http://dawn.com/2012/05/31/islamic-fundamentalism-and-youth-in-pakistan/


Islamic fundamentalism and youth in Pakistan
Nadeem F. Paracha | 



Islamic fundamentalism in the modern political context can be described as an 
attempt to attain an ‘Islamic State’ through political mobilisation, 
revolutionary action or government legislation.

Even though, ever since the 1980s, Islamic fundamentalism in this context has 
rapidly evolved into meaning and incorporating a number of varied 
interpretations of political Islam, the basic concept has remained the same: To 
‘Islamise’ the society from below so an Islamic State can effectively be 
constructed from above.

Islamic fundamentalism has had an active presence in the milieu of youth and 
student movements and politics in Pakistan. One of its leading components in 
this respect has been the student-wing of the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), the Islami 
Jamiat-i-Tuleba (IJT).

Others, like the Anjuman-i-Tuleba Islam (ATI), Jamiat-i-i Tuleba Islam (JTI) – 
the student wing of Jamiat Ulema Islam (JUI) – and the Imamia Students 
Organization (ISO) have also been driven by the political ideals of Islamic 
fundamentalism.

Soon after the creation of a separate Muslim country in the shape of Pakistan 
(in 1947), colleges and universities in most Muslim-majority regions of India 
were dominated by the student wing of the Muslim League (ML) – the Muslim 
Students Federation (MSF).

MSF, like its mother party, was largely anti-fundamentalist in orientation (if 
not secular) and its ideology was heavily rooted in the modernist Muslim 
political philosophies championed by Indian Muslim thinkers like Sir Syed Ahmed 
Khan, Muhammad Iqbal and Pakistan’s founding father, Muhammad Ali Jinnah.

Even when, after 1950, the Muslim League and (consequently) MSF began to 
disintegrate into various opposing factions, politics in Pakistani campuses did 
not fall in the hands of the more right-wing forces. Instead, the vacuum was at 
once filled by left-wing and progressive student outfits.

The Democratic Students Federation (DSF), which was close to the Communist 
Party of Pakistan (CPP) and the National Students Federation (NSF), which was 
ideologically linked to the left-wing National Awami Party (NAP)-dominated 
student and youth politics in the 1950s and 1960s respectively.

 
A 1966 poster of the left-wing National Students Federation (NSF). – Photo 
courtesy Apna Kal Blog

However, the IJT began taking a more direct part in campus politics after the 
emergence of Field Marshal Ayub Khan’s military coup in 1958.

In what was then a predominantly secular and pro-West social and political 
setting, IJT initiated a two-pronged mission on campuses, in which it not only 
opposed the Ayub dictatorship’s secularising policies and legislation, but also 
looked to check the continuing growth of leftist and progressive political 
groups in colleges and universities.

Basing its ideology on the political writings of the highly influential Islamic 
scholar, political Islamist and the chief of the Jamaat-i-Islami, Abul Ala 
Maududi, the IJT did manage to carve out important areas of ideological 
influence and electoral strength in various universities and colleges of 
Karachi and Lahore.

But across the 1960s, bulk of the students’ electoral and ideological support 
remained largely with the progressive student groups, especially the NSF.

 
NSF ideologue Rasheed Hassan surrounded by NSF workers and supporters at Dow 
Medical College, Karachi (1969). – Photo courtesy Apna Kal Blog

One of the first prominent exhibitions of Islamic fundamentalism articulated as 
a political expression in student politics of Pakistan emerged when (between 
1968 and 1970) IJT and its mother party began a concentrated movement against 
the Pakistan Peoples Party (formed in 1967) in former West Pakistan and the 
Bengali nationalist party, the Awami League (AL), in former East Pakistan.

IJT distributed a number of anti-socialist (and ‘pro-Islam’) pamphlets and got 
embroiled in clashes with activists of the PPP, AL and NSF.

Its opponents accused IJT of being ‘funded by the military regime of General 
Yahya Khan’ and by the American CIA, whom the leftists accused of using JI and 
IJT in its Cold War against the political influence of the Soviet Union.

By the mid-1970s, in the event of the splits and factional disintegration 
witnessed by leftist and progressive student groups, the IJT managed to turn 
itself into a well-oiled electoral machine. Its politics remained largely 
democratic and not radical.

