FYI
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Clear or nuclear: Will Saudi Arabia get the bomb?
Tuesday, 21 May 2013
There has been much speculation about the possibility of Riyadh
acquiring, or developing, nuclear weapon should Tehran obtain the bomb.
(Photo Courtesy: CNAS)
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Naser al-Tamimi, Special to Al Arabiya
Dr. Naser al-Tamimi
As the impasse over Tehran’s nuclear program worsens, those most
likely to be directly affected by an Iranian bomb are showing greater
alarm. While the media fixates on Israel and its possible reaction,
other regional players have no less at stake.
Despite Riyadh’s
long-held advocacy of making the Middle East a zone free of weapons of
mass destruction, there has been much speculation in the past few years
about the possibility of its acquiring, or developing, nuclear weapons
should Tehran obtain the bomb.
In the words of Saudi King
Abdullah: “If Iran developed nuclear weapons (...) everyone in the
region would do the same,” a sentiment echoed by Prince Turki al-Faisal, former
head of Saudi Arabia’s General Intelligence Directorate.
Why go nuclear?
A major deterioration in U.S.-Saudi relations - especially if Washington
fails to stop Tehran’s nuclear program or decides to scale back its
military presence in the Middle East due to its recent energy
discoveries and/or fiscal constraints - could force Riyadh to reconsider
nuclear weapon acquisition to avoid having to face foreign aggression
without U.S. security assurances.
The second issue is a mirror
image of the first, namely, the concern over Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
If Tehran crosses the threshold, this development could increase the
pressure on Riyadh to walk in the nuclear path.
If U.S.-Saudi relations should falter, the Chinese would doubtless
view it as an opportunity to take a more active role in Saudi affairs
>Dr. Naser al-Tamimi
In Feb. 2012, a senior Saudi source told The Times: “There is no
intention currently to pursue a unilateral military nuclear programme
but the dynamics will change immediately if the Iranians develop their
own nuclear capability (...) politically, it would be completely
unacceptable to have Iran with a nuclear capability and not the
kingdom.”
A third factor in the Saudi calculus is Israel’s
nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities. Given Israel’s status as an
assumed, but undeclared, nuclear weapons state, the most immediate
consequence of Tehran’s crossing the nuclear threshold would be the
possibility that Tel Aviv ends the ambiguity about its program and
announces that it has nuclear weapons as a form of deterrence against
Iran. This in turn will increase the pressure on Riyadh to acquire its
own deterrent vis-à-vis Israel as well as Iran.
Perhaps a more
critical factor in the nuclear equation is Saudi Arabia’s economic
outlook. The country depends almost exclusively on oil export revenues
to develop its economy, but the kingdom is an oil-consumer as well as a
producer. Burning oil for electricity production currently consumes
about a quarter of the crude oil Saudi Arabia produces, which could have very
serious implications for the future. In 2012, the country consumed an average
of 3.04 million barrels per day, according to the
International Energy Agency.
Third-party connections
There have been suggestions that, rather than develop an indigenous nuclear
program, Saudi Arabia would simply seek to buy nuclear warheads from
Pakistan or China. According to a news report, Riyadh is beefing up its
military links with Islamabad to counter Tehran’s expansionist plans,
either by acquiring atomic weapons from Pakistan or its pledge of
nuclear cover, a claim also reported in The Guardian.
Alternatively, Pakistan might offer a deterrent guarantee by deploying its own
nuclear weapons, delivery systems and troops on Saudi territory. This
arrangement could be particularly appealing to both Riyadh and
Islamabad, allowing the Saudis to argue that they are not violating the
nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) since the weapons would not be
theirs.
A Pakistani presence might also be preferable to a U.S. one,
because stationing Muslim forces on Saudi soil would not trigger the
kind of opposition that has in the past accompanied the deployment of
American troops.
However, a good Pakistani working relationship
with Washington is essential. The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of
2009 (also known as the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill) authorized a
massive increase in U.S. civilian assistance to Islamabad, tripling it
to $1.5 billion a year.
Despite tensions between the two states,
Pakistan remains keen on developing its relationship with Washington,
and the continued proliferation of nuclear technology is unlikely to
encourage either economic or military aid.
Indeed, selling
complete nuclear weapons would come at a great political cost. Islamabad might
forfeit U.S. foreign assistance and drive Washington into closer
cooperation with its mortal enemy, India. Providing Riyadh with a
Pakistani nuclear umbrella would also increase the likelihood of
convergence between New Delhi and Tehran, as both nations might view the move
as part of a larger Sunni threat.
Relations with Islamabad
Although relations with Islamabad are improving, the Saudi leadership has no
great trust in Pakistan’s intentions. On the contrary, many WikiLeaks
documents have revealed Saudi dissatisfaction with Pakistani politicians and
policies.
Above all, Indian-Saudi economic relations have
improved rapidly in recent years. At present, New Delhi is the
fifth-largest trading partner for Saudi Arabia, and Riyadh is the top
supplier of oil to India (approximately 700,000 barrels per day).
Saudi Arabia will take into account that India and China will be key markets
for its petroleum products during the next two decades. In addition,
Saudi nuclear acquisition could prompt a pre-emptive strike by Israel,
especially if the sale became known before the weapon was activated.
