On 2014-11-01 00:30, Sanjeev Verma wrote:
Hi Sanjeev,
I think your questions are highly motivated although I would like to start at a
somewhat higher level.
What would the point be with "W3C-fication" of FIDO specifications?
No security-oriented SDO has ever attracted as many "´Gig Guns" (and small ones
as well) in such a short time as FIDO so the market doesn't seem to be overly sensitive
regarding the origin of things.
Working side-by-side on the same target is not very realistic since FIDO have
closed WGs.
That I mentioned U2F is because it (IMO) has the "web flavor" which means
simple and elegant.
U2F also has clear links to the WebCrypto API (which development I consider the
most if not the only viable path ahead).
UAF (which I'm less knowledgeable about) looks awfully complex ("the framework
syndrome") and rather vendor-oriented.
I would let these guys try the waters first :-)
Since neither U2F or UAF addresses the "old world" like eID there's definitely
room for new technology which doesn't clash with FIDO.
As an example Android's <keygen> was designed almost 20 years ago and doesn't match
popular security applications like mobile banking which therefore without exception are written
as "Apps".
Regards,
Anders
Hello Anders, Siva,
This is Sanjeev from Samsung and I have been following this discussion thread
with keen interest. I am bit puzzled by specific reference to U2F specs in
regards to FIDO specifications.
FIDO U2F is very basic one and its scope is very narrow as rightly pointed by
you. However, things are bit different when it comes to FIDO UAF
specifications. FIDO UAF supports discovery APIs that enable a web app to
discover capabilities of the supported authenticator devices--like crypto
algorithms supported, Authenticator IDs etc. A web application can also request
authenticator to generate origin specific keys and sign text messages ( for
WYSIWYS ). Good thing here is that FIDO UAF supports a wide-variety of
authenticator devices--roaming authenticators, authenticators bound to the
device etc.
I am not saying that it supports all the requirements for the use case under
discussions here but it seems to meet some of them. IMHO it makes sense to work
closely with FIDO on specific requirements instead of looking for a parallel
solution.
Thanks,
Best regards,
Sanjeev
-----Original Message-----
From: Anders Rundgren [mailto:anders.rundgren....@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, October 29, 2014 9:07 PM
To: Siva Narendra
Cc: helpcrypto helpcrypto;public-web-security@w3.org
Subject: Re: [Web Crypto Next] Lets start discussing !
Hi Siva,
As seen from the messages on this list we are not anywhere near consensus on
what to do so the best I can do is elaborating a bit on my conclusions which
are both based on facts and on observations
One reason why simply bolting NSS et. al. to the web wasn't considered is
because NSS wasn't designed to be called by arbitrary, potentially malicious,
transiently downloaded web-code. The same is valid for EMV-cards which are to
be used in specific terminals equipped with certified software.
FIDO's U2F addresses this problem in a novel way which though requires new
middlware, hardware and browser upgrades.
The problem (that we agree on), is that U2F (in its current incarnation) is not
a replacement for existing smart cards.
Various solutions have indeed been suggested but since these have all been
dismissed/ignored by the browser vendors, it is really up to the browser
vendors stating their take on the matter.
The Swedish banks have after the removal of browser plugin support replaced
their web-based PKI-solution with iOS and Android apps. It is not pretty but it
is better than nothing :-)
Sincerely,
Anders Rundgren
On 2014-10-30 03:28, Siva Narendra wrote:
Dear Anders --
Some clarifications:
1. Apple Pay with Apple Watch will work on older iPhones as well as iPhone 6.
2. Let us not confuse smart card plastic with smart card chips. Just because
smart card plastic cannot be plugged into a PC/client device doesn't means
smart cards cannot be through USB, BLE, or NFC.
3. It is not that smart cards (chips) are not designed for the web. Web
browsers (other than Firefox and to some extent IE) are not designed to easily
integrate to the smart card (chips). If all of the browsers implemented NSS,
smart cards will work out of the box with them. There are other alternatives,
but the standardization that is missing is on the browser side. Not on the
smart card side. FIDO is one possible solution, but has virtually zero
penetration. And I do not know of a single company that would bet the farm only
on FIDO. Globally there are lot more smart card (plastic and chips) what work
with the web as opposed to FIDO devices. In fact from what I understand FIDO
devices will also use smart card chips.
-Siva
/
/--/
//Siva G. Narendra Ph.D.
/CEO - //Tyfone, Inc.
Portland | Bangalore | Taipei/
www.tyfone.com <http://www.tyfone.com>/
/Voice: +1.661.412.2233/
/
/
On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 11:48 PM, Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren....@gmail.com
<mailto:anders.rundgren....@gmail.com>> wrote:
Apple didn't try to retrofit the old devices when they created Apple Pay.
Although there are business models involved as well, Apple would also
have created huge problems for banks (and users) if everybody have
had to implement (and use) a "fallback" solution as well.
I.e. you should IMHO not expect PKCS #11 and existing smart cards to become
a part of the plot because they were simply put not designed for the web.
Regards
Anders Rundgren
On 2014-10-28 09:09, helpcrypto helpcrypto wrote:
Hi
Don't know if I'm late, but as nvdbleek proposed [1], we are truly
interested in a web-document signing approach.
Actually we suffer Java applets, and dream about a Javascript
alternative (like Webcrypto) but with the possibility of looking for an
specific key (even at specific card).
So, something like findCertificate(token,filter) where filter can be
subject, issuer or a combination of them would be great.
Regarding to population, we have several smartcards from different
manufacturers which -sadly- use different PKCS#11, so
generateKey(token,keyinfo) could also be interesting.
Finally, we do batch signing, where one PIN let the user sign a batch
of documents (currently hashes), so this feature is also very interesting.
With these constraints in mind, we propose -more or less- the
following API:
- optional getToken to retrieve a token handle to work with. This
could be also issues to secure communications between server and client, using
SM and/or component certificates like some eID.
- getCertificate(filter) which can allow us to filter and show a
"filtered dialog". some exaples: fingerprint, issuer, subject, keyUsage...using
a json-like filter which allows combination seems to be much better.
Signatures are made in 3 steps:
- init: needed initialization
- add: invoked for each document we want to sign. the document is
sent to the component/browser and stored internally
- final: a final "you are going to sign this" dialog is shown. It
will be possible to even show a preview of the documents (pdf,xml+xslt,...) using other
plugins. asks for pin
Of course, all this must be Js asynchronous
We usually do XAdES or PAdES signing. probably a signed js library or
something lika that could be great to extend usage.
This is what actually our applet does, and its the use case we would
live to have on Webcrypto.
Don't hesitate to contact me if you want to discuss this in deep.
Regards
[1]http://www.w3.org/2012/webcrypto/webcrypto-next-workshop/papers/Using_the_W3C_WebCrypto_API_for_Document_Signing.html
