On Jun 2, 2011, at 09:53 , Marcos Caceres wrote: > Consider this scenario: the widget requests access to www.google.com. > On a local level google redirects to .pl or co.in . With WARP, if we > checked redirects the local google page would be blocked. It would be > impossible for any developer to take care of all those country wide > domains in the normal way (and it does not scale). So we would want to > allow this. Also in widgets XHRs resulting in 301s are followed and > the final content is returned (this wasn't how it worked but was fixed > later). > > For a future version of WARP to work effectively, the spec should give > the option of allow for redirects (or should do this automatically): > > <access origin="http://x.com"; redirects="true"/>
That's a security hole begging to happen. A lot of perfectly legit sites have a built-in redirect service. People use that, notably, to be notified of when a user leaves their site through a link they clicked, so instead of linking to http://berjon.com/ they link to http://nyt.com/redirect?to=http://berjon.com/. So with your suggested approach, all a malicious widget has to do is request access to a perfectly valid data source under whatever false pretence, and then use its redirector service to go to evil.com, or to hit stuff that should be hidden on your private network: // grab all of Marcos's print jobs http://perfectly-legit.com/redirect?to=http://localhost:631/jobs?which_jobs=all -- Robin Berjon Robineko (http://robineko.com/) Twitter: @robinberjon