What’s more, the same period also saw the emergence of other democratic (and 
non-radical) fundamentalist student groups, such as the ATI.

Unlike the IJT that was dominated by the urbane but puritanical pro-Saudi Sunni 
Muslims, ATI represented students belonging to the Barelvi Sunni Muslim 
sub-sect that was not only more moderate in its fundamentalist outlook but was 
also in the majority.

 
Flag of the the Islami Jamiat-i-Tuleba (IJT).

The early 1970s also produced the Shia-dominated ISO.

In spite of the growth of fundamentalist student outfits (especially in the 
Punjab and Karachi), no serious fundamentalist movement involving the students 
took shape during much of the 1970s.

The tussle between Islamic fundamentalism and liberal and leftist student 
tendencies on campuses was contested through student-union elections and 
occasional clashes.

But if a point is to be picked to explain the growth in the radicalisation of 
Islamic fundamentalists among student groups, then that point may as well be 
the day the right-wing coalition, the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), 
kick-started its movement against the elected Zulfikar Ali Bhutto/PPP regime in 
1977.

Led by the organisational prowess of the JI, the PNA was a nine-party electoral 
alliance against the ruling PPP. After accusing the PPP regime of rigging the 
1977 general elections, PNA initiated a widespread movement calling for the 
dismissal of what it described to be as Bhutto’s ‘un-Islamic government’ and 
‘democratic dictatorship.’ The alliance also called for the imposition of 
‘Nizam-e-Mustafa’ (Prophet’s system of government).

The student-wings of Jamaat-i-Islami (IJT), Jamiat Ulema Islam (JTI) and Jamiat 
Ulema Pakistan (ATI) played a significant role in organising protests on the 
streets and campuses.

Religious-political student groups had only played a token role in the 
students’ movement against the Ayub Khan dictatorship (in 1968-69), which was 
mainly led by leftist student outfits like NSF, Baloch Students Organization, 
National Students Organization (NSO), and assorted progressive Sindhi, Pushtun 
and Bengali youth organisations.

However, religious student groups like IJT bloomed into becoming effective 
agitation units during the 1977 anti-Bhutto movement.

By 1977, some policies of the Bhutto regime, such as his purge against the 
radical/Marxist group within the PPP and his decision to send in the army 
against Baloch insurgents had alienated the party from a majority of left-wing 
youth outfits that had initially supported the PPP’s rise to power.

 
Baloch leader, Nawab Bugti and Z. A. Bhutto share a smoke (1974). Both were 
later killed by the military. Bhutto in 1979 and Bugti in 2006.

The emergence of the reactionary military dictatorship of General Ziaul Haq 
(July, 1977) boosted the presence and influence of fundamentalist student 
groups on the country’s campuses.

 
Ziaul Haq announcing the dissolution of elected assemblies and the imposition 
of Martial Law (July 1977).

IJT, in particular, was openly backed and aided by the dictatorship as it went 
about attempting to wipe-out anti-Zia and progressive student organisations. It 
also came into contact with certain Afghan jihadists who had begun to arrive in 
Pakistan after the 1979 Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

Interestingly, during the last countrywide student union elections that took 
place in early 1983, it seemed the leverage that fundamentalist student outfits 
had gained after the 1977 anti-Bhutto movement was fading when progressive 
student alliances delivered serious electoral blows to the IJT in colleges and 
universities across Pakistan.

Alarmed by the results of these elections, the Zia regime banned student unions 
in 1984.

Though the ban helped IJT to bounce back from the heavy defeats it had faced in 
the student union elections of 1983, its influence on campuses continued to be 
challenged by progressive student groups like Peoples Students Federation 
(PSF), BSO, Pakhtun Students Federation (PkSF), and (in Karachi) the All 
Pakistan Mohajir Students Organization (APMSO).

Also, with Zia’s ban on student unions and the consequential lack of the annual 
tradition of holding student-union elections curbed, student politics in 
Pakistan rapidly disintegrated and violence between opposing student outfits 
became a disconcerting norm.

Zia’s draconian ‘Islamisation’ project and his dictatorship’s direct 
involvement in the US and Saudi backed anti-Soviet ‘Afghan jihad’ in 
Afghanistan triggered the birth of a number of radical sectarian and jihadist 
organisations, mostly made up of militant Deobandi, Salafi and Wahabi sections 
of the population.

