An Islamic counter-reformation Ali Eteraz October 2, 2007 8:30 PM
http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/ali_eteraz/2007/10/an_islamic_counterreformation.html Just as Luther's reformation overlapped with Calvin's agitations against the Church, Abdul Wahhab was not the only one of Islam's 18th century reformers. In India, a "revivalist" by the name of Shah Waliullah who espoused a more humane version of dissent than Wahhab, stepped forward and questioned the clerical unwillingness to change with the times. Meanwhile, in Shia Iran, Waliullah's equivalent was Aqa Bihbihani, who opened the Shia clerics to the concept of ijtihad. The simultaneous appearance of these three men, speaking so vociferously against "blind imitation" of the traditionalist dogma, unleashed an era of convulsions within Islam's superstructure. A number of innovative movements reared their heads. These included the Bahai Faith in Iran (a reform upon Shi'ism), the Ahmadiyya and Deoband movements in India, and Salafism in the Arab world. While the Bahai and Ahmadiyya were persecuted, partly because they appeased the British, Deobandis and Salafis managed to enter the mainstream, mostly by acting tough against the colonisers. These two suddenly mainstream movements produced both moderate and extremist wings. The moderate wings (worth discussing but not today) were crushed by colonial powers and post-colonial dictators. But the extremist wings took off (largely because the US decided to bankroll them just as they lay dying). Today, extremist Deobandis go by another name - Taliban; meanwhile, extremist Salafism gave us Seyyid Qutb, Bin Laden, and assisted Khomeini. Over these 200 years the traditionalist clerics - against whose dogma all these reforms and revivals had fomented - sat around and did nothing of consequence. They taught an ethics of quietude and mimicked Laputans. As long as they could stay cloistered in study circles discussing their four precious schools of law and despising Salafis from a distance in vague syllogisms, they were content. Many of them mourned the demise of the Ottoman Caliphate, the one institution that had assured their relevance. Then, one day, a few years before 9/11, Bin Laden happened. More accurately, Bin Laden issued a fatwa that acquired pan-Islamic importance, and Sunni traditionalists, who once upon a time had such importance themselves, became jealous. The one thing the traditionalists guarded more than anything was the power to hand down fatwas. It certainly didn't hurt that traditionalist tomes from long ago completely forbade rebellion, which made them the only mainstream group to have anything close to a pre-fabcricated counter to Bin Laden available. In a collective "How dare he!" traditionalists began to organise. Instead of Muslim countries, where traditionalism was far too pacified and submissive, they made their power base in the west - mostly the US and UK - and then started to connect with allies around the world. This initial hustle-bustle resulted in disorganised initiatives. It included the European Council for Fatwa and Research and the Fiqh Council of North America, which were modelled on older clerical institutions like the Islamic Fiqh Academy (a part of the Organisation of Islamic Conference) and the Islamic Fiqh Academy of India, none of which had done anything of notice. Winning the Muslims in the west wasn't easy, especially as the clerics had to withstand a strident challenge from the Muslim Brotherhood who were the first to enter the market. However, by assuring the western governments of their willingness to assure western security - something the Brotherhood couldn't do - traditionalists eventually won. It was thus no surprise that after 9/11, President Bush featured a traditionalist scholar at his podium, or that a traditionalist scholar was the first to say that "the are not Muslim" or that a traditionalist organisation that put out a fatwa against Bin Laden, or that a traditionalist wrote a fatwa against British extremists in al-Muhajiroun, or that traditionalist scholars were at the heart of the counter-terrorism organisations. To prove they were desirous to get back the station they once held among Muslims, both liberal and conservative clerics blamed Bin Ladenism on a "crisis of authority" (and not on the traditional rigidity that had prompted the rise of Deobandis and Salafis in the first place). They further put the entire blame on "the Wahhabis" - a line that jived nicely with the War on Terror. With the insurgency in Iraq leading to an Islamic civil war, the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan targeting civilians, and the rise of jihadists from Morocco to Indonesia, traditionalists were confronted with the reality of Muslim-on-Muslim violence and realised they needed to take action. By this time they had high-level visibility and big-time friends. With the king of Jordan, a committed Western ally, backing them they issued the Amman Message. The historic message said it was not permissible for a Muslim to engage in takfir - ie, to declare another Muslim out of Islam and therefore punishable by death. The message was premised on the idea that if extremists lose the power to engage in takfir they will lose the power to brainwash new recruits (an argument that has some historical merit). It wasn't enlightenment, but it was a step in the direction, especially as it reached out to the Shia and moderate Salafis. After a 200-year hibernation the clerics were finally participating in Islam. Pakistan's former Sharia judge Taqi Usmani and the Mauritanian Shaykh Bin Bayyah are conservative keystones of this movement. Meanwhile, the liberal spearhead of group is the 18th Grand Mufti of Egypt, Sheikh Ali Gomaa. He is armed not just with a photographic memory but with a willingness to make pronouncements on controversial subjects, has classical traditionalist credentials, and is situated in a position of influence. He has disapproved of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, agitates for the equality of men and women, and has advised the British government. However, just like the conservatives, alarmed at the "fatwa-free-for-all" in the Muslim world, Gomaa proposed setting up a global standard of accreditation for Muslim scholars. If Gomaa's proposal had reached fruition, the Sunni world would have the centralisation of authority that some in the west areagitating for -ie, a sort of Muslim Pope or council of cardinals. On the whole, it can't be denied that traditional Muslim clerics have challenged terrorists and militants, and that their increased interest in the social and civic affairs of Muslims has been a positive development. However, whether clerical Islam should be embraced, how its resurrection should be negotiated, and how long this so-called counter-reformation can be expected to last, are questions worth looking at, and will be the subject of my next post. This article is the third in a series by Ali Eteraz on Islamic reform: Article 1: The roots of Islamic reform Article 2: The Islamic reformation Post message: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subscribe : [EMAIL PROTECTED] Unsubscribe : [EMAIL PROTECTED] List owner : [EMAIL PROTECTED] Homepage : http://proletar.8m.com/ Yahoo! Groups Links <*> To visit your group on the web, go to: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/proletar/ <*> Your email settings: Individual Email | Traditional <*> To change settings online go to: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/proletar/join (Yahoo! ID required) <*> To change settings via email: mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] <*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to: [EMAIL PROTECTED] <*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to: http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
