***Or as former prime minister Paul Keating told Inquirer after leaving Suharto's graveside on Monday, "corruption has always been an issue in Indonesia, and it'll always be there".
***Penyakit kanker belum bisa disembuhkan, tapi pasien bisa hidup bersama kanker. ***Apa nasib bangsa Indonesia, kemakmuran NKRI, ditentukan oleh penyelesaian kasus Soeharto ? Tentu tidak demikian. A nation judges Suharto Stephen Fitzpatrick | February 02, 2008 WHEN Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono ordered the lowering of flags on the death of his predecessor Suharto last Sunday, there was bemusement among some Indonesians that a man with such a history should be so honoured. "The flag at my house will not be flying at half-mast," Banda Aceh man Reza tells the online news service Detik.com. "I still feel great resentment towards him ... even though he's dead, justice must still be upheld. How many thousands of Acehnese died because of the military operation enacted during his time?" In the northern Java town of Semarang, former communist party district leader Semaun Utomo tells a reporter from the Koran Tempo newspaper that he also has no intention of obeying the instruction. "What for? He's no hero who should be honoured," says Utomo, who leads a group calling itself the Institute for the Rehabilitation of Victims of the New Order. The New Order was Suharto's name for his 32-year administration, which ended in chaos and ignominy in 1998. The old man may have finally expired, after several lingering close calls, but the controversy was only just firing up. At the age of 86, the "smiling general" had surrendered judgment to history, but it's a verdict that, going by debate over the past week, will be some time in coming. The big question is whether it will also ensnare the family and cronies who make up the tendrils in the vast network of abuses of which he stands accused. As Sunday night wore on, in the first hours after his passing, thousands of well-wishers gathered to pay their respects at the late general's shabby Jakarta residence. It's not, as many commentators would have it, a luxurious or even comfortable pile. Those homes of his rapacious children that surround it are luxurious, in a profoundly tasteless way, but No6 could at best be described as homely. There were tears and reverence, and in the breathtakingly Indonesian way that the personal can always be political and vice versa, a secret camera smuggled into the house by at least one TV network showed relatives and political allies praying in front of the body, funeral shroud pulled back from that famous face. The following day's burial, broadcast live on national television, had him in the ground in time for midday prayers, in accordance with Muslim tradition, and was watched over by the great and the powerful of Indonesia's fabulously wealthy ruling elite. By then the rumblings were well and truly under way: Suharto's missing billions ought to be tracked down, people were saying, regardless of what good he did in dragging the country out of the economic ruin it had faced under founding president Sukarno in the 1960s. Pre-written obituaries around the world veered from adulation to abhorrence, with varied emphases on his regime's demonstrably appalling record on human rights and corruption. Ratna Sari Dewi, one of several ex-wives of Sukarno, the man Suharto formally deposed in 1966, likens him to the Cambodian dictator Pol Pot for the hundreds of thousands of deaths he stands accused of. She isn't the only one making that comparison. And yet in many ways, although Suharto was undeniably ruthless and cold-blooded in his tight grip on the state, it was those around him - family and business associates, as well as the military that for his entire period in power played a prescribed political role in the country - who stripped the country clean of its major assets. There was a great hesitation during his lifetime to call him a crook, and you could almost hear the sigh of relief in some quarters when criminal charges for corruption were dropped due to his poor health following several debilitating strokes. But there is likely to be far less reluctance now when it comes to reopening investigations into his family's activities. Yoseph Suardi Sabda, director of civil prosecutions in the Attorney- General's department, is adamant that if the offspring were to inherit their father's riches, they would also have responsibility for explaining how he came by them. And, quite likely, for giving a sizeable portion of them back. In particular, he says, a 11.5 trillion rupiah ($1.4billion) civil case against Suharto for the misuse of funds from the Supersemar foundation, a body meant to support national education programs, would be aimed at the clan. A new twist, however, is the shock suggestion by Sabda that all of the family's assets, which stretch across the gamut of industries that powered Indonesia's economic boom times during Suharto's reign, could be examined and possibly quarantined, in order to guarantee payment of the state's claim. "The overseeing of their assets would be in line with their position as the new Suharto accused (in the case)," Sabda declares. Suharto lawyer Juan Felix Tampubolon describes the threat as "excessive", saying prosecutors have "no right to control (assets), unless they are already confiscated". Indonesian civil law analyst Isis Ikhwansyah, of Padjadjaran University in Bandung, is quoted in news reports as saying that if Suharto's descendants tried to escape responsibility for the legal case against him, they would also have to relinquish all claims on their inheritance. Given the estimates by global body Transparency International that Suharto and his circle skimmed off up to $US35billion during his reign, his six children will be thinking carefully about their next moves. Understanding the contradictions, and the reasons for such a range of analyses of the general's rule, takes some unpacking. The nature of the