Apakah apa yang dibeberkan Wikileaks akan mengubah pendirian Clinton-Obama?
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Nuclear dilemma: Israel vs. Iran
To move towards a nuclear-free Middle East, the US must change its stance on
Israel's nuclear weapons programme.
Robert Grenier Last Modified: 29 Nov 2010 12:13 GMT
If the US is to enjoy any credibility on non-proliferation in the Middle East,
it will either have to change its policy toward Israel, or change its broader
non-proliferation policy [AFP]
The year, as I recall, was 1994. The setting: a small, discreet restaurant in
Herzliya, a northern suburb of Tel Aviv. During dinner with an Israeli
official, I expressed the opinion that all efforts to deny weapons of mass
destruction to so-called rogue Middle Eastern regimes, whether through
sanctions, embargoes or otherwise, could at best be considered delaying actions.
Given the inexorable spread of technology, those countries wishing to acquire
such weapons and their means of delivery eventually would do so. The only
purpose of delay, then, was to create time for diplomacy, which alone could
provide a long-term solution.
To my surprise, the official agreed. Of course, what I had in mind was the
near-term negotiation of a genuinely verifiable Middle East nuclear
weapons-free zone. Precisely what he had in mind, he did not elaborate.
As it happens, the following year, 1995, the Review and Extension Conference of
the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) passed a resolution, co-sponsored by the US,
in favour of establishment of a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle East.
The US only agreed to this resolution, however, as the necessary price for an
extension of the NPT, and rejected in the process any language referring to
Israel's nuclear weapons programme.
Promoting a Middle East nuclear weapons-free zone
Since that time, the US has strongly resisted any efforts under the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to promote extension of safeguards to
Israel's undeclared nuclear facilities or, indeed, to promote a Middle East
nuclear weapons-free zone, despite the fact that both are fully consistent with
stated US non-proliferation policy.
Instead, the US and Israel have claimed that Israeli accession to the NPT and
establishment of a regional nuclear weapons-free zone must await both a
comprehensive Middle East peace and full compliance of all regional states
(read: Iran and Syria) with their IAEA obligations.
There are two things one can say regarding US policy toward Israel's nuclear
weapons programme: First, it is consistent with the rational, common-sense
notion that both accession to the NPT and establishment of regional nuclear
weapons-free zones can only be achieved when the concerned states are persuaded
that both are in their interest.
Second, it is utterly inconsistent with standing US non-proliferation policy
virtually everywhere else. If the US is to enjoy any credibility on
non-proliferation in the Middle East, it will either have to change its policy
toward Israel, or change its broader non-proliferation policy.
The above comes to mind in light of some interesting statements recently made
by Mojtaba Samareh Hashemi, an Iranian foreign policy expert and confidant of
Iranian President Ahmadinejad, in anticipation of the next round of talks
between Iran and the so-called five-plus-one group, due to start on December 5.
Making commitments
Tehran has indicated it intends to broaden the planned discussions beyond its
own nuclear programme, and to invite comments by its six interlocutors
regarding Israel's nuclear weapons and their own commitment to nuclear
disarmament. "Not answering these questions," says Hashemi, "will mean they
have decided not to commit to nuclear disarmament and support the Zionist
regime being armed with nuclear weapons."
One can easily dismiss this potential Iranian gambit as a cynical ploy, an
effort at obfuscation designed to take the focus away from the matter at hand -
Iran's dismal record in meeting its obligations under the IAEA as a signatory
to the NPT - while playing to a popular audience in the Middle East. And
indeed, perhaps that is all it is.
Especially given that regional audience, however, the US and the rest of the
five-plus-one, which includes all of the "legitimate" nuclear-weapons states
recognised under the NPT, would do well to respond forthrightly to these
questions, for they touch upon the essential nuclear bargain which lies at the
heart of the NPT, as well as on the essential fairness of Western
non-proliferation goals in the region.
The notion that nations will forswear nuclear weapons only when they consider
it in their national interest to do so is being consistently and compellingly
propounded these days by none other than Robert Gates, the US secretary of
defence.
Gates makes this point in support of the current policy of economic sanctions
and diplomacy vis-à-vis Iran, and as a caution against resort to military
force, which could only slow, and not stop an Iranian nuclear weapons
programme, and which would have many negative unintended consequences in the
bargain.
Security interests
Taking the Gates logic to its ultimate conclusion, however, would mean basing
our attempts to achieve non-proliferation goals concerning Iran upon an
appreciation of Iranian security interests, and not just on the coercive power
of sanctions.
Now, there are those who believe that Iran is hell-bent on the development of
nuclear weapons, and that, once having obtained them, it would have no
hesitation in employing them against Israel, oblivious of the retaliatory
consequences to itself. There are many, both in Israel and the US, who propound
this view, and who appear genuinely to believe it.
I know of no one, however, with a genuine understanding of Iran who believes
the Iranians to be so devoid of calculation. On the contrary, the Iranians are
very sophisticated in determining their national interest, and in pursuing it
on several levels simultaneously.
It may just be that Iranian leaders have concluded that development of nuclear
weapons is the only means of redressing the US ability and apparent willingness
to intervene militarily in their region at will, as well as being necessary to
counter an Israeli nuclear monopoly in the region, and thus will not be
deterred.
Down this path probably lie attempts of other regional powers to develop such
weapons, and a potentially unstable regional "balance of terror" which Iran
cannot view without approbation, but with which it may feel itself
well-equipped to deal. And indeed, current Iranian policy appears - one
stresses the word appears - designed to maintain the privileges attached to NPT
membership while also attempting to subvert those privileges to at least
develop a "break-out" nuclear-weapons capability.
But let us just suppose that either current or future Iranian leaders could be
convinced that there were the genuine possibility of a verifiable regional
nuclear weapons-free zone which, perhaps along with certain security guarantees
from the US and other major powers, might better serve their long-term
interests. This may not seem likely, especially given Iran's desire to exploit
unpopular Israeli policies to their benefit.
Peace no longer a pre-requisite for nuclear disarmament
However if it were possible, the US and the West would do well to underscore
their potential willingness to actively support and contribute to international
enforcement and verification of a regional disarmament pact, rather than
blindly supporting an open-ended policy of Israeli nuclear exceptionalism.
It is understandable that Israel and its supporters wish to focus not just on
the capabilities of Israel's antagonists in the region, but on their
motivations as well, which underscores the logic in their desire to await a
comprehensive regional peace based primarily on a resolution of the
Israeli-Palestinian dispute.
However, entrenched Israeli settlement policy, long aided and abetted by the
US, has made a two-state solution in former Mandatory Palestine impossible. An
alternative formula may eventually be found, but not without many years of
violence and rancour to come.
Waiting for peace and harmony to break out in the Middle East is no longer, if
indeed it ever was, a viable prerequisite to a regional non-proliferation pact
- not at the pace of current developments.
Negotiation of such an accord is due to begin in 2012, provided the parties can
be brought to the table. Under the circumstances, the US and its partners would
do well to frankly address Iran's questions on December 5, and to broaden their
discussions to encompass not just Iranian policies and actions, but their
regional context and motivation.
Such willingness, if nothing else, would go some way toward addressing the
clear ambivalence of many in the Arab world who are otherwise distrustful of
Persian nuclear designs, but who are nonetheless susceptible to the appeal of
an Iran which, unlike their own governments, is willing to stand up to
perceived injustice.
Robert Grenier is a retired, 27-year veteran of the CIA's Clandestine Service.
He conceived and organised the CIA's Counter Proliferation Division, serving as
its first chief of operations.
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily
reflect Al Jazeera's editorial policy.
Source:
Al Jazeera
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