Bahwa senjata pemusnah massal seperti bom nuklir itu artinya bencana untuk
semua orang sudah disadari pemimpin berbagai negara yang punya nuklir..
Termasuk pemimpin India dan Pakistan.
Saya yakin bahwa yang juga pelan-pelan sudah disadari banyak orang adalah bahwa
perang itu sudah bukan opsi lagi...
Dalam perspektif sejarah, dunia tanpa perang itu saya yakin sudah berada
diambang pintu...
--
[CNN]
Time to ratify nuclear test ban treaty - CNN.com
By Stephen A. Cheney , Special to CNN
2012-01-05T13:22:55Z
CNN.com
South Korean protesters rally in May, 2009, in Seoul against North Korea after
it announced it had conducted a nuclear test.
South Korean protesters rally in May, 2009, in Seoul against North Korea after
it announced it had conducted a nuclear test.
(CNN) -- It's been a year since the United States ratified the New Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty with Russia, and it's time to reflect on its benefits. By
allowing us to restart inspections, verifications and the dismantling of
nuclear assets, New START has established transparency, predictability and
stability that serves the security of the whole world.
We know what the Russians have, and they know what we have, and together we are
reducing our arsenals, allowing us all to sleep easier.
Keeping in mind the success of New START, the next logical step would be to
ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), as Russia did in 2000. The
establishment of such a ban on nuclear testing would further strengthen
American security.
START I was first proposed by President Reagan. The United States and the
Soviet Union signed the agreement in 1991, enhancing stability between the two
nations and allowing for a drastic reduction in nuclear weapons. After the
dissolution of the USSR, the treaty was inherited by Russia and continued until
its expiration in December of 2009.
The expiration of the treaty risked a new arms race that threatened the
security gains of the past 17 years. Succeeding the original agreement, New
START is the modern recognition that both our nations benefit by fostering
transparency between our two strategic nuclear forces.
It is no secret that during the course of the Cold War, the United States and
Soviet Union developed the nuclear capacity to destroy each other, and indeed
the very existence of humanity, several times over. At the height of that
conflict, the United States and USSR possessed more than 65,000 nuclear weapons
between them. Nuclear strategy promoted the concept of "bouncing the rubble,"
signifying the premise of destruction that nuclear war would unleash.
Yet this era demands thinking outside the conventions of nuclear war. We need
weapons for fighting the enemies of today, not the Soviets of yesteryear. In
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, our greatest threat has not been nuclear
weapons fueled by uranium, but buried homemade bombs fueled by fertilizer.
Investments in equipment, technology and training designed to combat low
technology threats have proven more decisive in protecting the lives of our
troops than any of our nuclear assets.
Of course, the United States can and should maintain a strong, credible nuclear
deterrent. It also can and should set an example for the rest of the world with
responsible ownership of these weapons.
After conducting more than 1,000 nuclear test explosions, the United States has
not explosively tested a nuclear weapon in nearly 20 years and instead
maintains a stockpile stewardship program to ensure the reliability of the
current arsenal. Still the U.S. Senate resists approving the test ban treaty,
which would create worldwide networks to apply pressure against states like
Iran and North Korea.
These networks of pressure are exactly what we need against rogue states that
aren't deterred from nuclear development by the vast American arsenal. These
states are more susceptible to pressure outside the nuclear realm, and our
strategy must incorporate this understanding to be effective. This means taking
a bold diplomatic leadership role. By ratifying the CTBT, at no consequence to
our own nuclear capabilities, the United States further establishes an
international norm that pressures Iran and North Korea to ratify the treaty as
well. We no longer need to test, but these states do in order to bridge their
knowledge gaps.
The success of New START exemplifies the kind of diplomatic leadership the
United States must embody. America became a reluctant global leader in the 20th
century. But with global power comes global responsibility.
Thrust onto the world stage in periods that demanded leadership, we have seen
the consequences of American reluctance to lead. The 21st century is a time of
new challenges, be those challenges of economic, environmental or military
nature. Leadership doesn't have to be expensive, and there are clear budgetary
incentives for reducing our Cold War nuclear arsenal.
As commentators discuss the decline of American influence in the world, we must
focus on the power of our example as a staple of international leadership and
that means active participation in diplomatic processes and organizations.
Americans firmly believe in their commitment to ideals, principles and
morality. New START is supremely representative of that. We should extend that
commitment to ratification of the CTBT.
The opinions expressed in this commentary are solely those of Stephen Cheney.
© 2012 Cable News Network. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
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