http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/LK05Ae01.html

Nov 5, 2010 

No alarm bells over Jakarta's military drive 
By Trefor Moss 



Indonesia has long been the individualist of Asian geopolitics - a big country 
that behaved like a small one when all those around it were trying to do the 
opposite. 

However, there is a sense that the world's largest Muslim state, and its 
fourth-largest by population, is slowly beginning to grow into its own skin. A 
Group of 20 member and arguably Southeast Asia's most functional democracy, 
Indonesia is starting to exude new political confidence. It is also growing in 
economic clout, with gross domestic product (GDP) expected to increase by over 
6% this year and next year, and probably beyond. 

A rising central budget includes bigger earmarks for the Indonesian armed 
forces, which have been starved of investment for decades and need to end their 
reliance on off-budget funding in order to become truly professional and 
accountable. The anticipated 2011 defense budget, now up to US$6.3 billion, 
should rise incrementally over the coming years and - assuming the economy 
continues to grow - potentially soon overtake Singapore's to become Southeast 
Asia's largest. 

Defense Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro has already mentally spent the extra 
money. He envisages 10 squadrons of Sukhoi fighter jets, new frigates and 
submarines, a modernized airlift capability, and a revamped domestic defense 
industry. In other words, he is preparing to reposition his country 
strategically as a more muscular power. 

The prospect of a militarily more capable Indonesia has potentially disquieting 
implications for its Asia-Pacific neighbors. Over the years, Jakarta has come 
to epitomize the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) way of 
non-aligned, non-interventionist neutrality. Ten-member ASEAN's do-nothing 
approach may frustrate outsiders on issues such as Myanmar, but in fact 
Indonesia's culture of political-military passivity, which permeates ASEAN, has 
been the bedrock of Southeast Asia's balmy security environment. 

When Indonesia was militarily more aggressive in the 1950s and early 1960s, the 
region seemed far from benign, as those in Malaysia, Singapore and Australia 
still recall; but once Indonesia went quiet, so for the most part did Southeast 
Asia in terms of intra-regional conflict, apart from regional involvement in 
the US-Vietnam war. As the region's strategic tone-setter, to what extent might 
Indonesia's military rise upset the quiet balance in the Malacca Strait and 
beyond? 

A more military-minded Indonesia clearly would reshape the region - and so the 
lack of complaint from neighboring countries in the wake of Purnomo's 
pronouncements on military investment demonstrates that none of them, yet, 
think that Indonesia has much chance of achieving its aims. "Indonesia's 
military-modernization plans are only realistic in the very long-term," says 
Tim Huxley, the executive director of the International Institute for Strategic 
Studies in Singapore. 

He likens Indonesia to South Korea, which took several decades to build a 
viable defense industry despite a large defense budget and consistent 
government policy-making. If Indonesia wants to emulate South Korea, Huxley 
says, then the transition will take between 20 or 30 years. "Indonesia is still 
at a relatively early stage," he says. "The stuffing has been knocked out of 
its defense industry." 

Bernard Loo, an associate professor at the S Rajaratnam School of International 
Studies in Singapore, says that Indonesia's decision "to acquire more 
up-to-date military kit will almost surely begin to feed into their 
war-fighting capabilities". However, this need not have "any significant 
implication for regional security and stability, apart from generally positive 
ones", he predicts. 

Jakarta's ability to maintain defense-spending increases over the long term 
remains a "big if", Loo thinks. Its main priority - refocused by the recent 
tsunami and volcanic eruptions - is to address "the need to be able to project 
power into disaster-hit areas to bring immediate humanitarian relief". Tackling 
piracy is a second priority, which neighboring states would again embrace - 
just as they would welcome the increasingly stable Indonesian state that a 
properly equipped military would underpin. 

Democratic might 
Indonesia's newfound status as a respectable democratic partner should help it 
to restock its aging military inventory. A partnership with South Korea to 
co-develop a fifth-generation fighter aircraft has already been unveiled. If 
Jakarta sees a strategic partnership with South Korea as the best route to 
achieving a capable defense industry, then an open tender for new submarines, 
for which Seoul is one of several bidders, might be expected to go the Koreans' 
way. "There's a lot of sense in South Korea and Indonesia going down the 
defense-industry route together," says Huxley. "They are both medium powers 
with concerns about the changing strategic balance." 

The US may also be willing to help Jakarta accelerate its military 
modernization efforts. US President Barack Obama is set to visit Indonesia next 
week not so much for a trip down memory lane (he once lived there) as for the 
strategic value the US sees in courting Jakarta. American hopes of retaining 
influence in Southeast Asia arguably rest with the likes of up-and-coming 
Indonesia, rather than with traditional allies such as Thailand and the 
Philippines. 

Thailand's political turmoil and its improving relationship with China mean 
than the US can no longer depend on Bangkok as it once did; and though the new 
Benigno Aquino government in the Philippines has shown itself to be wary of 
Beijing's perceived bullying tactics in the South China Sea, there is a rising 
chorus for an end to the US military's basing rights there. By contrast, the 
region's rising economic stars, Indonesia and Vietnam, have both welcomed US 
strategic overtures, while also displaying wariness of Chinese advances. 

Obama may now prepare the ground by offering mates' rates on the 10 C-130 
transport aircraft that Jakarta seeks, with the prospect of more favorable 
deals to come. The sourcing of equipment is significant, Loo observes, because 
it will have an impact on Indonesia's ability to engage in cooperative security 
ventures with Malaysia and Singapore. 

Loo regards Russia as a likely top source of Indonesia's future procurements, 
and it is already clear that Purnomo aims to buy Russian as he retools the air 
force's combat capability. Russian credit has funded the majority of recent 
military purchases in Indonesia. However, industry partnerships and technology 
transfer will become central to future Indonesian defense contracts, and any 
supplier willing to go along with that cooperation can expect a share of 
Jakarta's expanding budget. 

The only threat to regional stability from Indonesia's military efforts, 
suggests Huxley, would come with a political shift away from democratization 
and back towards military-backed authoritarianism. This could feasibly see 
military spending increase at an even faster rate and the military assuming a 
more provocative stance towards neighboring states. There is no reason to 
foresee such a scenario, but Jakarta would do well to resume stalled military 
reforms in order to mitigate the possibility. 

"Relationships within ASEAN have never been better," concludes Loo, who 
believes that Indonesia's military modernization will be good for Southeast 
Asia so long as it is "situated within the broader political framework of 
increasing security cooperation". There is certainly a clear sense both within 
Indonesia and across ASEAN that Indonesia requires a better equipped and better 
funded military than it currently possesses. 

While there is no real regional suspicion regarding Indonesia's intentions, 
this could change as its modernization program gains traction. The challenge in 
Jakarta is to ensure that, as Indonesia assumes its natural role as the 
region's most powerful strategic actor, it simultaneously remains the anchor of 
ASEAN's stability. 

Trefor Moss is a freelance journalist who covers Asian politics, in particular 
defense, security and economic issues. He is a former Asia-Pacific editor for 
Jane's Defense Weekly. 

(Copyright 2010 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please 
contact us about sales, syndication and republishing )

[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]



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