http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/NI15Dh01.html

Sep 15, 2012


Japan and China on a conflicting course
By Karl Lee 


Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online feature that allows guest writers to 
have their say. Please click here if you are interested in contributing. 

Months after Tokyo governor, Shintaro Ishihara's island purchase plan, the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands territorial spat has shown no signs of abating from both 
Tokyo and Beijing. Worst still, the likelihood that the islands row would 
escalate into a full blown political crisis has significantly increased after 
the Japanese Cabinet decided to wrap up the purchase deal with the islands' 
owner. 

Unlike previous cases, the latest handling of the crisis has shown obvious 
misperceptions between the two nations. In so far as China's repeated claim on 
the disputed islands is not recognized by Tokyo, Japan's handling of the issue 
is also not seen as a conflict resolution gesture to Beijing but rather, a 
serious encroachment of its interest and territorial integrity. 

The fear of diplomatic backlash with China if the issue is played up by the 
right-wing Ishihara required the Japanese central government's swift response 
to nationalize the islands before spiraling out of its control. What the 
Yoshihiko Noda administration hoped to achieve out of this is to preserve the 
islands' status quo where the issue is kept from affecting the overall 
Sino-Japanese relations. Politically too, Noda is using the issue to garner 
more public and internal support after the passing of its unpopular sales tax 
hike bill in August and the coming Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) presidential 
election. 

The Chinese government, meanwhile, thinks otherwise. As part of its territories 
which is currently administered by Tokyo due to historical reasons, there 
existed a dispute between the two nations and any unilateral attempt by Tokyo 
is a direct violation against Beijing's national interest and recognition. 

The latest islands bid, be it symbolic or "legal", is viewed by the Chinese 
leadership as an effort to "wrest control" over the islands against China's 
interests and thereby, alter the present status quo of the islands. Moreover, 
the purchase has also shown Tokyo's unwillingness to bend on the dispute, 
something which the Chinese authorities had hoped for in the past. 

The road ahead
Unlike the September 2010 trawler collision near the contented islands, Beijing 
seemed to have learnt a valuable lesson not to over-play its card as a means of 
forcing the Japanese government to back down. So far, Beijing has remained 
reactive to Tokyo's move, preferring to observe as to how far the unusually 
assertive Noda administration would pursue on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands case 
before taking stern measures to stake its claim on the islands. 

In fact, recent discourses by Chinese leaders have hinted that Beijing may have 
reached its acceptable limits following the Japanese government's unusual 
assertiveness in ramming ahead the purchase plan of the disputed islands. 

As demonstrated during Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in 
early September, Chinese President Hu Jintao's outright rejection of any 
official sideline meeting with Prime Minister Noda had signaled that another 
round of frozen Sino-Japanese diplomatic ties reminiscent of the Koizumi years 
may be well ahead of us. Even the 15-minute informal conservation with his 
Japanese counterpart was marred with Hu's serious warning on the repercussions 
that the islands purchase would inflict to the overall bilateral relations 
coupled with his reiteration of China's will to defend its sovereignty at all 
costs. 

A day later, on September 10, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, also reaffirmed 
China's unwavering stand to stake its claim on the islands and pledged against 
making any concession with Japan regarding its islands' sovereignty. By far, 
these two statements are the strongest ever been by members of the top 
leadership ever since the islands purchase proposal was mooted by Ishihara in 
April. 

At the same time, there is also news that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is 
stepping up its military preparedness in the middle of the crisis. On September 
6, the Jinan Military Region held a military operation in which it focused on a 
marine group landing and taking control of an island near the Yellow Sea. It 
seemed to indicate that the PLA is seriously contemplating similar operation if 
there is a need for military action on the Diaoyu Islands issue. Apart from 
that, Beijing may choose to employ its economic pressure once again against 
Japan after its successful attempt following the Chinese trawler collision 
incident in September 2010. 
For Japan, it is highly questionable on whether the Noda administration is 
prepared or able to confront the prospect of temporary or small-scale skirmish 
with Beijing. While the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) already had an 
operation plan to defend the Senkaku Islands, the weak central government mired 
with a myriad of problems, from internal party bickering to domestic economic 
woes, meant there is no guarantee that Tokyo is ready for full mobilization of 
all its resources in response against Beijing's armed and economic reprisals. 
Also, the whole situation would become extremely dangerous and complicated if 
Japan seeks cooperation from its close ally, the United States in order to 
respond to China's retaliatory measures at an advantage. 

With all these developments in sight, it is highly skeptical to concur to any 
view that China would take more conciliatory approach as evident in the South 
China Sea dispute. The central leadership transition later this year, strong 
anti-Japanese sentiment in China and grave public outcry to what is perceived 
as Beijing's passive take on the islands issue, meant that the same instance of 
Beijing's diplomacy of restraint toward Japan may not apply this time around. 

It is crystal clear that the Noda administration's nationalization drive of the 
islands has failed in alleviating concern from the Chinese top leadership and 
defusing the Sino-Japanese territorial tension. On the contrary, it heightened 
political apprehension with Beijing as the latter viewed the move as changing 
the status quo of the islands. That China's reprisals against Japan may begin 
with the signing of a purchase agreement between Tokyo and the islands' private 
owner, has shown that we are braving for a political storm ahead of us. 

Karl C L Lee is the Master reader of the University of Malaya, Malaysia. His 
research focus is on China-Japan relations in Southeast Asia and the wider East 
Asia. 

(Copyright 2012 Karl C L Lee) 

Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online feature that allows guest writers to 
have their say. Please click here if you are interested in contributing. 
Articles submitted for this section allow our readers to express their opinions 
and do not necessarily meet the same editorial standards of Asia Times Online's 
regular contributors 

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