http://www.majalla.com/en/cover_story/article59909.ece
Saudi Liberals
Elitist ambitions and the reality of Saudi society
By Stéphane Lacroix
Published: Wednesday 02 June 2010 Updated: Monday 07 June 2010
Saudi Liberals, one of the two competing factions in Saudi society, remain an
understudied group. The term liberal is relatively new in Saudi parlance,
although there had been earlier occurrences of secular activism in Saudi
Arabia. The liberal movement was born in opposition to the Sahwa movement and,
for years, it had no clear project of its own. In the early 2000s, a split
occurred between what can be referred to as social liberals and political
liberals. Today, although claiming to speak for a "silent majority," these
liberal voices continue to represent an elite group with no strong connections
to society.
Contemporary Saudi society is usually described as torn between two competing
factions-the Islamists and the Liberals. Yet, while the first group has been
the subject of numerous studies, the second group remains paradoxically much
more mysterious, in terms of who those Saudi "liberal" voices are, what their
background is and what they want.
The term liberal is relatively new in Saudi social parlance. By all accounts,
it wasn't used before the 1990s. This doesn't mean, however, that there was no
secular activism in Saudi Arabia before that period. In the wake of World War
II, some Saudi students who had traveled to Egypt, Lebanon or Iraq for their
studies came back to the Kingdom under the influence of the leftist and Arab
nationalist ideologies that were so popular in the region. Unintentionally,
ARAMCO also played a major role in this movement of secular politicization,
because it hosted Arabs from all neighboring countries, many of whom were under
the influence of those same ideologies. As a consequence, Marxist, leftist,
Nasserite and Arab nationalist clandestine groups appeared in Saudi Arabia. It
is true that they were confined to the elite, and never represented a mass
movement-and yet, they were seen as a threat, especially after some of their
members became politically active.
The government reacted strongly against those activists who had crossed the
line, while limiting their potential social base by offering graduates from
abroad high-profile jobs in an ever-expanding administration. They were soon
found at key positions in the ministries-to the extent that some of them later,
and obviously after having demonstrated their loyalty, became ministers-and in
some media institutions. As a consequence, from the mid-1970s, most secular
activists maintained a distance from politics. A few of them, however, became
active in a new field, which was developing quickly at the time: the literary
scene. There, they started calling for the modernization of Saudi literature-a
modernization that would not only involve form, but also content.
Simultaneously, the critique was directed, implicitly, at Saudi social norms,
which they aimed to liberalize. They were soon joined by a number of novelists,
poets and literary critics, the most prominent of whom were Abdallah
Al-Ghadhdhami and Sa'id Al-Surayhi. An intellectual trend was born, known as
modernism.
Again, this was a development that mainly had to do with a certain intellectual
elite and remained at the surface of society. At the same time, however, a much
deeper-reaching evolution was taking place in the Kingdom. From the 1960s, the
Sahwa (from Al-Sahwa Al-Islamiyya, the Islamic Awakening), a grassroots
Islamist movement, had been growing as a result, among other things, of the
influence of the Muslim Brotherhood activists who had found shelter in Saudi
Arabia. The Sahwa's base was the educational system, through which it had
access to all layers of society. More importantly, in a conservative society,
the Sahwa's discourse was well-understood-and well-received. By the mid-1980s,
the Sahwa had reached a critical mass, and it started seeing the modernists'
monopoly over certain media outlets, especially the literary supplements of the
major Saudi newspapers, as a provocation. A wide-ranging campaign against the
modernists was organized, and many of them were soon dismissed from their
positions. The Sahwa, apparently, had won.
In August 1990, the threat of a potential invasion of Saudi Arabia by the Iraqi
army, right after the latter had invaded Kuwait, convinced the Saudi rulers to
request the assistance of Western troops. This prompted a wave of unprecedented
debates in the Kingdom-with demands coming from all sectors of society. The
first individuals to take action were a group of women's rights advocates, who
organized a spectacular event: In November 1990, 49 women drove cars in the
streets of Riyadh, explicitly challenging the ban imposed on women's driving.
From early 1991, however, the Sahwa members-who had been outraged by the
women's demonstration-became the most salient voice in Saudi society. Through a
series of petitions and sermons, they called for the implementation of their
social and political project, which aimed, among other things, at increasing
the control of the religious establishment over Saudi society, and at giving
religious figures a more prominent role in the political system.
However, both the authorities and the liberals saw the momentum gained by the
Sahwa as a threat. The authorities reacted by silencing the most prominent
figures of the Sahwist opposition, while secular activists of all
backgrounds-leftists, communists, modernists, advocates of women's rights,
etc.-started to coalesce in a group, which, soon after, informally took the
name liberals (libaraliyyun). These liberals had a very simple program:
countering the Sahwa's project and worldview. This would remain the main
weakness of the Saudi liberal trend for the years to come: It was born in
opposition to the Sahwa, and had no real-and, even less so, coherent-project of
its own. It is true that, in the 1990s, some brilliant thinkers such as Turki
Al-Hamad attempted to inject intellectual flesh into the liberal project. But
Al-Hamad's effort was relatively isolated, and many of those claiming the
liberal label didn't even identify with it.