Though such state-backed organisations were not present in colleges and 
universities, the more evangelical expressions of these new and more 
puritanical forms of Islamic fundamentalism began making their way into the 
privately-owned higher educational institutions that had begun to spring up in 
the mid-1980s.

The supposedly apolitical but puritanical Tableeghi Jamat (TJ) began gathering 
young adherents in the privately-owned educational institutions. Their entry 
was largely encouraged by these institutions’ administration.



However, believing that their universities and colleges had kept the ‘violent’ 
political student organisations away, the administrations’ policy of allowing 
Islamic evangelical groups to openly recruit students subsequently created an 
opening for radical Islamist organisations like the Hizbul Tahrir (HuT) to slip 
in.

After the tragic 9/11 episode in the United States in 2001, and the way the 
military dictatorship of General Pervez Musharraf decided to become an active 
part of the United States’ ‘War on Terror,’ a fresh wave if radicalisation 
swept across various sections of Pakistan.



As secular and progressive student groups continued to struggle to revive their 
influence that had begun to erode after the 1984 ban on student unions, 
activities of TJ and HuT on privately owned colleges along with the 
unrestrained appearance of right-wing conspiracy theorists on private TV 
channels and campuses (as invited speakers), gave birth to perhaps the most 
intransigent and conservative generation of young Pakistanis.

This tendency was on display during the ‘Lawyers’ Movement’ against the 
Musharraf dictatorship (2006-7).

For example, though the movement was originally led by progressive lawyers and 
its central aim was the replacement of the Musharraf dictatorship with a 
democratic government, more and more right-wing elements became a part of the 
movement as it gained momentum.

This was also perhaps the first major political movement in Pakistan in which 
progressive mainstream student groups did not play a significant role, even 
though some minor factions of the NSF were present.

The progressive (rather non-Islamist) aspect of the movement in the context of 
student participation mainly came from brand new student outfits that were 
formed in private universities and the Punjab University (PU).

United Students Federation (USF) and University Students Federation (USF) were 
formed as platforms for a mixture of independent, progressive and ‘moderate 
Islamist’ students opposed to the Musharraf dictatorship, whereas another newly 
formed student organisation, the Insaf Students Federation (ISF), the 
student-wing of the right-wing Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI), played 
noteworthy roles in the movement.

By the time the movement had reached a peak (in late 2007), IJT and Pakistan 
Muslim League-N’s student-wing, MSF, also joined in. However, the most 
interesting thing was when IJT and later HuT turned some rallies of the 
movement into pro-jihad affairs, in which portraits of renegade terrorist Osama 
Bin Laden, were openly displayed.

The fundamentalist tendency on campuses that touched a peak in the mid-2000s 
now seems be receding. But with the mainstream processes of student unionism 
still in the dock, one is not sure whether this tendency would give way to the 
return of mainstream democratic politics on campuses or will it only mutate 
into becoming something a lot more militant.

Nevertheless, with the democratic system that returned to Pakistan in 2008, the 
subsequent strengthening of the judiciary and the elected parliament; and also 
with the military-establishment and radical Islamist groups now coming under 
greater scrutiny may as well mean that the fundamentalist aspects of student 
politics in Pakistan may now evolve into becoming something a lot more 
temperate.

 
A PTI/ ISF rally. Satirist and political pop acts like Ali Aftab Saeed believe 
that PTI is ‘just a good looking version of Jamaat-i-Islami.’

However, there is also the view that the hold on campuses and influence of old 
fundamentalist outfits may be loosening. Unchecked HuT activities on various 
private educational institutions have added a radical and reactionary tendency 
to new urban youth groups, especially in many sections of ISF.

Bibliography: Nasr, Vali Reza: The Vanguard of Islamic Revolution (I B. Tauris, 
1994); Haqqani, Husain: Pakistan: Between Mosque & Military (Carnegie 
Endowment, 2005); Malik, Anas: Political Survival in Pakistan-Beyond Ideology 
(Taylor & Francis, 2010); Nelson, MJ: Religion, Politics & the Modern 
University in Pakistan & Bangladesh (National Bureau of Asian Research, 2009).


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