http://news.independent.co.uk/world/americas/article2891176.ece


Was George Bush right about Vietnam? 
This week, President Bush cited America's experience in Vietnam as an argument 
against withdrawing from Iraq. Unfortunately, argues Rupert Cornwell, he had 
got quite the wrong end of the historical stick 
Published: 24 August 2007 
There have been surreal moments aplenty in the presidency of George W Bush. 
Few, however, can match his invocation of Graham Greene in defence of America's 
policy in Iraq. Where Bush is the most faith-driven of leaders, so unafflicted 
by self-doubt, Greene is the mouthpiece par excellence of seedy ambiguity, 
tattered faith and human frailty. 

The subject was Vietnam, the war that Mr Bush famously chose not to fight. In 
the intervening 30-plus years, however, he has plainly undergone something of a 
conversion. Vietnam was a noble undertaking, was his basic message this week to 
a convention of US veterans. If anything, the mistake of America was not to 
stay there longer, a mistake he has no intention of repeating in Iraq.

Thus he cited Greene's 1955 novel The Quiet American, and singled out one of 
its main characters, the US government agent Alden Pyle. Those were the days 
when the French still ruled Indochina, but Pyle, young, driven and naive, was 
already on the scene, seeking surreptitiously to bring American solutions to 
the unhappy land of Vietnam. Many find him insufferable - but not Mr Bush - as 
he tries in vain to bring American solutions to an equally unhappy Iraq.

In Kansas City on Wednesday, Mr Bush used three arguments - two negative and 
one positive - to draw his version of the parallels between Iraq and Vietnam. A 
hasty American pullout, he maintained, would bring unspeakable horrors for 
innocent civilians in Iraq and neighbouring countries, just as American 
withdrawal had led to suffering and slaughter in Indochina three decades ago.

By contrast - and this was his second argument - when the US "stays the course" 
(to use a once-favoured but now abandoned Bushism) as it did in Germany and 
Japan after the Second World War and in South Korea after the 1953 armistice, 
the results in terms of democracy and prosperity are miraculous to behold.

Thirdly, an American retreat would do huge damage to US credibility. It would 
be greeted by terrorists as a victory that would embolden them in their global 
challenge to the lone superpower, and increase the risks of new, and perhaps 
even deadlier, 9/11s on the soil of America itself.

Inspect them closely, however, and each of the arguments has less substance 
than its predecessor. Mr Bush was on his firmest ground when he pointed to the 
terrible events that followed America's departure from Vietnam. Then, as now, 
he said, some insisted that the real problem was the US presence, "and that if 
we would just withdraw, the killing would end". Instead unknown tens or 
hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese were executed, imprisoned or otherwise 
"re-educated" in camps, and more than a million others became refugees. But 
these upheavals paled beside the genocide unleashed by Pol Pot and the Khmer 
Rouge in Cambodia, that killed some 1.7 million people, a fifth of the 
population.

In fact, however, these disasters were not precipitated by a rapid withdrawal 
of the sort opponents of the Iraq war seek. The departure of US forces from 
Vietnam was a long, gradual process that began in 1968 and continued for six 
years. As for the rise of Pol Pot, historians agree that without the war in 
Vietnam and the "collateral damage" visited upon Cambodia by US bombers and the 
machinations of the CIA, this almost certainly would never have happened.

And Mr Bush overlooked another point. His troop "surge" may be producing some 
results, but the political settlement that alone can produce genuine stability 
looks more remote than ever. In its absence, Iraq's own killing fields of 
innocent civilians multiply.

True, the victims are numbered in dozens, not thousands as in Cambodia. But 
that is only because millions have already fled for their lives. Some 2 million 
or more Iraqis are refugees. In the short term the violence in Iraq might well 
worsen, if US troops are withdrawn. In the long run, however, consider Vietnam, 
today a unified, peaceful and increasingly prosperous country.

So assume the US does stay. Is there a chance of turning Iraq into a Middle 
Eastern equivalent of Germany, Japan or South Korea? That was the conceit of 
the neo-conservatives when they made the case for war. Today that vision lies 
in ruins - for reasons Mr Bush conveniently omitted in his Kansas City speech.