The weakening of the Sahwa, however, gave the liberal trend a first impulse:
Liberals soon reclaimed the positions that some of them had earlier occupied in
the media, and they re-established their influence at the elite level. The
emergence of salafi-jihadi terrorism, and the events of September 11 gave
liberals a second impulse: The fact that 15 of the 19 hijackers were Saudi and
the media campaign against the Kingdom in the West opened a phase of
self-introspection in Saudi Arabia. Presenting themselves as an alternative to
the Islamists-while explicitly assimilating Sahwis and jihadists-the liberals
undoubtedly took advantage of the situation. Another factor played in favor of
the liberals; the emergence of a group of mutahawwilun (literally "those who
have changed"), former Islamists who had become extremely critical of the Sahwa
and other forms of Islamic activism.
For the liberals, these mutahawwilun were a key asset, first because they spoke
out of personal experience, and second because they had a mastery of the
language of Islam that was sorely lacking among the liberals. In the 1990s,
most of the liberals had no discourse on Islam. They claimed to represent
universal values, and outwardly presumed that those values were compatible with
Islam. In the wake of 9/11, and with the help of some of the mutahawwilun such
as Mansur Al-Nuqaidan or Muhammad Al-Mahmud, the liberals would increasingly
attempt to justify their positions through Islam. This intrusion in a sphere
considered alien to them reinforced the Sahwa's hostility towards the liberals.
This was especially so when, for instance, Al-Nuqaidan went so far as to call
for a revival of irja', a medieval group known for its tolerance of all
religious opinions but considered deviant by the Sahwis, who had spent
considerable efforts refuting their ideas.
This gave the liberals an increasing visibility, especially on the Internet
where they established a significant presence. Liberal forums were created:
first, Tuwaa, until 2004, then Dar Al-Nadwa, until 2006, and finally, and since
then, Minbar Al-Ibda' wal-Hiwar and Muntadayatuna (Al-Shabaka Al-Libaraliyya).
This is a remarkable development: for the first time, the term liberal is used
here in a formal way, marking the increasing assertiveness of its proponents.
This development coincided with the increasing use of the same term by the
liberals' foes, as in the 2009 book published by the Sahwis of Al-Bayan
magazine under the name Naqd Al-Libaraliyya ("critique of liberalism").
However, the increasing visibility of the liberals also exposed their
contradictions. The liberal trend grew out of its opposition to the Sahwa, but
lacked a coherence of its own. Liberals wanted reform, but they disagreed on
what should be reformed, and how. This produced an important split in the early
2000s, which led to the emergence of two groups, representing two radically
distinct options-those who may be referred to as social liberals and those that
I would refer to as political liberals. For the first group, the main problem
in Saudi Arabia is social and cultural, and what is needed primarily, then, is
social and cultural reform. Many of those liberals even oppose the idea of
democratization, because, according to them, any opening in this direction
while society isn't ready would only benefit their Islamist foes. They are very
loyal to the regime, which they see as an ally and protector against the
influence of the Sahwa. The political liberals, on the contrary, believe that
no change can be achieved without an all-encompassing effort at political
reform. For them, social and cultural reform is also deeply needed, but it will
not happen if the political issue is not addressed first. To make this happen,
some of those "political liberals" have proven ready to collaborate with any
other social group, including Islamists, as long as they agree on common goals.
The resulting Islamo-liberal alliance prompted heated debates between the
different groups of liberals: While the political liberals insisted on the
fruitfulness of their approach, others, especially the social liberals,
reproached them for becoming tools in the hands of the Islamists. As Turki
Al-Hamad, who may be considered as part of the social liberal group, once put
it in an interview he gave me, "Those 'liberals' are being fooled by the
Islamists the same way Iranian liberals were fooled by Khomeini. The Islamists
claim to be democrats, but if they get to power, they'll establish a regime of
the kind of what is found in Iran."
The debate between the different groups of liberals about what liberalism truly
means continues today-as does the debate between Islamists and liberals on what
social and political project to implement. The latter, however, remains an
uneven debate: Despite the visibility that the media boom and the post-9/11
context have provided to the liberals, these activists continue to represent an
elite group, with no strong connections to society. They do claim to represent
the "silent majority"; but, even if this were true, the main characteristic of
the silent majority is precisely that it remains. silent. In contrast, the
Islamists control a considerable number of institutions and associations, and
are found in every sphere of Saudi society. In the debate, they are-and will
without a doubt continue to be in the years to come-the strong side.
Stéphane Lacroix - Assistant professor of political science at Sciences Po in
Paris. His work focuses on Islam and politics in the contemporary Middle East,
with a particular focus on the Gulf region.
[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
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