In theory, the Saudis could pursue a nuclear option with the Chinese, but
in the current strategic environment, it is hard to imagine this as a
realistic scenario. Beijing and Riyadh have never had close military
relations, largely because Washington has provided the Saudis with
advanced military equipment, as well as security assurances against
international threats, that China cannot provide.
While Beijing
and Washington do not see eye to eye on many issues, including the
severity of the Iranian threat, it is unlikely that Beijing would
jeopardize its political, trade and other relations with Washington over
supplying the Saudis with nuclear weapons.
Additionally, China
is a member of the NPT system, and thus obliged “not in any way to
assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or
otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other explosive devices, or
control over such weapons or explosive devices.”
Under the
Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994, Beijing would face
revocation of the U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement it worked so hard
to secure, as well as the possible imposition of economic sanctions, if
it were deemed to have “aided or abetted” the acquisition of nuclear
weapons.
If U.S.-Saudi relations should falter, the Chinese would doubtless view it as
an opportunity to take a more active role in Saudi affairs. However, there is
no evidence suggesting that this
relationship will sour in the near future; in fact, as shall be seen, it is
clearly improving.
Domestic constraints
Technical
barriers for entry into the nuclear club are high, and it is difficult
for states to completely hide a clandestine military program from
foreign intelligence observers. Indeed, many analysts believe that
Riyadh’s talk about developing nuclear arms may be more intended to
focus Western attention on its concerns about regional risks, than to
indicate any kind of definitive action to go nuclear.
It is
unlikely that the Saudis would want to proliferate at the present time;
doing so would deeply strain the U.S.-Saudi relationship, perhaps to an
irrevocable degree. It would also place Riyadh in breach of a memorandum of
understanding signed with Washington in 2008, promising U.S.
assistance with civil nuclear power on condition that Riyadh not pursue
“sensitive nuclear technologies.”
Riyadh’s desire to maintain a
strong relationship with Washington, especially in light of the
kingdom’s desire to prevent unconventional terrorism within its borders,
inhibits any appetite to develop nuclear weapons. There is also strong
evidence that Washington is committed to defending Saudi Arabia. The
Obama administration authorized, in the last three years, the largest
ever arms sales to Riyadh.
Furthermore, the character of the
Saudi establishment militates against taking the drastic step of nuclear
proliferation. Journalist Richard Nield has noted that Riyadh has
committed itself to a major industrialization and economic
diversification campaign that will require sustained engagement with the rest
of the world. “It’s not rational that they would jeopardize this
in favour of a pre-emptive strike against the theoretical possibility of a
nuclear-armed Iran.”
The same idea is echoed by Kate Amlin, a
nuclear analyst at the U.S.-based Monterey Institute of International
Studies, who believes that Saudi leaders would not want to incur the
political and economic backlash resulting from pursuit of a nuclear
arsenal, at a time when they are trying to integrate further into the
international economy.
Finally, it would take many years and
considerable financial cost for Riyadh to develop nuclear weapons. There exists
a relatively strong consensus regarding the immature state of
the Saudi nuclear technology infrastructure.
The country lacks
the human expertise and technical knowledge necessary to develop a
nuclear weapons program on its own. It does not operate nuclear power
facilities, and its scientists do not have the necessary experience to
enrich uranium for reactor fuel, to convert nuclear fuel, or operate
reactors in desert conditions.
There have, however, been clear
signs recently of the Saudis’ intent to enter the nuclear arena. In June 2010,
the kingdom commissioned Finnish management consultancy Poyry to
offer a strategy for nuclear and renewable energy use, and to study the
economic and technical feasibility of becoming involved in all aspects
of the nuclear power chain, including uranium enrichment.
Earlier that year, the Saudi government said it planned to build a new
technology centre, the King Abdullah City for Nuclear and Renewable
Energies, in Riyadh. Despite this, it will be years before it is
developed; some experts estimate that the Saudi nuclear civilian plan
might take up to 15 years.
Given that it is the world’s top oil
exporter, handling a nuclear Saudi Arabia would be a delicate manner.
However, at least for now, the Saudis have no alternative but to rely on a U.S.
defence umbrella in the region. Still, it would be contrary to
Riyadh’s practice to put all its eggs in one basket.
Thus, the
kingdom will work in two parallel routes, strengthening its military,
particularly the air force and navy, while aggressively seeking to buy
the civil nuclear technology that could in the future provide the
technical capacity and human resources for dealing with nuclear weapons.
Overall, though not insurmountable, the obstacles to Saudi
nuclearization are considerable. Much depends on Tehran’s ambitions, and the
West’s determination to stymie them.
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Dr. Naser al-Tamimi is a UK-based Middle East analyst and the author of the
forthcoming book “China-Saudi Arabia Relations, 1990-2012: Marriage of
Convenience or Strategic Alliance? ” He is also a regular contributor to Al
Arabiya, with particular research interest in energy politics, the
political economy of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, and Middle East-Asia
relations. The writer can be reached at Twitter: @ nasertamimi and
email: [email protected]
[An extended version of this article was first published in the Middle East
Quarterly.]
[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
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