I wrote:
> I would like to see some real code evidence that omitting Origin:
> and Referer: is necessary too. In theory sites might use them as
> "credentials" as you say, but in practise I don't see how that can
> work and be safe on the web.
>
> If we ship XHR with an "anonymous" flag removing Origin: and Referer:
> and call it a security feature, wouldn't that *encourage* sites to
> validate requests by Origin: and Referer:? Aren't we basically pushing
> snake oil security measures if we do so?
I hereby propose that we drop the {anonymous:true} constructor argument and the
"anonymous flag", and instead modify withCredentials to take three values:
"samedomain" (default), "always" and "never". For backwards compatibility with
earlier versions of the spec, setting withCredentials=true maps to "always" and
withCredentials=false maps to "samedomain".
This seems easier to understand, easier to implement, and handles all use cases
of practical significance.
Anne: if you want rewrite proposals as pull requests, let me know ;-)
--
Hallvord R. M. Steen
Core tester, Opera Software