was religious.
Many refer to the role that senior ulama played in persuading them that killing
communists was justified. Many ulama described communists as kafir harbi, or
war-like infidels - the most dangerous category of unbelievers according to
classical jurisprudence - and informed their students and followers that it was
an obligation to physically oppose such enemies until they either relent or are
dead. Other ulama referred to communists as bughat, or rebels who oppose a
government that is properly constituted according to Islamic law. These
religious explanations convinced many NU members of the rightness of
exterminating PKI activists. One killing squad member told me: 'I didn't worry
about being involved in the [killing] units after I heard my religious teacher
say killing communists would protect Islam. I never had trouble sleeping
because of what I was doing, because I knew it was right.'
When the direct interests of NU ulama elite were at risk, the
organisation was capable of mobilising with belligerent fervour
Ulama were also mindful of the threat that the PKI posed to their
material interests. The unilateral actions had targeted lands owned by ulama
families or their religious boarding schools, as well as the properties of NU
benefactors in rural areas of Java. NU leaders must have viewed with alarm the
risk of communist attacks upon their privileged socio-economic position, much
of which was connected to control of land and access to capital. And when the
direct interests of NU ulama elite were at risk, the organisation was capable
of mobilising with belligerent fervour.
Ulama used Islamic boarding schools and public sermons to vilify
communists. References to communist treachery at Madiun became increasingly
common from 1964, as did mention of recent clashes between NU and PKI
supporters, some of which resulted in severe injuries or death to NU members.
The overall effect was to create an impression in the mind of the NU community
that the PKI represented a lethal threat. Moreover, this threat had been
historically recurring; the PKI had quickly recovered from its defeat at Madiun
and become Indonesia's largest political party by the late 1950s. The ulama
argued that NU should now use the failed coup to help destroy communism
permanently.
NU ulama did not only sanction the killings - they were also often
directly involved in organising and training the Banser units and ad hoc
killing squads. When attending training sessions, they would give special
guidance and prayers for members, as well as dispensing amulets or talismans to
ensure the safety of those involved in killings. Former Banser members from
this period recount how they regarded themselves as a privileged group, closer
to the religous elite than other NU members and better able to receive their
blessings - something that is important in traditionalist Muslim communities,
where ulama are seen as being able to channel God's grace, and close proximity
to them is likely to bring spiritual and material reward.
Another crucial factor in explaining the depth of NU's involvement in the
violence was the role of the army. Many of the more stridently anti-communist
NU leaders, such as Munasir, Subchan ZE and Yusuf Hasyim, were themselves
ex-army officers and they had retained close links to the military. As tensions
with the PKI rose from the early 1960s, they began strengthening relations with
like-minded officers in the army, using these links to exchange information on
communist activities, to gain access to training and funding of NU members and
to obtain army protection should the PKI act aggressively towards NU.
Some NU leaders later claimed that their organisation's participation in
the killings was due to pressure from the army. Most evidence, however,
suggests that NU's elite were keen to move unequivocally against the PKI but
were wary of a military backlash. Within hours of the collapse of the coup
attempt on the evening of 1 October, NU leaders had begun meeting with their
army counterparts to coordinate responses. They were given 'evidence' of PKI
leadership of the coup and quietly encouraged to begin preparations for
anti-PKI action. Once it was clear to NU leaders that the army was supporting
reprisals against communists, then NU responded quickly. Ex-army officer
Munasir was a case in point. Close to former Armed Forces' commander General AH
Nasution and having also served as secretary-general of the Veterans' League,
Munasir met with Nasution on 3 October and was told that the PKI had
'masterminded' the coup. He then asked for, and was given, Nasution's approval
for NU to prepare to confront the PKI.
The NU killing squads did not cease their grisly work until about March
1966. Even then, many local units seemed reluctant to halt the executions and
only desisted when pressured to do so by the central NU leadership and regional
military commands. It is clear, then, that while many scholars have emphasised
the role of the military in unleashing NU's killing squads, much of the
anti-PKI animus was generated from within NU itself and that the organisation
need little encouragement in its attempts to destroy the communist party.
Dr Greg Fealy ([email protected]) is a senior lecturer and fellow in
Indonesian politics at the Australian National University
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