I'm pretty sure it can't be in the interest of this specification to force application authors to bifurcate the mime-type into one that can't be used reliably, and another informal one that's prepended to the octet-stream. Relevant XKCD quote omitted.
On Thu, Jun 25, 2015 at 4:27 PM, Florian Bösch <[email protected]> wrote: > Surely you realize that if the specification where to state to only > "safely" expose data to the clipboard, this can only be interpreted to deny > any formats but those a UA can interprete and deem well-formed. If such a > thing where to be done, that would leave any user of the clipboard no > recourse but to resort to "application/octett-stream" and ignore any other > metadata as the merry magic header guessing game gets underway. For all > you'd have achieved was to muddle any meaning of the mime-type and forced > applications to work around an unenforceable restriction. > > On Thu, Jun 25, 2015 at 3:21 PM, Wez <[email protected]> wrote: > >> And, again, I don't see what that has to do with whether the spec >> mandates that user agents let apps place JPEG, PNG or GIF directly on the >> local system clipboard. The spec doesn't currently mandate OpenEXR be >> supported, so it's currently up to individual user agents to decide whether >> they can support that format safely. >> >> On Thu, 25 Jun 2015 at 14:16 Florian Bösch <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> On Thu, Jun 25, 2015 at 3:13 PM, Wez <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> I think there's obvious value in support for arbitrary content-specific >>>> formats, but IMO the spec should at least give guidance on how to present >>>> the capability in a safe way. >>>> >>> Which is exactly the core of my question. If you intend to make it say, >>> safe to put OpenEXR into the clipboard (as opposed to letting an app just >>> put any bytes there), the UA has to understand OpenEXR. Since I don't see >>> how the UA can understand every conceivable format in existence both future >>> and past, I don't see how that should work. >>> >> >
