***Or as former prime minister Paul Keating told Inquirer after 
leaving Suharto's graveside on Monday, "corruption has always been 
an issue in Indonesia, and it'll always be there".

***Penyakit kanker belum bisa disembuhkan, tapi pasien bisa hidup 
bersama kanker.

***Apa nasib bangsa Indonesia, kemakmuran NKRI, ditentukan oleh 
penyelesaian kasus Soeharto ? Tentu tidak demikian. 

A nation judges Suharto 

Stephen Fitzpatrick | February 02, 2008 

WHEN Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono ordered the 
lowering of flags on the death of his predecessor Suharto last 
Sunday, there was bemusement among some Indonesians that a man with 
such a history should be so honoured.

"The flag at my house will not be flying at half-mast," Banda Aceh 
man Reza tells the online news service Detik.com. "I still feel 
great resentment towards him ... even though he's dead, justice must 
still be upheld. How many thousands of Acehnese died because of the 
military operation enacted during his time?" 

In the northern Java town of Semarang, former communist party 
district leader Semaun Utomo tells a reporter from the Koran Tempo 
newspaper that he also has no intention of obeying the instruction. 

"What for? He's no hero who should be honoured," says Utomo, who 
leads a group calling itself the Institute for the Rehabilitation of 
Victims of the New Order. The New Order was Suharto's name for his 
32-year administration, which ended in chaos and ignominy in 1998. 
The old man may have finally expired, after several lingering close 
calls, but the controversy was only just firing up. 

At the age of 86, the "smiling general" had surrendered judgment to 
history, but it's a verdict that, going by debate over the past 
week, will be some time in coming. The big question is whether it 
will also ensnare the family and cronies who make up the tendrils in 
the vast network of abuses of which he stands accused. 

As Sunday night wore on, in the first hours after his passing, 
thousands of well-wishers gathered to pay their respects at the late 
general's shabby Jakarta residence. It's not, as many commentators 
would have it, a luxurious or even comfortable pile. Those homes of 
his rapacious children that surround it are luxurious, in a 
profoundly tasteless way, but No6 could at best be described as 
homely. 

There were tears and reverence, and in the breathtakingly Indonesian 
way that the personal can always be political and vice versa, a 
secret camera smuggled into the house by at least one TV network 
showed relatives and political allies praying in front of the body, 
funeral shroud pulled back from that famous face. 

The following day's burial, broadcast live on national television, 
had him in the ground in time for midday prayers, in accordance with 
Muslim tradition, and was watched over by the great and the powerful 
of Indonesia's fabulously wealthy ruling elite. 

By then the rumblings were well and truly under way: Suharto's 
missing billions ought to be tracked down, people were saying, 
regardless of what good he did in dragging the country out of the 
economic ruin it had faced under founding president Sukarno in the 
1960s. Pre-written obituaries around the world veered from adulation 
to abhorrence, with varied emphases on his regime's demonstrably 
appalling record on human rights and corruption. 

Ratna Sari Dewi, one of several ex-wives of Sukarno, the man Suharto 
formally deposed in 1966, likens him to the Cambodian dictator Pol 
Pot for the hundreds of thousands of deaths he stands accused of. 
She isn't the only one making that comparison. 

And yet in many ways, although Suharto was undeniably ruthless and 
cold-blooded in his tight grip on the state, it was those around 
him - family and business associates, as well as the military that 
for his entire period in power played a prescribed political role in 
the country - who stripped the country clean of its major assets. 

There was a great hesitation during his lifetime to call him a 
crook, and you could almost hear the sigh of relief in some quarters 
when criminal charges for corruption were dropped due to his poor 
health following several debilitating strokes. But there is likely 
to be far less reluctance now when it comes to reopening 
investigations into his family's activities. 

Yoseph Suardi Sabda, director of civil prosecutions in the Attorney-
General's department, is adamant that if the offspring were to 
inherit their father's riches, they would also have responsibility 
for explaining how he came by them. And, quite likely, for giving a 
sizeable portion of them back. In particular, he says, a 11.5 
trillion rupiah ($1.4billion) civil case against Suharto for the 
misuse of funds from the Supersemar foundation, a body meant to 
support national education programs, would be aimed at the clan. 

A new twist, however, is the shock suggestion by Sabda that all of 
the family's assets, which stretch across the gamut of industries 
that powered Indonesia's economic boom times during Suharto's reign, 
could be examined and possibly quarantined, in order to guarantee 
payment of the state's claim. "The overseeing of their assets would 
be in line with their position as the new Suharto accused (in the 
case)," Sabda declares. 

Suharto lawyer Juan Felix Tampubolon describes the threat 
as "excessive", saying prosecutors have "no right to control 
(assets), unless they are already confiscated". 

