Well, the point is that in addition to removing the optionality, the added 
information must bind the RWC to the request.  I actually like JC’s change as a 
good step in the right direction.

Writing generic descriptions of validation methods tends to allow more bad 
things than it helps.  I’d rather see a description of enough of the ACME 
protocol to capture it’s necessary security features.  If people want to add 
similar validation schemes in the future, they should be added as new methods 
after being adequately reviewed, instead of trying to anticipate all possible 
similar future methods in advance.

-Tim

From: Richard Barnes [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: Wednesday, May 04, 2016 10:18 AM
To: J.C. Jones
Cc: Tim Hollebeek; Ryan Sleevi; CABFPub
Subject: Re: [cabfpub] Pre-Ballot 169: Revised Validation Requirements



On Tue, May 3, 2016 at 8:06 PM, J.C. Jones 
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
Tim, Ryan:

Your points are well-made. As it sounds like we'd prefer to err being more 
ACME-specific, I propose changing the definition of Required Website Content 
(RWC) to:

Required Website Content: Either a Random Value or a Request Token, optionally 
concatenated with additional information +{to uniquely identify the 
Subscriber}+ as specified by the CA.

I would think the change needed would be in the other direction -- rather than 
adding description, remove the optionality:
"Required Website Content: A byte string specified by the CA containing either 
a Random Value or a Request Token, as well as some additional information"



This should preclude concatenating a fixed prefix, or other such simple 
validation schemes.

I've also made a one-word clarification to my change from yesterday, clarifying 
that the RWC can't be contained in its entirety anywhere in the whole request, 
not only the path.

Both of these changes are reflected in the diff at GitHub [1].

1) 
https://github.com/cabforum/documents/compare/Ballot-169...jcjones:Ballot-169?expand=1

Cheers,
J.C.

On Tue, May 3, 2016 at 4:21 PM, Tim Hollebeek 
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:

Given the goal of this ballot is to remove "any other method", and we 
explicitly agreed at the start of this process to simply enumerate existing 
practice (unless egregiously wrong), I'm not going to hold things up over my 
concerns.  I'd like to see any other method go away ASAP.



That said, this language allows "Tim's Zero Fuss Certificate Authority", which 
uses Random Value + "ZFCA" as the challenge, and "Tim's Zero Fuss Web Server" 
which simply parrots back Request + "ZFCA" for all requests for any file under 
.well_known/pki-validation.



I predict my product will be extremely popular, as issuance will always succeed 
without any configuration or manual steps.  Once my web server achieves 
ubiquity, it will succeed even if you accidentally use the wrong domain name in 
your CSR!



Basically, I don't see anywhere in the proposed text where there is a 
requirement that the validation method must include the essential security that 
account_key_thumbprint might provide.



-Tim



________________________________
From: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> 
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> on behalf of 
Ryan Sleevi <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>
Sent: Tuesday, May 3, 2016 6:07:23 PM
To: Richard Barnes
Cc: CABFPub
Subject: Re: [cabfpub] Pre-Ballot 169: Revised Validation Requirements



On Tue, May 3, 2016 at 3:02 PM, Richard Barnes 
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
Hey Ryan,
I'm confused about where you're going here.

It seems like the property that we need to remedy the flaw that Peter exposed 
is that the server's response cannot be generated based on the request from the 
CA.  It seems to me that the right response is just to make that requirement 
explicitly.  As I think JC's text does, though perhaps it could be made clearer.
Do you agree with that approach, and we're just arguing about wording?  Or do 
you think the HTTP validation method needs to be even more prescriptive?

Well, the wording is to make the HTTP validation method more prescriptive ;)

To be clear: We're discussing wording. Tim proposed some more restrictive 
changes, and J.C. raised the concern that ACME relies on the lax language. The 
question is fundamentally trying to find out what options we have to tweak 
wording or implementation - to try to close the gap so that everyone is happy.

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