http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2011/1030/fr1.htm

 6 - 12 January 2011
Issue No. 1030
Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875


The end of Sudan (as we know it)

As important as the result of south Sudan's vote is how the outcome will be 
handled, writes Asmaa El-Husseini in Khartoum 

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

In statements issued in Khartoum and Juba in the run-up to the imminent 
referendum in south Sudan over whether or not to remain in a united Sudan, 
President Omar Al-Bashir said that he, his party and his government would 
accept the results whatever the outcome. His remarks came as a great relief to 
various Sudanese, regional and international circles who had feared that 
Al-Bashir and the National Congress Party (NCP) would take action to impede the 
realisation of secession, which appears to be the most likely outcome of the 
referendum in view of the growing nationalist spirit among southerners who seem 
impatient for their day of deliverance. 

The Sudanese president also tried to alleviate fears over the status, rights 
and properties of southerners residing in the north and northerners residing in 
the south. He simultaneously delivered positive messages regarding solutions to 
pending differences between the north and south, urging cooperation between the 
two sides in the event of secession, which eventuality he has begun to treat as 
inevitable in spite of his continued support for -- and emphasis on -- the 
advantages of unity. 

The present relative calm has alleviated widespread alarm aroused by spectres 
of possible tragedy should the north act against the referendum. US President 
Barack Obama warned that any such action would lead to millions of deaths while 
his envoy to Sudan, Scott Gration, said that renewed violence in Sudan would 
have repercussions from Cairo to Cape Town and from Djibouti to Dakar. In like 
manner, Ethiopian President Meles Zenawi cautioned that the return to warfare 
between the north and south would be like the Day of Judgement, while Egyptian 
Foreign Minister Ahmed Abul-Gheit foresaw catastrophic consequences that would 
drive more Sudanese towards Egypt. 

Al-Bashir's positive messages were greeted with cautious optimism. Southerners 
were generally heartened by the Sudanese president's visit to Juba and his 
statements, which raised hopes of good relations between the northern and 
southern states in the event of secession. At the same time, officials from the 
south cautioned that attempts to undermine relations between the north and the 
south would lead to consequences that would prove costly. 

Yet, Al-Bashir's fine sounding remarks on brotherly and cooperative relations 
with the south and the reciprocated aspirations voiced by southern leaders form 
only the surface appearance. There remain a number of outstanding issues that 
will have to be resolved after the referendum, not least of which are the 
borders that have yet to be finalised, the question of Abyei, debts, petroleum 
rights and questions of national affiliation. All of these could be solved with 
relative ease if both sides act in good faith and desist from conspiring 
against each other. In the absence of such constructive attitudes, each issue 
is a potential time bomb capable of destabilising the situation entirely. 

Many southern leaders continue to regard the north with suspicion, pointing to 
the intrigues Khartoum has weaved in order to support rebels in the south or to 
create new rebel groups against the government in Juba with the purpose of 
showing that the southern leadership is unable to control the south. They also 
allege that Khartoum has attempted to spark disturbances in the south in order 
to prevent the referendum from going ahead on schedule. Khartoum, for its part, 
claims that Juba is supporting and sheltering insurgents in Darfur and demands 
that it cease this support and the support of any party that could create 
unrest in the north. Such mistrust will probably remain ingrained in both the 
Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the NCP in Khartoum, the 
principal parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in Naivasha in 
2005. The mutual sentiment is not only the product of the last six years of the 
interim phase, but also the result of what the southerners describe as the 
north's "legacy of breaking promises and agreements". 

Some observers take Al-Bashir's new conciliatory tone, which diverges radically 
from his previous rhetoric, as a clear sign that Khartoum has caved into 
enormous international pressures that made it understand that it had no choice 
but to accept the fact of the secession of the south, for to do otherwise would 
be suicide. Others counter that the NCP has not yet accepted the possibility of 
secession, adding that years of experience have taught us that this government 
will say anything and do the opposite, and that when told to turn right it will 
turn left. Those who share this view add that the situation is still very 
volatile and could explode at any moment in the south or along the borders as a 
consequence of actions by Khartoum, which will never bow to the will of the 
international community and allow secession to proceed peacefully, if only to 
evade the demands of the International Criminal Court that has asked for 
Al-Bashir to be handed over for prosecution on charges of genocide and crimes 
against humanity in Darfur. A third camp of opinion maintains that the radical 
Islamist government in the north had sought the secession of the south even 
before it reached power. 

Sudanese along with the rest of the world are still waiting with bated breath 
for 9 January. The results of the referendum and how they are handled over the 
following months will determine the fate not only of southerners who will be 
voting on whether they want to exercise their right to self- determination in a 
separate state, but also for people in the north who will not take part in the 
referendum but who, along with the people of the south, would be adversely 
affected by a resurgence of civil strife. As the clock speeds towards the vote, 
parties in both the south and the north are jockeying for position in 
anticipation of a new map that is in the making. 

New alliances are being forged; old ones are collapsing. Parties that once 
could not see eye-to-eye are reaching understandings while erstwhile allies are 
quarrelling. While some parties are unifying, others are preparing to split on 
the basis of the new geographical divide. If some political forces are already 
manoeuvring to overthrow others, others are waiting for zero hour to start 
moving. Meanwhile, various regional and international powers are preparing for 
the emergence of two states, still troubled by the fact that fingers are on the 
triggers in both the north and the south, against the backdrop of a bleak 
economic climate and increased hardship in both regions. As for the people 
themselves, northerners residing in the south have begun to head northwards 
while southerners fearful for their lives in the north are moving in the 
opposite direction. Large numbers of both have flocked major roads and ports, 
while millions of others across north and south Sudan combined are haunted by 
the thought of becoming victims of spiralling violence.


[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]



------------------------------------

Post message: [email protected]
Subscribe   :  [email protected]
Unsubscribe :  [email protected]
List owner  :  [email protected]
Homepage    :  http://proletar.8m.com/Yahoo! Groups Links

<*> To visit your group on the web, go to:
    http://groups.yahoo.com/group/proletar/

<*> Your email settings:
    Individual Email | Traditional

<*> To change settings online go to:
    http://groups.yahoo.com/group/proletar/join
    (Yahoo! ID required)

<*> To change settings via email:
    [email protected] 
    [email protected]

<*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to:
    [email protected]

<*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to:
    http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/

Kirim email ke