On 4/24/14, 7:20 AM, Stephen Farrell wrote:
Stephen Farrell has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-precis-framework-16: No Objection

When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this
introductory paragraph, however.)


Please refer to http://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html
for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.


The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-precis-framework/



----------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMENT:
----------------------------------------------------------------------


- I agree with Bary's discuss - it seems weird to not
have the initial registries in hand when the RFC is
being issued. People will, I guess, implement from
Appendix A here anyway, so why not either delete this
and get the registry in place, or else make Appendix A
be the initial registry content.

Appendix A has been checked using two implementations. The question is whether we want to base the initial registration on a third.

But yes, the *initial* registration *could* use Appendix A once it has been reviewed by the designated expert (who might find errors, despite the fact that Takahiro Nemoto and I checked our independent results and came to agreement on the derived properties).

This was discussed on the WG list, see for instance:

http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/precis/current/msg00605.html

7.7: This uses the empty set, which is puzzling. I think
you mean that this set is to be populated by the DE in
the IANA registries but if so, saying so would be good.

We are simply referencing RFC 5892 here:

http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5892#section-2.7

Further, the PRECIS Derived Property Value Registry will specify only the derived properties (e.g., UNASSIGNED or PVALID), not the interim steps used to calculate the derived properties (e.g., HasCompat or BackwardCompatible). So the latter values are never populated into the registry.

10.5: This says that a) its all too hard but also b)
"Nevertheless, specifications for application protocols
that use this framework MUST describe how confusable
characters can be abused to compromise the security of
systems that use the protocol in question, along with any
protocol-specific suggestions for overcoming those
threats." That seems like a 6919 MUST (but we know you
won't) to me. Is that a good plan?

s/MUST/are strongly encouraged to/ ?

One example of what an application protocol spec could say is here:

http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-xmpp-6122bis-12#section-7.3.2

10.6: Prompted by the secdir review, it might be worth a
few words on password hashing, which is very common.  E.g.
say that the canonical form is input to hashing and
therefore just can't be mucked about with. (But say that
nicely:-)

Well, draft-ietf-precis-saslprepbis currently says:

   In protocols that provide usernames as input to a cryptographic
   algorithm such as a hash function, the client will need to perform
   proper preparation of the username before applying the algorithm.

and:

   In protocols that provide passwords as input to a cryptographic
   algorithm such as a hash function, the client will need to perform
   proper preparation of the password before applying the algorithm,
   since the password is not available to the server in plaintext form.

Would some text along those lines in the security considerations of this document meet your needs?

Peter

_______________________________________________
precis mailing list
[email protected]
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/precis

Reply via email to