First and foremost, Germany and Japan were homogeneous countries, by 1945 
crushed, exhausted and shamed, yet with huge civic, industrial and cultural 
traditions waiting to be revived. Iraq is an artificial amalgam of three former 
and very different provinces of the Ottoman Empire, held together by a tyrant. 
A slightly better analogy might be South Korea, which, protected by the US 
military shield, has transformed itself from a poor and largely rural country 
into a global economic powerhouse. But partition ended the Korean War. In Iraq, 
civil war continues to rage - and if the Korean timetable applies, American 
soldiers will still be there in 2060 trying to contain it.

Second, Mr Bush refuses to put his money where his mouth is. His war - its cost 
of $500bn and counting already exceeds that of Vietnam - has seen no tax 
increases to pay for it. It demands no sacrifices except from those who 
actually fight it and their families. At the height of the Vietnam War, half a 
million US troops were deployed. Even with the surge, barely a third that 
number are in Iraq - as everyone but this President has long admitted, far 
fewer than are needed.

It is worth noting that in post-war Germany and Japan, there were three times 
as many allied occupation troops per head of the local population as in Iraq. 
But to provide more troops would mean a return of the same draft that brought 
Vietnam directly into the personal experience of millions of American families.

The President's third point of comparison between Iraq now and Indochina then 
is that withdrawal - a surrender, in his words, to "the deceptive allure of 
retreat" - would be disastrous for American credibility.

After all, Mr Bush noted, had not both Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman 
al-Zawahiri, invoked Vietnam as a lesson. Americans, he quoted Zawahiri as 
saying, "ran and left their agents" in Vietnam, and "know better than others 
that there is no hope in victory ... the Vietnam spectre is closing every 
outlet."

A withdrawal from Iraq might indeed damage US credibility - but if the example 
of Vietnam is any guide, that damage will be very slight. Probably, Moscow was 
emboldened in its war-by-proxy with the US, in Cuba, Angola and like places. 
But the dominoes did not fall in South-east Asia. And if Vietnam fuelled a 
perception of American weakness that helped persuade the Kremlin to invade 
Afghanistan in 1979, then it contributed to the collapse not of the US, but of 
the Soviet Union itself.

In fact, any loss of credibility caused by an early wind-down of the US 
presence in Iraq would surely be outweighed by the removal - or, at least, 
mitigation - of the moral stain caused by an unprovoked invasion of a country 
that did not represent the slightest threat to the US and had nothing to do 
with 9/11, and by the subsequent disgrace of Abu Ghraib. Vietnam was a conflict 
that gradually escalated from small beginnings, as Washington's military 
strategists fell into the trap of believing that just one more shove would do 
the trick. Iraq was a pure war of choice, and as such will probably go down in 
US history as an even greater blunder than Vietnam.

Of course, these two wars, though more than a generation apart, do have 
similarities. Each of them was based on a flawed premise. Vietnam was supposed 
to be part of the free world's global battle against communism. In fact, the 
North's ultimately successful campaign to unify the country was the final act 
of a decades-long, anti-colonial struggle.

Iraq was, and continues to be, presented as a central front in the "war against 
terror", made even more threatening by those imaginary WMD Saddam Hussein was 
reputedly aiming at America's jugular. As even Mr Bush now grudgingly admits, 
Saddam had nothing to do with 9/11. In fact, his secular regime was anathema to 
Bin Laden. If Iraq is now a terrorist breeding ground, that is entirely of this 
President's making.

And underlying American instincts have not changed. In The Quiet American, 
Alden Pyle reckons he has all the answers - above all that the American way 
alone can bring good things like "national democracy" to the unhappy land of 
Vietnam.

To which the older, wiser and deeply sceptical British journalist Thomas Fowler 
replies that the real aspirations of the Vietnamese are less exalted. "They 
want enough rice. They don't want to be shot at. They don't want our white 
skins telling them what they want."

In a way, that world-weary line conjures up the famous remark attributed to 
Harold McMillan, that the Americans are "great big, vulgar, bustling people, 
more vigorous than we are". Given the enthusiastic participation by the last 
British government in the Iraq adventure, we should be wary of condescension. 
But it is hard not to see Bush as a modern Pyle, with the same disastrous blend 
of idealism, ignorance and well-meaning arrogance. "We are the old colonial 
peoples," Fowler, the authentic voice of Donald Rumsfeld's despised "Old 
Europe", tells Pyle. "But we've learnt a bit of reality. We have learned not to 
play with matches." And was ever a larger match tossed into a greater sea of 
petrol than that of George Bush's invasion of Iraq?


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