Indonesian civil law analyst Isis Ikhwansyah, of Padjadjaran 
University in Bandung, is quoted in news reports as saying that if 
Suharto's descendants tried to escape responsibility for the legal 
case against him, they would also have to relinquish all claims on 
their inheritance. Given the estimates by global body Transparency 
International that Suharto and his circle skimmed off up to 
$US35billion during his reign, his six children will be thinking 
carefully about their next moves. 

Understanding the contradictions, and the reasons for such a range 
of analyses of the general's rule, takes some unpacking. The nature 
of the two great excesses over which history will judge Suharto - 
corruption and human rights abuses - are, ironically, a product of 
precisely the style of leadership that produced other things for 
which he is rightly lauded. 

He brought vast progress in the fields of education, agricultural 
production, even the regional political strength of the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations that he helped bring into existence. 

But the Irish-American scholar Benedict Anderson, in a 1999 address 
in Jakarta, bemoans the turpitude of what he calls Suharto's "dry-
rot order" (the epithet was a play on the strongman's New Order 
administration, a piece of self-invented rhetoric designed to 
contrast with Sukarno's "old order"). The centralised state, 
Anderson argues, with its Javanese power base and Jakarta-based 
rapaciousness, had created an extraordinary situation where parts of 
the country were important not for the existence of a citizenry that 
could imagine itself as Indonesian, but for the existence of natural 
resources that could enrich the new elite. 

"The astounding greed of the rulers in Jakarta, and of their 
provincial minions and errand boys ... increasingly seemed to be 
saying to the Acehnese, 'We don't need you; what we need are your 
natural resources. How wonderful it would be if Aceh were emptied of 
the Acehnese,"' Anderson says, not restricting his analysis to the 
separatist province on Sumatra's northwest tip, but also pointing to 
military violence in Papua and East Timor. 

It is a significant moment of public condemnation from one of the 
regime's most prominent international critics: the first time 
Anderson had made a public appearance in the country, after his 1972 
banishment for co-authoring a scathing analysis of the 1965 alleged 
coup that brought the general to power. 

Anderson, whose early academic writing on Indonesia helped lay the 
foundations for an entire generation of historians trying to 
understand what it was that gave definition to such a disparate, 
spread-out archipelagic nation, despaired at the internal division 
Suharto's rule had brought to the nation. It was a division papered 
over only by brute force, he argues. 

"If we could go back to 1945-49 and talk with the fighters for 
independence of that period," he says, "you can be sure they would 
find it impossible to believe that 50 years later the function of 
the Republic's armed forces would no longer be defending the country 
against external enemies, but rather oppressing their own people, in 
this way actually picking up the traditions of the colonial 
military." 

As scholars picked among the ruins of the New Order in those early 
days of its fall, many saw it for the rotting structure it had been, 
although the question remains as to how much progress has been made 
by successive presidents who came to power on corruption-busting 
promises. 

"(The New Order's) sudden downfall revealed that, in the end, 
Suharto's power was only a shell, like the outside of a house eaten 
up by termites, so that three months of student protests sufficed to 
bring it down," the Jesuit scholar and long-time Indonesian citizen 
Franz Magnis-Suseno writes. 

"Corruption," he writes at the time, was "endemic in the New Order 
from the beginning (and) grew like an octopus out of all proportion, 
invading every segment of Indonesian life and society, especially 
after the Suharto 'children' came of age. 

"It seemed that the military themselves felt helpless facing the 
unbridled appetite of the 'family' in dividing up the resources and 
development projects of the country." But Magnis-Suseno argues that 
this corruption that came so fully to characterise the Suharto era 
was a product of the administration itself, rather than some kind of 
indigenous Javanese extraction of continuous tribute by divinely 
appointed rulers. 

"Corruption was not rampant during the first 14 years of Indonesian 
independence," he writes. "The sources of the corruption of the New 
Order government must be sought in its total monopoly of power." 
However, even as the attempts to turn the nation's corrupt power 
base around continue, other analysts warn of its self-regenerating 
capacity. 

The post-Suharto policy of decentralised government, known as 
regional autonomy, brought with it a whole new dynamic of 
corruption, the Australian historian Adrian Vickers points out. 
Writing in his expansive A History of Modern Indonesia, Vickers 
opines that "the temptation for regional leaders to recreate 
themselves as local lords has been great, and in many regions there 
has been a strong revival of traditional royal families". 

Thanks to the decades of centralised rule and with only Suharto's 
example to turn to, many of the new local leaders have been 
incapable of instituting genuinely transparent institutions, Vickers 
writes, so that "the centralised corruption of the Suharto years 
rapidly turned to local corruption, as increased local revenues went 
directly into local leaders' pockets". 

Or as former prime minister Paul Keating told Inquirer after leaving 
Suharto's graveside on Monday, "corruption has always been an issue 
in Indonesia, and it'll always be there".

http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,23145955-
28737,00.html



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