- HS2.0 Intermediate Certificates again don't follow CABF BR for the
NameConstraints extension; HS2.0 states that this extension shall not be
critical, when CABF BR states that it SHOULD be critical; please keep in
mind that RFC5280 says it MUST be critical, CABF has reduced this
requirement to a SHOULD to accommodate Apple devices; now that recent
versions of MacOS and iOS support the NC extension, is it really a good
sign to lower again the requirements on this extension?
[JR] This is complaint with the current BRs. It doesn't lower the
requirements on the extension as no change to the BRs is required for
the root to issue publicly trusted certs.
No, it doesn't lower the requirement, but it does give Digicert
incentive to argue against increasing the requirement when the time
comes to do so. If memory serves our intent when we made the decision
to make the criticality of name constraints a SHOULD rather than a MUST,
thereby bucking the RFC5280 requirement, we did so both reluctantly, and
with the intent that we would update this to a MUST as soon as it was
feasible to do so w/out adversely affecting a massive number of relying
parties. I think the discrepancy in policies here is far more serious
than you are allowing for, and lends credence to Ryan's arguments
against this proposal.
Scenario:
We ignore this and Ryan's arguments against, and we pass this proposal.
Next month we decide that the various browsers all now have enough
support for critical name constraints to update the BRs to MUST, but
because it will break your newly authorized dual-use certs Digicert is
now arguing against bringing the BRs back into full compliance w/RFC5280.
-Rich
On 1/4/2017 11:44 AM, Jeremy Rowley via Public wrote:
Thanks Erwann for looking at this.
- Hotspot 2.0 Root Certificates don't follow CABF BR in the subject
field; HS2.0 require « C=US, O=WFA Hotspot 2.0, CN=Hotspot 2.0 Trust
Root CA - <ID#> », where CABF BR clause 7.1.2.1 has different
expectations on C and O
[JR] I disagree. C the O both accurately represent the CA in this case
(the WFA). Although DigiCert operates a root on behalf of the WFA, I
believe the CA in this case is the WFA.
- HS2.0 Intermediate Certificates again don't follow CABF BR for the
NameConstraints extension; HS2.0 states that this extension shall not
be critical, when CABF BR states that it SHOULD be critical; please
keep in mind that RFC5280 says it MUST be critical, CABF has reduced
this requirement to a SHOULD to accommodate Apple devices; now that
recent versions of MacOS and iOS support the NC extension, is it
really a good sign to lower again the requirements on this extension?
[JR] This is complaint with the current BRs. It doesn't lower the
requirements on the extension as no change to the BRs is required for
the root to issue publicly trusted certs.
- HS2.0 Intermediate Certificates let the CRLDP extension to be
optional, when it's mandatory for CABF BR
[JR] This is not inconsistent. Anyone wanting to issue publicly
trusted Hotspot certs would be required to have a CRLDP extension in
the intermediate.
- there has been some effort to standardize the SRVName name form
(RFC4985), with (incomplete) Name Constraints matching rules. I don't
see any comparable effort for this hotspot-friendlyName name form.
Since technically-constrained CAs is a preferred model for enterprises
(and browsers), I think it's preferable to describe the expected
behaviour of a relying party facing such combinations before blindly
allowing them, even more with the « shall not be critical » describe
above, which will surely transform someday into a « I won't implement
it, it's not critical anyway » and will bite us in the future.
[JR] I4985 has been around since 2007. The WFA friendly name has only
existed since 2015. I can bring up technically constrained Sub CAs
with the WFA (they'd be open to it), but I do not think the lack of a
standardized version of technical constraints creates an inconsistency
between the BRs and the WFA CP. Until name constraints are fully
defined for friendly names, the cert would never qualify as
technically constrained, meaning an audit would be required for each
publicly trusted intermediate, etc.
The only change in the BRs I'm asking for is to permit WFA otherNames.
As browsers don't currently use the otherName, they won't be affected
by the modification, especially the certs themselves would be
completely compliant with the BR requirements.
Jeremy
Le 3 janv. 2017 à 22:07, Jeremy Rowley via Public
<[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> a écrit :
Agreed, but this line of reasoning always leads to simply not
supporting third party projects because the projects may cause
issues with the CAB Forum update. IMO, if a group wants to use
publicly trusted certs, then that group inherits all the baggage
that goes with it. We really control all the cards on this one as
the interoperability is one-way. What would you propose to make
sure we can update requirements in the future? A statement like
"CAB Forum can do whatever it wants without notice" is superfluous
as this is already the case.
Jeremy
*From:*Ryan Sleevi [mailto:[email protected]]
*Sent:*Tuesday, January 3, 2017 1:54 PM
*To:*Jeremy Rowley <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>
*Cc:*CA/Browser Forum Public Discussion List <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>; Peter Bowen <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>>
*Subject:*Re: [cabfpub] Proposed Ballot 183 - Allowing 822 Names
and (limited) otherNames
On Tue, Jan 3, 2017 at 12:46 PM, Jeremy Rowley
<[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>
wrote:
There is a public file (in the link I provided), but it
requires filling out information to access. It's the HotSpot
2.0 Technical documentation, which includes the Certificate
Policy ("Hostspot 2-0 (R2) OSU Certificate Policy
Specification"). The documentation is already free to anyone
who wants to enter information and agree to the terms of use.
Ah, the many meanings of free ;) I suppose it wasn't clear that I
was talking more about freedom than beer there :)
We essentially already have a liaison member from the WFA
(DigiCert, Microsoft, Apple, and Google are all members).
I wouldn't put Google in that list - none of Google's CA/B Forum
participants participate in HotSpot 2.0 nor communicate
developments on either side of that profile to the other party. I
would suggest, to date, only DigiCert does, and only to the extent
you've shared anything to the Forum.
Obviously, the context was that we shouldn't be introducing this
to the Web PKI unless we're sure we're not going to repeat all the
same mistakes we're currently going through the SHA-1 exception
process - or at least trying to learn from them. It would be
foolish to ignore the feedback we've received from those affected
by SHA-1 when considering expanding that scope.
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