On 21/07/16 22:53, Dean Coclin wrote: > Geoff, Thank you for the additional feedback. It seems that several > parties have similar comments. > > Is it the consensus of the community to request that TSYS resubmit > the TBS certificates, even though the counter crypt analysis so far > has shown no issues? I realize that is an independent function but > please provide feedback if you would like TSYS to do as Geoff > suggests as soon as possible.
I am moving house next week, and so cannot guarantee my ability to participate in this discussion. Mozilla approves the application from TSYS (that is to say, we will accept a qualified BR audit from their CA where the qualifications relate to this event) on the condition that the serial numbers of the final certificates follow some documented strict construction process, in broadly the manner PHB outlined, using a modern crypto hash algorithm in the process of serial number generation, using an earlier form of the cert as input. I believe this should be a sufficient stopgap to reassure the public (who cannot see inside the CA's or TSYS's operations) that collisions are not being attempted. Other CAs may want the process nailed down; the above is intended to be vague enough to accommodate whatever they decide. We do not (although others may) require that TSYS reuse old keys, or remove the random identifiers from the OU. Dean indicated on yesterday's call that following this type of process was possible for Symantec if approval from browsers was provided quickly. This is an attempt to provide such approval with the necessary speed. Gerv _______________________________________________ Public mailing list [email protected] https://cabforum.org/mailman/listinfo/public