two great excesses over which history will judge Suharto - corruption and human rights abuses - are, ironically, a product of precisely the style of leadership that produced other things for which he is rightly lauded. He brought vast progress in the fields of education, agricultural production, even the regional political strength of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations that he helped bring into existence. But the Irish-American scholar Benedict Anderson, in a 1999 address in Jakarta, bemoans the turpitude of what he calls Suharto's "dry- rot order" (the epithet was a play on the strongman's New Order administration, a piece of self-invented rhetoric designed to contrast with Sukarno's "old order"). The centralised state, Anderson argues, with its Javanese power base and Jakarta-based rapaciousness, had created an extraordinary situation where parts of the country were important not for the existence of a citizenry that could imagine itself as Indonesian, but for the existence of natural resources that could enrich the new elite. "The astounding greed of the rulers in Jakarta, and of their provincial minions and errand boys ... increasingly seemed to be saying to the Acehnese, 'We don't need you; what we need are your natural resources. How wonderful it would be if Aceh were emptied of the Acehnese,"' Anderson says, not restricting his analysis to the separatist province on Sumatra's northwest tip, but also pointing to military violence in Papua and East Timor. It is a significant moment of public condemnation from one of the regime's most prominent international critics: the first time Anderson had made a public appearance in the country, after his 1972 banishment for co-authoring a scathing analysis of the 1965 alleged coup that brought the general to power. Anderson, whose early academic writing on Indonesia helped lay the foundations for an entire generation of historians trying to understand what it was that gave definition to such a disparate, spread-out archipelagic nation, despaired at the internal division Suharto's rule had brought to the nation. It was a division papered over only by brute force, he argues. "If we could go back to 1945-49 and talk with the fighters for independence of that period," he says, "you can be sure they would find it impossible to believe that 50 years later the function of the Republic's armed forces would no longer be defending the country against external enemies, but rather oppressing their own people, in this way actually picking up the traditions of the colonial military." As scholars picked among the ruins of the New Order in those early days of its fall, many saw it for the rotting structure it had been, although the question remains as to how much progress has been made by successive presidents who came to power on corruption-busting promises. "(The New Order's) sudden downfall revealed that, in the end, Suharto's power was only a shell, like the outside of a house eaten up by termites, so that three months of student protests sufficed to bring it down," the Jesuit scholar and long-time Indonesian citizen Franz Magnis-Suseno writes. "Corruption," he writes at the time, was "endemic in the New Order from the beginning (and) grew like an octopus out of all proportion, invading every segment of Indonesian life and society, especially after the Suharto 'children' came of age. "It seemed that the military themselves felt helpless facing the unbridled appetite of the 'family' in dividing up the resources and development projects of the country." But Magnis-Suseno argues that this corruption that came so fully to characterise the Suharto era was a product of the administration itself, rather than some kind of indigenous Javanese extraction of continuous tribute by divinely appointed rulers. "Corruption was not rampant during the first 14 years of Indonesian independence," he writes. "The sources of the corruption of the New Order government must be sought in its total monopoly of power." However, even as the attempts to turn the nation's corrupt power base around continue, other analysts warn of its self-regenerating capacity. The post-Suharto policy of decentralised government, known as regional autonomy, brought with it a whole new dynamic of corruption, the Australian historian Adrian Vickers points out. Writing in his expansive A History of Modern Indonesia, Vickers opines that "the temptation for regional leaders to recreate themselves as local lords has been great, and in many regions there has been a strong revival of traditional royal families". Thanks to the decades of centralised rule and with only Suharto's example to turn to, many of the new local leaders have been incapable of instituting genuinely transparent institutions, Vickers writes, so that "the centralised corruption of the Suharto years rapidly turned to local corruption, as increased local revenues went directly into local leaders' pockets". Or as former prime minister Paul Keating told Inquirer after leaving Suharto's graveside on Monday, "corruption has always been an issue in Indonesia, and it'll always be there". http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,23145955- 28737,00.html Post message: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subscribe : [EMAIL PROTECTED] Unsubscribe : [EMAIL PROTECTED] List owner : [EMAIL PROTECTED] Homepage : http://proletar.8m.com/ Yahoo! Groups Links <*> To visit your group on the web, go to: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/proletar/ <*> Your email settings: Individual Email | Traditional <*> To change settings online go to: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/proletar/join (Yahoo! ID required) <*> To change settings via email: mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] <*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to: [EMAIL PROTECTED] <*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to: http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
